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This book offers insights on politics and ethics of representation that are relevant 
to researchers concerned with struggles for justice. It takes moments of discomfort 
in the qualitative research process as important sites of knowledge for exploring 
representational practices in critical research.
The Politics and Ethics of Representation in Qualitative Research draws on 
experiences from research processes in nine PhD projects. In some chapters, ethical 
and political dilemmas related to representational practices are analyzed as experi-
enced in fieldwork. In others, the focus is on the production of representation at the 
stage of writing. The book deals with questions such as: What does it mean to write 
about the lives of others? How are ethics and politics of representation intertwined, 
and how are they distinct? How are politics of representation linked to a practice 
of solidarity in research? What are the im/possibilities of hope and care in research?
Drawing on grounded empirical research, the book offers input to students, 
PhDs, researchers, practitioners, activists and others dealing with methodological 
dilemmas from a critical perspective. Instead of ignoring discomforts, or describing 
them as solved, we stay with them, showing how such a reflective process provides 
new, ongoing insights.
The Critical Methodologies Collective consists of nine feminist researchers 
early in their careers with a shared interest in, and discomfort of, doing critical 
research. The members come from varied social, political and academic back-
grounds, with roots and routes in Denmark, Finland, India, Iran, Poland, Sweden, 
Turkey and the UK.
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PREFACE
We are a collective of feminist researchers early in their careers. We come from var-
ied social, political and academic backgrounds, with roots and routes in Denmark, 
Finland, India, Iran, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the UK. Although we denominated 
our group the Critical Methodologies Collective only a few years ago, we have 
been meeting regularly since 2012. This book – which draws on experiences from 
research processes in our nine PhD projects to engage with issues of ethics and 
politics of representation – originates from those gatherings. Therefore, we want to 
begin by telling our story of becoming a collective. Like other stories of becoming, 
ours is neither linear nor complete. Time is central to writing – we write about the 
past, with and against time in the present, hoping that the writing will advance an 
intellectual endeavour in the future.
viii Preface
It all started with a critical methodology workshop moderated by Yasmin 
Gunaratnam at Lund University, Sweden. The workshop brought together doctoral 
students in social sciences to discuss methodological issues in their research. Some of 
the authors in this volume were among those lucky students. Working with Yasmin 
Gunaratnam was a transformative experience. During the workshop, Yasmin pro-
vided us not only with critical feedback on our research projects but also with tools 
to realize and situate commonalities and differences in our research ideals, meth-
odological anxieties and academic vulnerabilities in relation to multiple relations 
of power and inequality. Yasmin’s nurturing pedagogy encouraged us to organize a 
critical methodologies group.
We started as a small working group of doctoral students. Initially, we read and 
discussed texts from queer, feminist, materialist and decolonial/postcolonial scholars 
which we considered significant in order to situate, problematize and liberate our 
research practices and discomforts. As the politics of the group began solidifying 
and our PhD projects progressed, we began discussing our work- in- progress in the 
group meetings. Trying to resist ideals imposed by the neoliberal academy, which 
measure progress by the quantity of produced texts, one of our commitments has 
become to imbibe the reflexive practice to ‘count what others don’t’ (Mountz et al. 
2015, p. 1250).
An important point in our history was another methodology workshop we 
arranged, this time with Les Back. The workshop inspired us to think of writing 
collectively on the challenges we faced and the solidarities we built while conduct-
ing research as doctoral students. It would take a few more years to materialize our 
thoughts. This book grew from that idea.
Working on this book has involved collective writing days, workshops with scholars 
who inspire us – Bridget Anderson, Diana Mulinari, Johanna Esseveld and Yasmin 
Gunaratnam – and a joint editorial process over a period of time that was probably 
longer than is usual for edited volumes and called for a very close collaboration.
Signing the agreement with the publisher opened up for questions that forced 
us to reflect on how we wanted to work on the volume: How would we resolve 
the editorship with this many involved members? Who should stand as editors? And 
how could the ideals of working as a collective be translated into the legal language 
of copyrights and liabilities? We decided that we wanted the Collective to stand as 
editor and author of some parts of the book, and came up with a solution that made 
it formally possible: we registered the Collective as a legal association. This process 
helped us to articulate what was important for the group and what visions we had in 
terms of collective writing. But it also showed that going against what is the norm 
in academic work requires extra labour and inventiveness.
A practice of care has been central to the Collective, especially because, by decid-
ing to work on moments of discomfort in our research, we opened up a space 
in which we allowed ourselves to become vulnerable. One very crucial common 
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denominator permeating the work process has been the unease in writing about 
these matters. After all, we were not only sharing our experiences during the work 
of our PhD theses; we were likewise revisiting our emotions. Writing about it was, 
for all of us to different extents, also associated with a degree of discomfort. We 
have learned through the process of writing this book (and with the help of schol-
ars such as Anzaldúa 2002 and hooks 1994) that creating and working to obtain a 
space where we can present ourselves and our ideas is not necessarily a friction- free 
course of action. Our work process, and the formation of a collective, have, similar 
to the experience described by Gannon et al. (2016), proven to be more than a 
process of connecting us with one another. We do not share the same experiences 
of class,  employment status, sexuality,  gender, racialization  and citizenship status, 
and, as such, not all of our political and theoretical knowledge has been elaborated 
in our joint work. Acknowledging our differences, we see the collective work over 
the last couple of years, and especially in the labour of this book, as a space where 
we have been allowed to test ideas and ‘bridge’ (Anzaldúa 2002) some of the differ-
ences between us. For us, it is important to stress this loosening of our borders and 
to emphasize: We are not ‘one’ but we form a collective.
The Critical Methodologies Collective
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INTRODUCTION
The Critical Methodologies Collective
In qualitative research, the research process is often filled with moments of discom-
fort. These discomforts can appear at any stage of the research: when choosing the 
subject of research, during fieldwork, in the process of analysis and when present-
ing research findings to different audiences. In this edited volume, we take these 
moments of discomfort seriously and use them as sites of knowledge production for 
reflecting on the politics and ethics of the qualitative research process. By locating 
our experiences in implementing nine different PhD projects carried out in differ-
ent disciplines and research contexts in social sciences, we argue that these moments 
of discomfort help us to gain important insights into the methodological, theoreti-
cal, ethical and political issues that are crucial for the fields we engage with. Drawing 
on feminist and other critical discussions (Mulinari and Sandell 1999, Gunaratnam 
2003, Back 2007, Gunaratnam and Hamilton 2017), we deal with questions such as: 
What does it mean to write about the lives of others? What are the ethical modes 
and conundrums of producing representations? In research projects that are located 
in the tradition of critical or engaged scholarship, how are ethics and politics of rep-
resentation intertwined, and when are they distinct? How are politics of representa-
tion linked to the practice of solidarity in research? What are the im/possibilities of 
hope and care in research?
2 Introduction
Representation, solidarity and accountability in qualitative 
research
Qualitative research is a representational practice, in the sense that it is concerned 
with making sense of the world, by understanding and interpreting the mean-
ings of different practices, phenomena and processes. This is done by construct-
ing representations of those who are being analyzed. Representational practices 
in research, like any other representational practices, always involve a process of 
translation (Hall 1997). Such a process carries in it an inherent violence of transfor-
mation, reduction or obliteration (cf. Hastrup 1992). In this sense, it opens up space 
for dilemmas of ethics of representation. Such general questions of research ethics 
should, however, not be divorced from questions concerning research politics. As 
we have learned from conceptualizations of, as well as debates on, the working of 
representation in feminist, critical and post-colonial fields (Foucault 1970[2002], 
Said 1978[2003], Hall 1997, hooks 1999, Ahmed 2000), these processes are not 
innocent, but deeply implicated in power relations of societies that the research 
concerns. In this sense, to create a representation is always a political endeavour. 
It is also the case in critical research that aims at producing knowledge that is 
concerned with issues of justice. While structuralist and semiotic traditions teach 
us how representational practices operate, critical, feminist and post-colonial tradi-
tions encourage us to contextualize these practices in particular historical moments 
in order to explore their implications for imposing and maintaining, but also resist-
ing, unjust social structures.
A basic condition in qualitative research is that it is impossible as a researcher 
to fully understand every aspect of people or communities we conduct research 
with, with the resultant conundrum in representation. It is impossible to acquire 
‘full representation on the one hand, and full comprehension on the other’, which 
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can be seen as an inherent failure (Visweswaran 1994, p. 100). This inherent failure 
should be recognized by the researcher, something that would allow to ‘question the 
authority of the investigating subject without paralyzing him’ (Spivak 1998, p. 276). 
This means carefully reflecting on the practice of creating representations of other 
people, while not letting these critical reflections lead to a state of not being able to 
do any representations at all.
In this volume, politics and ethics of representational practices in research are 
considered in relation to the question of accountability. Based on Haraway’s dis-
cussions of accountability as part of feminist objectivity, Bhavnani (1993) holds 
that anyone who claims to undertake feminist research must carefully avoid repro-
ducing dominant representations which reinforce inequality. Accountability, then, 
she argues, is both about being accountable towards individuals (research subjects) 
as well as being accountable to the ‘overall project of feminism’ (1993, p. 98). In 
many of the research projects discussed in this book, this question is complicated 
by the fact that researchers often face competing or even conflicting account-
abilities. Most importantly, tensions might occur between accountability towards 
the research participants and accountability towards political struggles in which 
the research project is situated (see the chapter by Tove Lundberg and the chapter 
by Vanna Nordling in this volume). Some key questions that we pose to ourselves 
in this context are: What modes of representation are both ethically accountable 
to those represented in the study and politically accountable in the context of 
contentious justice struggles? And what if these two types of accountabilities not 
only diverge, but even remain in tension? It is when asking these questions that 
we might find it productive to distinguish between the ethics and the politics of 
research. All our studies are politically committed to different struggles of social 
justice: from queer recognition of non-binary sex characteristics, through asylum 
rights and migrants’ rights, to antiracist critique, we recognize and adhere to a 
particular ideal of knowledge production in academia – one that understands the 
role and significance of social science in reproducing, supporting and opposing 
power structures.
This type of critical research often builds on an epistemology where partial per-
spectives coming from ‘below’ are seen to have the potential of creating more valid 
situated knowledges, as these positions will render visible the structures of power in 
our society, as well as structures present in the production of knowledge (Haraway 
1988; also see Harding 2004, p. 128). Importantly, these positions at the margin, 
creating partial perspectives from below, are not static or universal. Oppression is 
produced through social relations and played out differently in regard to time and 
context (Mohanty 1988). The positions of social movements with which research-
ers claim to stand in solidarity, as well as the positions of researchers, need to be 
subjected to a thorough reflexive engagement (Harding 2004). Simultaneously, the 
knowledge produced by and in collaboration with social movements should be 
acknowledged as creating relevant and grounded analyses (Mulinari and Sandell 
1999). Striving to research in solidarity brings to the fore a range of ethical as 
well as political challenges. Scholars who have worked in sensitive and precarious 
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settings often emphasize the importance of recognizing challenges of asymmetric 
power relations, representation, trust and suspicion, risks, agency and human rights 
(Mackenzie et al. 2007). An important aspect of this is that the precarious situation 
for people and/or communities who have been subject to research has led research-
ers to conclude that we must formulate research projects that contribute something 
back to the communities and individuals, and that research participants need to be 
involved in the production of research (Huisman 2008, Düvell et al. 2010). These 
are examples where the ethical dilemmas related to power asymmetries also led to 
researchers formulating and carrying out their research in modified ways. Although 
these are honourable ambitions of handling power asymmetries in a constructive 
way, it does diminish the fact that researchers gain academically from the interaction, 
whilst the benefits for the participants might be less clear (Sinha and Back 2014; see 
discussion in Pankhuri Agarwal’s chapter in this volume).
Solidarity in a context of critical research can hence be actualized in the meet-
ing between the researchers and the subjects of the enquiry: what can a solidary 
position as a researcher entail within a relation many times characterized by power 
asymmetries? What stories are we to tell, how do we tell them, and how to ‘get hold 
of them’? Matters of accountability and representation are hence brought (back) to 
the fore. We do not claim to ‘solve’ these issues – doing research in solidarity with 
movements and struggles will always bring about tensions and ambivalence – but 
we find it crucial to address and scrutinize them to bring to light how to address, 
engage with and embrace the discomforts in each case of research.
Introduction 5
Overview of the book
The chapters that make up this volume draw on experiences from research pro-
cesses in nine projects. They all engage with issues of ethics and politics of repre-
sentation in different ways. In some chapters, ethical and political dilemmas related 
to representational practices are analyzed as experienced in the fieldwork. In others, 
the focus is on production of representation at the stage of writing the text. Still 
others draw parallels between these stages. While the moments of discomfort that 
open up for different dilemmas are specific to the particular research process, we 
hope that they will resonate with similar dilemmas in other fields and contexts as 
well as disciplines.
In a dialogical piece opening this volume, Tove Lundberg captures how the 
choice of terms and definitions – both in conversations with the research partici-
pants and in the text produced by the researcher – might entail politically infected 
dilemmas that go beyond conceptualization of the object of her study. She articu-
lates how, in the research project on variations in sex characteristics, usually referred 
to as ‘intersex’ or ‘disorders of sex development’, she was struggling when choosing 
how to talk about her research and address her participants. Lundberg shows how 
this choice had to do with particular politics of representation and how using cer-
tain terminology not only entailed a commitment to a particular scientific explana-
tion of the phenomenon she was studying, but also situated her work politically in 
relation to different justice struggles. Lundberg shows how this dilemma reflected 
something at the very core of her study: the ways in which sex characteristics are 
constructed in a binary system where there are clear options and no in-betweens 
allowed, and explores whether it is possible to navigate in less categorical ways the 
conceptual, theoretical and political choices she has been confronted with.
The issue of ethics of representation arises at the very beginning of the field-
work, by being related to living up to such central ethical requirements as informed 
consent. When we engage with other people’s lives with an aim of producing a 
representation of them, how can we be sure that those represented consent to this? 
Johanna Sixtensson describes in her chapter how giving consent or ‘saying no’ to 
being represented in a research project is a complicated practice that should not 
be reduced to a single act or signature on an official consent form. Her account 
of an exchange with one of her young research participants, both at the time of 
the fieldwork and after her thesis had been published, discloses complexities and 
ambivalences of asking for and giving consent.
In another way, the issues of representation are at the heart of Emma Söderman’s 
chapter. Söderman explores the work around the No Border Musical, in which she 
herself performed. In her thesis, she analyzes not only the ways in which a represen-
tation of the experience of borders was created in the musical by a group of activists 
that included irregular migrants, but also how working on the musical opened up 
for practices of commoning. There are two levels of representational practice in her 
work: the theatrical representation of the musical and the representation produced 
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as a result of research. In her chapter, Söderman explores what we as researchers can 
learn about representation from the method of community theatre, in which people 
with and without the experience of irregular migration work together. She shows 
how on the stage irregular migrants are confronted by what she conceptualizes as 
faceness – an expectation of embodying the representation of the other. Söderman’s 
chapter illustrates how issues of aesthetic representation – be it through performa-
tive arts or in text – are closely related to issues of representation in the political 
sense of the term. The question thus is not only where the source of frames of ref-
erence for representation is located, but also who is expected to represent or stand 
for the other.
A commonality of experiences in the field – and more exactly of the experience 
of waiting – is used as a point of departure in the chapter by Pankhuri Agarwal. 
Describing her fieldwork in the research on internal migrant workers in Delhi, who 
are struggling for their rights through legal proceedings, she shows how her waiting 
in the field became a site of knowledge in itself. By waiting for some research par-
ticipants and waiting together with others, she learns not only about the workings 
of legal institutions in India, but also about how particular hierarchies and power 
relations are produced through temporal and spatial aspects of waiting. While expe-
riencing waiting, with all its frustration and discomfort, which becomes for Agarwal 
a methodological tool in itself and a way of connecting with her research partici-
pants, she also shows how her experience of waiting is fundamentally different from 
that of the workers’. In a way, the very act of representing the experience of waiting 
transforms this experience and thereby creates a distance from the participants, sug-
gesting the limits of commonality in the field.
In yet another way, the issues of representation – both in the field and in text – 
are present in the chapter by Katrine Scott. In ethnographic work, being in the 
field also involves a self-representational practice, when the ethnographer repre-
sents themselves to the research participants. Scott describes her search for finding a 
common ground with university students in Iraqi Kurdistan. She explores her per-
formance of middle-class respectability in the field using concepts of ‘studying side-
ways’ and ‘matching’ and shows how these strategies open up for certain possibilities, 
while at the same time they bear risks of obliterating differences and power relations 
in the research process. In the second part of her chapter, Scott illustrates how the 
question of self-representation is not limited to the fieldwork, but continues in the 
process of writing: she explains how she used auto-ethnographic accounts as entry 
points to analysis, and discusses what such a stylistic choice means for representa-
tional practice of the other in relation to the ethnographic self.
Another contribution, written by Vanna Nordling, deals with the politics of rep-
resentation in relation to expectations of inscribing one’s research into a particular 
field. In her chapter, Nordling analyzes the dilemma of representing her research on 
social workers supporting migrants whose application for asylum has been rejected. 
She writes about how her framing of the topic would shift when presenting to 
different audiences, in different research fields and in a changing political climate: 
making visible diverse, often conflicting, expectations of how social workers should 
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be portrayed and their practices understood. In a way, the chapter illustrates how 
representation created in the research is always a product of available frames co-
created by other scholars, disciplines, institutions and political contexts in which the 
research is produced. Nordling’s chapter, in a somewhat similar way to Söderman’s, 
touches upon the issue of visibility of representation and its use for the political 
struggles, when such visibility might actually transpire to carry very concrete risks.
Another chapter addressing issues of representation in relation to the writing 
process is by Marta Kolankiewicz. It describes the process of anonymization in 
research on anti-Muslim racism in courts of law in Sweden. Kolankiewicz explores 
representational practices in relation to the significance of proper names of those 
depicted in the research. She analyzes the working of different anonymization 
 procedures – from erasing original names, through substituting them by numbers 
or symbols, to giving pseudonyms – in order to ask questions about the politics and 
ethics of such operations. By situating these practices in the context of research on 
racism, Kolankiewicz shows how names are significant markers of difference in rac-
ist discourses and practices, but at the same time meaningful signs that carry with 
them diverse histories of racialization that should not be obliterated if we want to 
understand different experiences of racism. Finally, she poses the question of the role 
of the proper name for the possibility of attending to the singularity of the stories 
represented in the research.
The final chapter builds on a conversation between Pouran Djampour and Eda 
Hatice Farsakoglu and deals with the practice of care in the field and in research 
more broadly. Djampour and Farsakoglu set out from their observations from doing 
research with young people with experience of migrating to Sweden and with 
Iranian LGBTQ refugees in Turkey waiting for resettlement to a third country, 
respectively. They analyze caring encounters in the field through a reflexive lens. 
They argue that creating knowledge together with, and learning from, research par-
ticipants involves making oneself vulnerable. They also show how caring encounters 
and relationships between researcher and research participants may alter both the 
research process and the content of ethnographic material, with an awareness of the 
challenges, limitations, multiplicities and contradictions inherent in ethnographic 
research. Djampour and Farsakoglu close the chapter by addressing the reader and 
proposing that the practice of sharing – a practice that started through the given 
encounters with the research participants – instantiates the practice of care itself. In 
a way, this final point relates to all the chapters of this volume, which have been 
written with the intention of sharing moments of discomfort.
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BECOMING ‘UNSTUCK’ AMONG 
POSITIONALITIES, TERMS AND 
DISCIPLINES VIA CONVERSATION 
(WITH MYSELF)
Exploring Potentials for Affective Reflexivity in 
Critical Intersex Studies
Tove Lundberg
In memory […] there’s no ahead and no behind really, is there? Memory wells 
up in the now, in vertical time. And remembered time, as you know, is shot 
through with imagination.
(Hustvedt, 2019)
RESEARCHER TOVE: So, where do I start to write reflexively?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST TOVE: Well, I guess I am stating the obvious now, but I 
think you just did.
RESEARCHER: I guess I did. By conversing with an externalized part of myself, 
which is you. Just as if I were doing a Gestalt therapy exercise?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, you have split off a part of yourself in order to expe-
rience yourself more clearly from different perspectives, just like in Gestalt 
therapy.
RESEARCHER: Great. I guess the next reasonable question to answer is why we are 
here.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, yes, I was just about to ask.
RESEARCHER: Sure. Okay, let’s see how to articulate that. {Thinking} Well, before I 
became a researcher, I worked as a clinical psychologist for several years.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Mm-hmm.
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RESEARCHER: As a clinical psychologist, you are such an important part of me and 
inform my thinking. However, you are never explicitly acknowledged in my 
academic work. I often feel like I have to choose a certain role or positionality 
in representing myself in academia, which usually excludes you. I was wonder-
ing if this kind of conversation would help me acknowledge the ‘in-between-
ness’ of us that I feel that I embody.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay.
RESEARCHER: And as a PhD candidate, I didn’t really explicitly talk to others about 
how to navigate the complexity of positions, roles, stakes, interests, feelings and 
so on that I guess most researchers experience.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, instead you converse with yourself.
RESEARCHER: Yes, I guess so. {Laughs}
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, as a clinical psychologist, I think that talking about 
things, even with yourself, is usually better than being silent about it. So what 
will be the topic for our current conversation?
RESEARCHER: You know my doctoral research on variations in sex characteristics 
(see Lundberg 2017).1
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, I know. What about it?
RESEARCHER: Well, I have this feeling of discomfort, which haunts me. That I 
wasn’t reflexive enough during my doctoral research. I mean, I didn’t write 
anything about reflexivity in my thesis and I just can’t let that go. I feel like a 
bad qualitative researcher.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay, so do you mean that not including reflexive sec-
tions explicitly in your thesis suggests that you were not reflexive at all during 
your PhD project?
RESEARCHER: Well, drawing on ideas by scholars such as Skeggs (2002), I think I 
was doing some kind of reflexivity even though I didn’t make my reflexive self 
explicit in the text? Today, I am quite inspired by Alvesson’s and Sköldberg’s 
(2017) idea of reflexivity as happening when ‘thinking is confronted with 
another way of thinking’ (p. 384) – that reflexivity can be about challenging 
our thinking. And I think I was doing that. However, the research process just 
felt like a mess and, by the end of it, I was just so happy to have a thesis to hand 
in at all.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, by challenging your thinking, one interpretation is 
that you actively reflected during your research at least?
RESEARCHER: Maybe. I guess I was doing ‘reflection-in-action’, to borrow Schön’s 
(1995) words. Schön’s thinking informed the way I reflected on my practice 
as a clinical psychologist. I guess I just used what I had and went with it? 
However, I feel that this reflexive practice could have been more theoreti-
cally informed; that I should have ‘grounded’ myself in a reflexive perspective 
earlier.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, well, that is always part of a process, isn’t it? That you 
are where you are and it is hard to be somewhere else, especially to be more 
knowledgeable than you are?
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RESEARCHER: Yes, I guess so. That is also why I chose to be part of writing this 
book. I want to use this space to look at my ‘reflexivity in retrospect’, as Doucet 
and Mauthner (2007) call it, as a form of what Schön (1995) describes as 
‘reflection-on-action’. In what way did I actually practise reflexivity? What 
kinds of ideas and theories was I drawing on that were behind the scenes and 
not really made explicit in my thesis? And did my practices of reflexivity actu-
ally make my research any better (Pillow 2003)?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: That makes sense. And you want to explore this with 
me?
RESEARCHER: Yes, I want to explore it with you. Because I understand, now, that 
your perspectives and ideas were crucial in how the thesis developed. However, 
I never explicitly acknowledged in the text the expertise you brought to the 
thesis. Perhaps because it was so subconscious and unarticulated even within 
myself? And because I didn’t utilize your knowing systematically? So, this chap-
ter is a way of making sense of what I was doing as a PhD candidate and trying 
to make your input more explicit and transparent.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: That sounds reasonable.
RESEARCHER: I also think that this has more general implications as well, because 
I am starting to understand how a dialogue between qualitative methodology 
and clinical psychology, in a broad perspective, can be very constructive. I think 
we need more texts that acknowledge these kinds of conversations. And maybe 
this text can contribute to the small body of literature that does exactly that as 
well as open up for other collective and interdisciplinary conversations where 
research positionalities and perspectives can be highlighted in constructive ways 
(see e.g. Hollway and Jefferson 2011)?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: That sounds reasonable. So, how do we move on in this 
conversation to be able to attend to what is important?
RESEARCHER: Well, I thought that in the next section we would try to reconstruct 
some of our conversations from 2012 and onwards.2 I was really struggling with 
terminology during my PhD project, and your input helped me move forward 
when I felt stuck. I thought we could focus on that. And then, I thought, we 
could end this chapter with a reflection on what happened during my PhD 
project.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Sounds like an interesting exploration. Let’s travel back 
in time, then, to 2012 when you’d just started your PhD position.
Reconstructing my discomfort with terminology3 as a PhD 
candidate in 2012 and onwards
RESEARCHER TOVE: {Clearly frustrated} Okay, so here’s the thing. What should I even 
write in the material I use to recruit participants? Should I use, or should I 
avoid, terms such as ‘intersex’ and ‘disorders of sex development’ (DSD)? I just 
feel so frustrated. And whatever term I use, I will position myself in the topic 
area as either from the human rights or the medical perspective, in a way that I 
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feel uncomfortable with. I also feel that whatever term I use I will offend some 
people. I really feel stuck!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST TOVE: Well, what did you write in the things you sent 
to the ethical review boards in Sweden and the UK before you started your 
project?
RESEARCHER: That this is research {reads from information sheet} ‘about young people 
whose sex development has been different from others: they may have been 
different from birth, or they may have become different at some time in their 
development’.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, perhaps use that?
RESEARCHER: {Stirred up} Sure, but how do I WRITE about it? I can’t write that 
in every sentence in my thesis! I need a noun, a term, something to represent 
the phenomena I am supposed to explore! Should I perhaps find language 
that works irrespective of perspective, that would be as descriptive as possible? 
‘Atypical sex development’?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Hmm… Just thinking critically here… Do you really 
think that ‘atypical sex development’ is more descriptive than ‘intersex’ or ‘disor-
ders of sex development’?
RESEARCHER: No, I guess not. That’s actually also kind of normative. And also, if 
I use yet another term, I will perhaps neither be able to stay in conversations 
with those communities who use ‘intersex’, nor those who use ‘DSD’. So what 
should I do?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: {Thinking} Well, do you really need to figure it out now? 
And are you sure that you, of all people, are the one who should be sitting here 
in your room and trying to figure this out on your own? You are more than 
one year into your PhD project and you really need to start doing interviews 
as soon as you have ethical permissions. Perhaps you just have to throw yourself 
out there and see what happens? Perhaps the answers you are looking for are 
not in your head but could be articulated in conversations with the people who 
live these experiences in their everyday lives?
RESEARCHER: Good point. That feels like the first thing you learn on any course in 
critical methodology. {Pause} So, should I just ask people what they think about 
this? However, this wasn’t part of the original project, and isn’t really part of the 
interview guide, is it? Doesn’t that make me a bad researcher?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, it is part of the interview guide to ask people what 
terms they feel comfortable with and what terms they want to use during the 
interview. In other words, you need to ask them what terms they use, or prefer 
to use, and how they feel about different umbrella terms such as ‘intersex’ and 
‘DSD’, right?
RESEARCHER: That’s true.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: And no, you didn’t really understand the importance of this 
question before coming to this point of your PhD process. But isn’t that the whole 
idea of research – of really learning things and understanding that you might not 
know what the most important things are when you design the research?
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RESEARCHER: Yes, that also feels like a take-home message from any course in 
qualitative methodologies. Okay. I’ll talk to people and see what happens.
Still struggling as a PhD candidate in 2015
RESEARCHER TOVE: Okay, so I have done 22 interviews with young people and 33 
interviews with parents.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST TOVE: Great! You were really struggling with terminol-
ogy. What did people say?
RESEARCHER: Well, I am still struggling with terminology. I thought that I could 
talk to people about what terms they use and what they think about ‘intersex’ 
and ‘DSD’ so I would know what terms I should use in my thesis.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, how did it go?
RESEARCHER: Well, the conversations went well. It was quite easy to tune in to the 
specific thoughts and preferences of each participant. However, I’m still stuck, 
in a way. I still don’t know what term, or terms, to use to write my thesis. And 
talking to these participants gave me a sense that none of the existing terms 
works for everyone and every occasion. So, I am still stuck.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, you have already submitted two articles. What did 
you write in them?
RESEARCHER: I tried to avoid the issue.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: {Sounding tired} But, Tove, come on, you are trained as a 
clinical psychologist! You know that avoidance typically only helps you from a 
short-term perspective and that it often ends up not serving you in the longer 
run.
RESEARCHER: {Frustrated} I know! But what am I supposed to do? I don’t have time 
to just sit and wait for some kind of eureka moment! I have 55 interviews to 
analyze! I need to publish my papers in order to finish my thesis! I only have 
like 18 months to go before I need to finish!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay. So I understand that you are under pressure and 
that you are very frustrated. And from what you are telling me, you have too 
much data and too little time. And I understand that this puts you in a position 
where you need to make choices as to what to focus on and not to focus on.
RESEARCHER: {Upset} EXACTLY!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: But, I guess, you must have used some kind of terminol-
ogy in those two submitted manuscripts. So could you tell me what you did?
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RESEARCHER: {Sighs} Okay. In one paper (Lundberg et al. 2017), I focused only 
on a specific medical diagnosis, congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH). I said 
in the paper just that this diagnosis is usually covered under the umbrella term 
‘disorders of sex development’ in medicine, but that terms such as ‘intersex’ and 
‘diverse sex development’ are also used outside medicine. And then I just used 
the specific diagnostic term.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, it sounds like you were trying to be transpar-
ent and show the diversity here. So maybe not really ‘avoiding the issue’, but 
highlighting it and then not focusing on it in the paper? And in the other 
manuscript?
RESEARCHER: Well, in that paper (Lundberg et al. 2016) I stated that ‘disorders 
of sex development’ is used in medicine but that in psychology ‘diverse sex 
development’ is increasingly being used – which it was at the time. And then 
I used ‘DSD’, as meaning ‘diverse sex development’, in the article. I wrote 
this paper with two medical professionals and we had different opinions 
on what to use. They thought that using the formal medical language of 
‘disorders of sex development’ was the best thing to do. But I just couldn’t 
do that. My whole body just protested. It was just physically impossible! 
However, while I really appreciate the non-pathologizing sound of ‘diverse 
sex development’, I just think it doesn’t do the job. It is perhaps the least-
bad term, though.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Why do you think that ‘diverse sex development’ 
‘doesn’t do the job’?
RESEARCHER: Well, this is complex. But, okay, this paper was a narrative analysis of 
the process of receiving a diagnosis. And ‘diverse sex development’ is not a diag-
nostic or medical term. Basically, all people with sex characteristics are covered 
by that term. So the title says ‘a diagnosis related to diverse sex development’, 
which is kind of a compromise. But I don’t think that ‘diverse sex development’ 
will be able to replace ‘disorders of sex development’ because it is not referring 
to what medics want to refer to.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay, so what do medics want to refer to?
RESEARCHER: Well, in a medical consensus statement where ‘disorders of sex devel-
opment’ is introduced as an umbrella term, it is to cover ‘congenital conditions 
in which development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex is atypical’ 
(Lee et al. 2006, p. e488).
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay, so do you think that ‘disorder’ is used as a syn-
onym for ‘congenital conditions’?
RESEARCHER: Well, I guess so. That this term was to point to conditions that 
might involve what medics would call pathological processes that ‘abnor-
mally affect physiology’ (Pasterski et al. 2010, p. 189). I just feel that I have 
a different understanding of how words such as ‘disorder’ and ‘abnormality’ 
function than the people writing these things seem to have. I think these 
terms are really problematic. And at the same time I kind of get it. The whole 
healthcare system is built upon medical classifications. At least in Sweden, 
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as soon as a doctor sees a patient, they need to report a diagnosis in the 
administrative system to be able to provide the patient with treatment and 
prescriptions, and also to get the correct funding to the relevant health cen-
tre or department.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, this is how it works for us clinical psychologists as 
well in the healthcare system in Sweden.
RESEARCHER: Exactly. And it is so strange because, you know, the diagnosis can 
both be based on mutations in a gene, like the cause of a certain medical 
‘condition’, or just the reason why someone sought healthcare. Diagnostic ter-
minology is, in other words, formed on very different kinds of bases and the 
diagnostic system is philosophically very inconsistent.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Sure, causes for a condition and reasons why people seek 
help are very different.
RESEARCHER: Yes. However, I can’t change that system, even though I think that 
‘disorders of sex development’ is a bad term. But then again, if a medical 
umbrella term is really, really needed, I just think that they – we? – could have 
done some more work on the term. Like consulted someone who is a public 
relations specialist or something.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay. So what would be a better medical term, do you 
think, if you do the work?
RESEARCHER: Well, I don’t know. But if they want to group diagnoses or condi-
tions together in a classification, why not say just that? ‘Conditions classified as 
affecting sex development’. I don’t know. Or ‘diagnoses classified as affecting 
sex development’, and then they could keep the acronym DSD –
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Sorry for interrupting your thoughts here, Tove. But 
have you written these things down?
RESEARCHER: What do you mean? No. Why?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, I am just thinking as your clinical part here again. 
You said that you avoided these issues. And I said to you that avoidance doesn’t 
help you in the long term. If avoidance of something doesn’t work, what should 
we do then?
RESEARCHER: What do you mean? Like generally? {Thinking} Well, the opposite of 
avoidance is exposure.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes. So, instead of trying to avoid this issue, should you 
engage in it? Should part of your argument in your thesis be about terminol-
ogy? I mean, you did talk to people about their thoughts on terminology.
RESEARCHER: Yes, I did. But what do you mean – that this part of the data should 
be a specific paper?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, for example. Why not?
RESEARCHER: {Upset} But I don’t even know what to say?!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, you have already articulated several important 
points above. All of that could go into the introduction to the article. And 
then perhaps you need to engage with the data you have. I mean, what did 
people say?
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RESEARCHER: I can’t remember. Everyone just had very different thoughts and 
opinions. I need to go back and look at the data more systematically. Perhaps I 
can write a paper on people’s preferences when it comes to terminology?
A couple of months later in 2015
RESEARCHER TOVE: Okay, I have some data for you.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST TOVE: Exciting! Tell me, what did they say?
RESEARCHER: Well, most participants don’t talk about their characteristics. Not at 
all. And also many don’t use certain labels to describe themselves. This young 
person explains it well {showing the clinical psychologist an excerpt from the 
transcription, see Box 1.1}:
RESEARCHER: So now this is even more complex! I mean, researchers and profes-
sionals are kind of discussing {talks in a silly voice}, ‘Do we need medical terms 
or not, and what should those be, and how about “intersex”, and so on?’, and 
in their everyday life many people don’t really talk about it.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes. That sounds important.
RESEARCHER: Important? How?
BOX 1.1  EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPTION OF INTER­
VIEW  WITH A YOUNG PERSON, CODED AS 
‘TERMINOLOGY’
Interviewer: I just wanted to hear like what words do you use when you talk 
about your development, or your condition, or…
Participant: I don’t really talk about it that much. {Laughter} […]
Interviewer: No, no, so you don’t really talk about it with other people, or…?
Participant: Um, I – I – no, not really, I think it’s not a defining characteristic 
of myself.
Interviewer: No, no.
Participant: And I – maybe I’ve got to hide it a bit, but I don’t think that actu-
ally it changes who I am and I shouldn’t have to use these said 
words that, you know.
Interviewer: Yeah.
Participant: I’m just – you know, I’m just a bit different from other people 
[…]. Sorry, that’s probably not a very good answer, but…
Interviewer: It is a really good answer because, I mean, I’m interested in how 
you feel about things.
Participant: Yeah.
Interviewer: So that’s – that’s a perfectly fine answer.
Participant: Okay, good, good.
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CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, think as a clinician again. If you met a person who 
didn’t talk about things, you would explore if there is a need to talk about 
things and the reasons for not talking about it. And if there is a need, you would 
try to make the unspoken ‘talkable’, right? And ‘talkable’ in different ways in 
different contexts? I mean, people have to be in many situations where they 
need to talk about these things.
RESEARCHER: Well, of course, participants said they needed to talk to their doctor 
or with partners and so on, and they did address how they dealt or didn’t deal 
with that, in the interviews.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: I think this part of the data is useful. It opens up some-
thing else about terminology.
RESEARCHER: Okay. How do you mean, ‘opened up something else’?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, this is an interpretation and it might not be 
 correct. But you have said that you feel very stuck when it comes to ter-
minology, and that it is either ‘DSD’ OR ‘intersex’ and that you feel that 
choosing one or the other is problematic, but you can kind of see some of 
the points of both?
RESEARCHER: Yes, well, this is true.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, first, you know, drawing on classic psychoanalytic 
thinking by Klein here (for an introduction to Klein, see e.g. Hinshelwood and 
Fortuna 2018), being stuck in an either/or position is typically problematic for 
people in the longer run. We need to be able to understand and integrate both 
aspects of, for example, the good and the bad in ourselves and others in order 
to function well. So I think that moving on from this either/or perspective to a 
more flexible one would be useful here. Second, I wonder if this ‘stuckness’ in 
terminology is just a parallel process, mirroring something about the phenom-
enon itself (see e.g. Sachs and Shapiro 1976).
RESEARCHER: Okay, so I think I got your first point. But this parallel process thing 
is a bit unclear.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, isn’t the whole problem that binary understand-
ings imply that sex characteristics need to be either male OR female, and so 
every kind of sense-making is based on that either/or construction?
RESEARCHER: Yes, and that is why it is called ‘intersex’.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes. And so a psychodynamic interpretation of the ter-
minology discussion is that this debate is stuck in the same dynamics, and 
perhaps also underpinned by the same socio-psychological forces as the under-
standings of sex characteristics themselves. The processes relevant for how we 
make sense of characteristics are also being played out in how we describe 
these characteristics. This is what we call ‘parallel processes’ in psychodynamic 
literature.
RESEARCHER: Okay, now it makes more sense. I haven’t thought of it that way. But 
I think that this perspective could open something up. So the ‘stuckness’ I feel 
could be interpreted as not being about me only? I might be embodying larger 
and more fundamental things here?
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CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, from a psychodynamic point of view, that could 
be an interpretation.
RESEARCHER: So maybe I don’t need to ‘choose’ sides but explore if there are other 
ways of engaging with terminology.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Exactly. See if there are ways to open up conversations 
about terminology instead of being stuck.
RESEARCHER: This is potentially useful. {Thinks for a while} So when it comes to 
‘intersex’ and ‘DSD’, one way of opening up the either/or dynamic would be 
to use both, like in ‘intersex/DSD’? Instead of trying to find yet another term, 
like I was trying to do with ‘atypical sex development’.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: I guess different stakeholders will interpret that strategy 
in different ways, but yes, that is something else than choosing one term over 
the other or trying to sit in your room and ‘invent yet another term’. Didn’t 
you have a quote by a parent highlighting this?
RESEARCHER: Well, when I asked a parent what he thought about ‘DSD’ and said 
that health professionals and researchers use that as a standard term now, he 
replied {reads quote}: ‘Fine – in your lab, do what you like. But when you’re 
dealing with people, {pause} because you’re so scientifically based, there’s a 
whole group of people who can miss the fact that what you say […] can be 
incredibly hurtful.’
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Ah, that’s right. So if we think of ourselves as the ones in 
the ‘lab’, I really don’t think that folks need yet another researcher suggesting 
a new term to use.
RESEARCHER: Yes, you have a point. Several young people also talked about the 
effects that terminology, especially ‘disorders of sex development’, could have 
on people. One young person said {reading from transcript}: ‘I don’t like the word 
“disorder”, ’cause it suggests there’s something wrong with someone. And for 
like, you know, some of these kids, […] if they hear “disorder of sexual develop-
ment”, they might, be it subconsciously or otherwise, think, “Oh my God”, you 
know, […] “I’ve got something wrong with me”.’
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So that participant shared your concerns regarding 
‘disorder’.
RESEARCHER: Yes, but, at the same time, some also liked or used both ‘DSD’ and 
‘intersex’. Or they were very pragmatic. One parent said {reads again}: ‘It’s 
all jargon and […] recently they stopped saying “intersex” and started saying 
“DSD” […]. I’m comfortable with sort of all – all of the different terms […] 
it’s whatever you want, so you know it’s, if you want to identify as a person 
with a [DSD], then that’s what you are; if you want to identify as intersex, 
that’s what you are. […] ultimately, [our son] can decide […] how he talks 
about it. I think that’s why I do want to almost talk about it in so many dif-
ferent ways.’
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Tove, these are all really strong and important quotes. 
You need to write this terminology paper.
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RESEARCHER: You think so? And illustrate the diversity and complexity of termi-
nology instead of just descriptively summarize what terms people prefer?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, definitely. You can also talk about what people pre-
fer, but yes, highlight what people think. And also, I guess, the discrepancy 
between the formal terminology debate among professionals and the everyday 
sense-making and the communication needs that people have, which typically 
require another way of thinking about terminology. Like having a pool of dif-
ferent terms or ways of talking about your body in different contexts and for 
different purposes.
RESEARCHER: Yes. Another young person actually made that point really clear by 
saying that, whatever label is used by professionals, she is the one who needs to 
‘deal with it’. So yes, I guess I won’t be able to avoid writing this paper.
Reflecting over reflexivity in retrospect: From 2019 and onwards
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST TOVE: So, Tove, you wrote that paper eventually.
RESEARCHER TOVE: I did (Lundberg et  al. 2018). And I positioned it as the first 
paper in my thesis. Like the foundation for the rest of the thesis.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: And for the first time you have tried to put the process 
that led up to that paper into words in order to write about and evaluate your 
reflexivity in retrospect, as you said at the beginning of this chapter.
RESEARCHER: Yes.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, the reconstructed section above really tries to make 
how you practised reflexivity and what theories you drew on transparent to the 
reader as well as yourself?
RESEARCHER: Yes, I hope it has made things more explicit. It is more apparent to 
me, at least. And, oh my, was that hard to write!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Why?
RESEARCHER: Well, first, it is hard to reconstruct something that happened a while 
ago. I think Hustvedt’s quote at the beginning of the chapter illustrates that 
eloquently. And second, it was all so emotional and I really didn’t know what 
to do with those feelings.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, as a clinical psychologist, I can really see that you 
were struggling a lot with your feelings during your doctoral research. And I 
can see that it must have been emotional to return to those feelings as well. I 
wonder if you want to explore that a bit?
RESEARCHER: It was emotional! And being educated in a very post-positivist and 
quantitative discipline as a researcher, I interpret having all of these feelings as 
being biased and as being a bad researcher.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay, I see. So struggling with not only the emotions, 
but with not living up to a certain idea of how a researcher should be?
RESEARCHER: Yes! Exactly! And as an interdisciplinary scholar, maybe trying to 
navigate inconsistent and competing ideas of how a researcher should be? On 
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the one hand, trying to adhere to those more quantitative ideals of my disci-
pline and, on the other hand, trying to live up to ideals of being a critical and 
feminist scholar with social justice and ethics of care in mind.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: I see. Yes, you mentioned feelings of ‘in-between-ness’ at 
the beginning of this chapter. It sounds like you were caught with challenging 
affects in between different epistemological ideals?
RESEARCHER: Yes, that is really how I felt.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes. And in the section above, where you reconstruct 
your experience of your doctoral work, there is also this sense of ‘stuckness’. 
Now, when we talk, I still get an embodied feeling of being stuck.
RESEARCHER: Yes, in my academic work I tend to feel that I am walking on thin 
ice that might break at any minute. That I don’t want to move, but have to, and 
do that slowly and just hope that the ice won’t break.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: That sounds daunting and… exhausting?
RESEARCHER: It is.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, what does the walking-on-thin-ice metaphor sym-
bolize right now?
RESEARCHER: Well, after writing the above section on my discomfort with ter-
minology, it is really clear to me how my emotions kept me back, and how I 
tried to avoid them. And I am just not really sure what to do with all of these 
emotions in research? I mean, the main training I have had about emotions in 
research is that they shouldn’t be there!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Sure, but you also mentioned critical and feminist the-
ory. And several scholars in these traditions have, in fact, turned to affect.
RESEARCHER: Well, that is true.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: And I know you know some of this literature, and that 
these scholars present very different ideas on emotions in research. For example, 
that emotions are not just an inevitable part of research, but perhaps even nec-
essary. As in life in general. You know, as a clinical psychologist, I work a lot 
with affects because they ‘move us to act or spur specific action’ (McCullough 
et al. 2003, p. 15). In other words, we need affects to do things, for example to 
do research.
RESEARCHER: Yes, you are right. Hemmings (2012) refers to different theorists 
stressing the importance of rage, passion and other emotions, and highlights 
‘that in order to know differently, we have to feel differently’ (p. 150). Similarly, 
Whitson (2017) points out that our emotional reactions to research say some-
thing about our ‘dreams and desires’ about ourselves and our ‘research partici-
pants’ (p. 305).
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Exactly. However, I still feel that you are not really con-
vinced that the emotions you experienced should have been there or even 
helped you during your PhD research?
RESEARCHER: No, I don’t feel that they were really helping me! They were awful, 
and I wish I hadn’t had to feel them!
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CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Okay. I hear you. They weren’t pleasant. I under-
stand that not having to experience them at all would have been preferable. 
However, you also wondered if your practices of reflexivity actually made 
your research any better. Judging from our reconstruction of the discomfort 
with terminology, I would say that, yes, addressing this discomfort made the 
research better.
RESEARCHER: Why?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Because by exposing yourself and addressing this dis-
comfort, instead of running away from it, you were able to know differently, 
just like Hemmings (2012) suggests.
RESEARCHER: Sure. I admit that addressing this discomfort provided me with a new 
route for my thesis. However, was it worth all the anguish and all the discom-
fort? Will I ever get rid of all of these negative feelings in the future? I don’t 
know if I can stand being a researcher in the future if it means I will need to 
struggle like this in everything I do!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, maybe the problem is not that you have all of these 
feelings, but rather that you spend a lot of time and energy trying to avoid 
them?
RESEARCHER: Well, what is the alternative?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: That you work with them.
RESEARCHER: How?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: By acknowledging the fact that negative feelings and 
suffering are an inevitable part of life, including a part of doing research. And 
as human beings we tend to do two things in response to these feelings. One 
is to ‘overidentify’ with our feelings and perspectives: that how we feel and 
think is how the world is instead of one way of experiencing life. The other is to 
try to control or avoid feelings that make us suffer. However, these approaches 
can create more suffering because they make us psychologically inflexible. For 
instance, trying to control or get rid of unwanted aspects typically just creates 
more unwanted thoughts and feelings. Instead of reflecting, we might obses-
sively ruminate, for example.
RESEARCHER: That is exactly what I was trying to do. So what could an alternative 
way of relating to our emotions and thoughts be?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, if we draw on the understandings from some third-
wave behavioural theories, first, we really need to connect to ‘the ongoing flow 
of experience in the moment’ (Hayes and Pierson 2005, p. 3). Instead of control 
or avoidance, we need to willingly accept that we will experience undesirable 
and negative situations and feelings. This also means exposing ourselves to dis-
comfort instead of running away from it.
RESEARCHER: Okay. {Thinking} So, really we can’t escape moments of discomfort 
in research? And drawing on this idea, this whole book could be understood 
as a collective exposure of discomfort where all the authors try to highlight it, 
instead of avoiding it? {Laughing}
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CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: {Laughing} Yes, that could be a constructive way of 
understanding this book.
RESEARCHER: Great! So what do we do next?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: We practise developing a ‘decentred stance’ to cogni-
tively defuse from our experiences, thoughts and feelings. By being non-judg-
mental and by not overidentifying with our feelings and thoughts, or trying 
to control or avoid them, we can develop a more flexible way of reflecting 
upon them and decide how to respond to our experiences. Instead of react-
ing automatically, this space gives us opportunities to do things that move us 
in a direction that is consistent with our values. However, this is a striving, a 
leaning towards something in life; these values are not specific goals that can 
be accomplished.
RESEARCHER: Well, it all sounds very clever, but it also sounds easier in theory than 
in practice?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: It is a striving that you need to practise. It won’t solve 
your discomfort, but it could help you deal with it in ways that are more con-
structive than trying to control or avoid things.
RESEARCHER: {Quiet for a while} So, let’s see if I get what you are trying to say. 
Drawing on these theories, we, as researchers, need to understand that reflexiv-
ity is probably not something that would control or remove the moments of 
discomfort we experience. It isn’t about becoming the perfect researcher with 
no flaws that will get things ‘right’ all the time? It is rather about accepting 
that we will mess up, experience defeat as well as success and sometimes be 
lucky enough to generate constructive knowledge? And that reflexivity could 
involve developing a ‘decentred stance’, from where we notice our experiences 
of research, and critically evaluate what we have written, our thinking, our 
practices and our feelings and see if what we do is in accordance with the values 
that we deeply care about as researchers? Also, in order to be accountable for 
what we do and our representations?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, I think that is a reasonable summary of what I was 
trying to say.
RESEARCHER: I realize now that my preoccupation with trying to control or avoid 
my discomfort as well as my feelings of doing things wrong as a researcher 
actually was a source that led to a centring of myself. This is quite the oppo-
site of what some writers, such as Skeggs (2002), suggest we do as reflex-
ive researchers. If I had had more psychological flexibility via this ‘decentred 
stance’, I think I could have focused a lot more of my energy on knowledge 
production and my participants’ concerns and accounts. To use the quote by 
Hemmings (2012, p. 150) again, ‘in order to know differently’ I would have had 
to feel differently about my feelings.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, being a researcher is challenging in several differ-
ent ways. I think that not overidentifying with your discomfort and not inter-
preting these negative feelings as proof of your being a bad researcher would 
perhaps have made this work just a bit easier?
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RESEARCHER: {Thinking} Perhaps. {Sits quietly for a while}
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: You are very quiet now.
RESEARCHER: Yes. I am thinking about overidentifying with feelings. And how I 
felt about the terminology question.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: What are you thinking?
RESEARCHER: Well, I think that, as a PhD candidate, I was still emotionally invested 
in finding ‘The Term’ that could be used by everyone, everywhere.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, you really desired to ‘solve’ the terminology debate, 
didn’t you?
RESEARCHER: I think I did, and I was quite disappointed in not being able to do it.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, that is a very natural response when people find 
things hard to contain. That you want something to be solved to escape the 
unbearable feelings it activates. When staying in the complexity is too over-
whelming or when you are doing a lot of unrewarding ‘dirty work’, as Irvine 
(2014) calls it.
RESEARCHER: Yeah, that is probably it. I really do find this terminology discussion 
exhausting in many ways, and I think many others do as well. As soon as I talk 
to other researchers or health professionals about this, most don’t really want 
to listen to or engage with the terminology discussion. It feels like many just 
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want to decide on a term and then we can move on to discuss other ‘more 
important’ things.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Yes, well, as we discussed in the reconstructed part above, 
maybe it isn’t about terminology per se, but about the phenomenon itself.
RESEARCHER: I think that interpretation makes sense. I think that I as a PhD can-
didate, in an embodied sense, experienced being ‘amiss in how [some]one is 
recognized, feeling an ill fit with social descriptions’, as Hemmings (2012, p. 
150) calls it. However, it is only really in the last year that I have comprehended 
the width and depth of what this really means, also affectively.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, building on that, terminology sounds even more 
important to acknowledge in a thesis, then.
RESEARCHER: Yes, I think so. Liao (2015), who is a clinical psychologist and 
researcher, also talks about the need to start addressing emotions more explic-
itly in this topic area. She refers to healthcare, but I think we need to focus 
more on feelings in intersex research as well. If I were to write my thesis now, 
I would focus a bit more on different affective aspects and also try to utilize an 
affective reflexivity more explicitly.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, then, I understand why you think using your 
knowing as a clinical psychologist more explicitly would have been useful. 
Maybe you can do that in the future?
RESEARCHER: Maybe.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, should that be the concluding remark of this chapter?
RESEARCHER: Ermmm… {Hesitating} If I am now supposed to follow your psycho-
therapeutic technique to connect to ‘the ongoing flow of experience’, which 
basically is the focus of this text now, I cannot avoid noticing some hesitations.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Great, let’s notice them together.
RESEARCHER: Okay. So, in a way, I feel that the thoughts in this chapter are impor-
tant. But I also just wonder how ‘new’ these ideas are, like methodologically? 
I mean, isn’t this just some kind of introspective form of reflexivity, which has 
been criticized by so many academics (see e.g. Skeggs 2002, Pillow 2003)? Am 
I not just writing about my ‘self ’ a lot now, which makes me self-centred and 
narcissistic as well as decentre what is important in my research?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: What if it is narcissistic and self-centred?
RESEARCHER: Do you think it IS narcissistic?!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, I think that it is possible to interpret it in differ-
ent ways. And I guess some would say that academia is quite narcissistic. And 
speaking of that, let’s think about your hesitation to write about your ‘self ’. 
You are working in a system where the best success indicator of who you are 
as an academic is the texts you are writing. So, in this system, the impression-
management of your ‘self ’ is what you have got to deal with. Is that narcissistic? 
Then, yes.
RESEARCHER: But being in academia doesn’t mean that I have to centre myself in 
everything I do, does it? And I just wonder if there is too much centring of 
myself in this text?!
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CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, you did make it clear that you wanted to use this 
chapter to explore your reflexivity during your PhD research. So, one interpre-
tation could be that this is a self-centred and confessional piece. But maybe you 
and others can still learn from it?
RESEARCHER: Well, I certainly have learned something in writing this chapter. But 
maybe I should have done this work quietly and privately in my office?
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, that is what you said you did as a PhD candidate, 
didn’t you? And then you were worried about not being reflexive enough.
RESEARCHER: Fair point.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Or maybe it isn’t narcissistic? Another interpretation could 
be that maybe it is not only your ‘self ’ that is in focus here, but rather your thinking 
and your knowing? But these are, of course, related to your ‘self ’. By that I mean, 
as I think Skeggs (2002) points out, the self is a historically and socially produced 
‘necessity’ nowadays, isn’t it? I mean, can you ‘escape’ your ‘self ’, even though we 
can clearly see that this is part of a certain discourse? Can you step outside of dis-
course? As far as how I understand Foucault (1984), you can’t. And do you really 
focus on your ‘self ’ or is it not your ‘subjectivity’? And what is really the difference?
RESEARCHER: Okay, I see the complexity here. These are all really hard and impor-
tant questions. And they are not really new questions, either…
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, your hesitation about this chapter being ‘new’: I 
don’t think this is new. Does everything you write have to be ‘new’? And what 
does ‘new’ even mean? Does it mean ideas, words or meanings that have never 
been expressed before? Always writing something new seems like a very hope-
less and tiring ideal for an academic.
RESEARCHER: It is a very hopeless and tiring thing to be an academic!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Then should you perhaps stop overidentifying with 
these ideals and start to ‘decentre’ from them a bit?
RESEARCHER: Actually, I’m not sure I will be able to do that. But sure, I’ll try.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, trying is all we can do. Remember that being in a 
‘decentred stance’ as well as living and researching in your valued direction is a 
striving, a leaning towards something in life. It isn’t a goal that can be reached 
once and for all time.
RESEARCHER: Okay, sure. So, I will try to decentre from problematic academic ide-
als but still reflect on and engage with them. And I hope that the readers of this 
book will too.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: Well, social support is one of the most effective coping 
strategies there are. You all know that from writing this book.
RESEARCHER: That is true.
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: So, can the clinical psychologist share a final professional 
tip, then?
RESEARCHER: Sure, go on!
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: I suggest that you all continue resisting these problem-
atic academic ideals together.
RESEARCHER: Collective resistance via affective reflexivity? {Pause} I like that. I’m on!
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Notes
 1 ‘Moments of discomfort’, which is part of the title of this book, sounds like a good 
descriptive summary of the feelings of disorientation, frustration and ‘stuckness’ I expe-
rienced as a doctoral researcher in psychology from 2012 to 2017. The discomfort was 
mostly related to my attempts to position myself in a field of research where at least two 
very different bodies of knowledge with contrasting views are evident. The topic of my 
thesis was to explore the lived experiences of people with sex characteristics that do not 
conform to typical understandings of female or male physical development (Lundberg 
2017). Within medicine, such characteristics are typically referred to as ‘disorders of sex 
development’ that are understood to be ‘congenital conditions in which development of 
chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex is atypical’ (Lee et al. 2006, p. e488). The term 
‘intersex’, however, is used by many people with personal experience of DSD as well 
as by human rights advocates and researchers within the humanities and the social sci-
ences (Lundberg et al. 2018). In these contexts, intersex characteristics are understood 
as naturally occurring variations of human embodiment that should be recognized and 
protected by human rights. One main challenge that gave rise to the discomfort was to 
stay in conversation with both of these perspectives and at the same time try to articulate 
my own position in an intelligible manner. The different participants whom I interviewed 
for this project, 22 young people and 33 parents, described very different challenges 
in their everyday lives, presented diverse ways of making sense of their or their child’s 
variations and preferred different terminology to describe these characteristics (Lundberg 
et  al. 2018). Some participants drew on medical discourses and labelled themselves or 
their child as someone with a specific medical condition. Others articulated thoughts 
that were more in line with the human rights perspective and some young people also 
identified as intersex. Only some participants utilized both discourses. A challenge during 
my research was thus to respect the many different ways that participants made sense of 
their embodiment, while at the same time critically analyze and discuss the medical as well 
as the human rights perspective. Being caught in a dilemma of respecting research par-
ticipants while at the same time, on a more general level, problematizing and criticizing 
the same frameworks of understanding that participants draw on is not a unique or new 
challenge. Feminist scholars have struggled with these issues for decades (Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger 1996, Finlay 2002a). However, even though I think I was able to articulate some 
kind of strategy in dealing with these moments of discomfort, I still feel that my ‘solution’ 
was very provisional. Finally, I was also discomforted when I was trying to put all of the 
above-mentioned discomfort, and the ways I coped with it, into words. As a young clini-
cal psychology student, I was encouraged to do such reflexive work when I saw clients; 
however, I was never trained to do so when I did research. The formal and expected 
requirements of the thesis and the lack of time and skills of understanding how I was to 
‘write about reflexivity’ led me to omit the reflexive parts I initially planned to have in 
the introduction to my thesis. In other words, I retreated from engaging with reflexivity 
(Finlay 2002b). This chapter starts in the discomfort related to reflexivity and the chapter’s 
main aim is to write about those reflexive parts that were omitted in my thesis.
 2 While it looks like all these conversations happened in my head, they did not appear in 
an academic vacuum. Many of the insights presented in this chapter have been possible 
because of other people’s input. I could never have arrived at these thoughts if it were 
not for Katrina Roen, Peter Hegarty, Lih-Mei Liao, Margaret Simmonds, Ellie Magritte, 
Del LaGrace Volcano and many others. I am also deeply thankful for conversations with 
Catrine Andersson and Elinor Hermansson, which have helped me feel differently about 
my feelings.
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 3 Narrating a history of intersex in order to provide a background and a context for the 
current situation is a complex task. Narrations in current academic texts usually use the 
paradigm of medical guidelines from the 1950s (the ones suggested by Money, Hampson 
and Hampson 1955) and describe the growing critique of researchers (such as Fausto-
Sterling 1993, Diamond and Sigmundson 1997, Kessler 1998) and activists (such as Chase 
1998) during the 1990s as the starting point for the current situation. Narrations also 
often point out that these developments led many stakeholders to be concerned about 
medical practices by the beginning of the 2000s (Davis 2015). One main discussion since 
then has been in regard to whether early surgery should be performed in order to nor-
malize the appearance of children’s genitals. Other aspects that are typically narrated as 
important parts of the changes that have happened since the 1990s include discussions 
on how to understand these variations, what terminology to use, and if, and in that case 
how, medical classifications should be constructed. Many authors, for example Dreger 
(1999), Karkazis (2008), Reis (2012), Davis (2015) and Garland (2016), provide important 
historical contextualizations. When it comes to terminology, activists reclaimed the term 
‘intersex’ as well as ‘hermaphrodite’ from medicine in the 1990s (Davis 2015). In 2005, 
activists, bioethicists and medical practitioners wrote a piece together arguing for a revi-
sion in terminology and medical classifications (Dreger et al. 2005). Their main point was 
that the diagnostic taxonomy, including terms such as ‘hermaphroditism’ and ‘pseudo-
hermaphroditism’, was problematic because the terms were based on the histology of 
gonads and, thus, scientifically misleading as well as stigmatizing. They suggested a system 
where specific conditions were recognized and that these could be grouped together with 
the medical umbrella term ‘disorders of sexual differentiation’ (DSD). This suggestion was 
taken up by medical experts. Also in 2005, a consensus meeting with paediatricians and 
a couple of patient representatives was held in Chicago. A year later, a Consensus state-
ment was published (Lee et al. 2006). In this document, the umbrella term ‘disorders of 
sex development’ (DSD) was presented as well as a new taxonomy that classified specific 
conditions on the basis of chromosomes. The authors argued that ‘disorders of sex devel-
opment’ was a better term than ‘intersex’ because it was more descriptive and because it 
incorporated advances in medicine. It was also understood as less confusing and stigmatiz-
ing as well as more meaningful to the people concerned. Since the early 2000s, different 
groups that organize people with lived experiences of intersex/DSD have appeared and 
some have changed their format and approach (Davis 2015). Some are organized as sup-
port groups and work in close collaboration with health providers and medical researchers 
in order to improve care. Some of these groups support the current medical terminol-
ogy and taxonomy as well as the guidelines and practices. While not all groups under-
stand DSD as ‘disorders of sex development’, but rather as ‘diverse’ or ‘differences of sex 
development’ (Monro et al. 2017), some still support the idea that these variations can or 
should be understood from a medical model. Other organizations have continued to criti-
cize medical practices. Some of these latter groups ground their claims in human rights 
(Ghattas 2015). With the support of international LGBTQ organizations, some groups 
argue that the still-occurring practices of non-essential surgery violate children’s rights 
to bodily integrity and self-determination (a concern also raised by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council 2013). Commentators are also critical of the changes in medical 
terminology and classifications (see e.g. Davis 2014, Monro et al. 2017). They argue that 
this medical reclassification pathologizes variations in embodiment which, in turn, under-
pins problematic medical practices. Some also argue that the continuous medicalization of 
these sex characteristics gives medical professionals a disproportionate amount of power 
in defining how these variations should be understood and also treated. As such, the move 
towards using the term ‘DSD’ in medicine can be understood as a form of hermeneutical 
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injustice, where the right to self-determination in understanding and naming one’s body 
and oneself has been taken away from people with these sex characteristics (Carpenter 
2016). It was in the context of these complexities that my doctoral thesis was situated.
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‘TO SAY NO WASN’T SOMETHING WE 
COULD DO’
Reflexive accounts and negotiations of the 
ethical practice of informed consent during the 
research process and beyond
Johanna Sixtensson
To: Johanna.sixtensson@mau.se
On: Friday, 6 April 2018 at 10.09
Subject: Hello!
I received your book today and I must say I was shocked. I thought I had 
received someone else’s post. But while reading I started to remember and I 
couldn’t stop reading. It was very interesting, and fun to read my own words. 
6–7 years have passed since the interview with you and a lot has changed 
when it comes to us, of course. We are still friends and see each other when 
we can. Some of us still study […] and others (me) have travelled every other 
month and enjoyed life.
The reason why I write (besides to say that I was very impressed with your 
work) is that I want to explain why we were so difficult to get hold of or didn’t 
appear at the interviews… We were interested; but just then we were young, 
lazy girls who simply couldn’t bother. We were 16–17 years old, and a little 
disrespectful. Today, we would never have done what we did back then […]. 
And to say no wasn’t something we could do. So, we ignored you and felt bad 
instead.
I think you deserve to know it and I was embarrassed when I read about it 
in the book. I’m sorry it made you frustrated. But I’m glad you managed to see 
the positives in it all. At least, I gave you the correct number the second time 
(haha) […].
Good luck with the rest of your life ☺
Kind Regards,
‘Leila’
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The above extract is from an e-mail from a research participant to whom I gave 
the name Leila. I first met her during the autumn of 2012. At that time, she was 17 
years old and I was visiting her class at a secondary school to inform them about 
my research project and ask for participants. I was conducting research on teenage 
girls’ lived experiences of everyday life in in the city of Malmö in southern Sweden. 
A few weeks after my first visit to the class, Leila and three of her friends partici-
pated in a focus group. A few months later, in January 2013, I met her again for 
an individual interview. After that, our paths parted and we had no further contact 
until March 2018, when I sent my published book to her and the other research 
participants. Along with the printed book I attached a handwritten note where I 
mentioned the long time that had passed since I last saw them and thanked them 
for their participation. On the note I included my e-mail address in case they had 
any questions.
At the beginning of April 2018, Leila’s e-mail reached my inbox. Approximately 
5 years had passed since I interviewed her and she must have been 22 or 23 when 
she wrote to me. Even though participant responses to research findings are always 
a possibility, and I had opened up the possibility for exactly this by sending out the 
book and my e-mail address along with it, Leila’s reaching out to me took me by 
surprise. I remember feeling grateful and moved that she had taken time not only 
to read the book, but also to write to me and comment on aspects of its content. 
Mixed up with this positive response of mine was also a more uncomfortable 
feeling that originated in our past meetings, that was also one of my biggest 
methodological dilemmas during the research process. The essence of the problem 
is located in Leila’s saying: ‘to say no wasn’t something we could do’ and refers back 
to my seeking informed consent as it would be a verbal, linear and rational one-time 
decision, and then getting mixed, not always verbal, signals in return. This, at the 
time of the fieldwork, was frustrating, confusing and stressful. However, taking time 
to theoretically think about the meaning of the concept of consent, and analyzing 
the events that took place between me and the participants through that lens, has 
led to a broader understanding. To consent, or not, I argue, is rather an open-ended, 
situated, ambivalent and not necessarily verbal process that requires a situated ethical 
(re)thinking on the researcher’s part.
The Swedish Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics on its online site states 
that ‘When research involves humans, they are, with few exceptions, to be informed 
about the research and its effects, as well as being able to freely decide whether they 
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wish to participate’ (CODEX 2020). This information, moreover, should be given 
in a neutral manner in order not to put pressure on possible participants. As a PhD 
student within social sciences using qualitative methods in planning and  conducting 
my first individual research project, I anxiously tried to follow the formal criteria for 
this ethical principle. It turned out to be difficult since, even though the guidelines of 
the ethical principle of informed consent make it seem like a straightforward, linear 
and rational process (Gallagher et al. 2010), the practice of informed consent, ask-
ing for it and giving it, is a ‘slippery and elusive notion during the research process’ 
(Aaltonen 2017, p. 329), as will be elaborated in this chapter. Throughout the text, 
I will revisit, explore and make meaning of methodological and ethical dilemmas 
connected to the principle of informed consent that took place between Leila, her 
group of friends and me, but that to some extent were present in encounters with 
other participants too. At the core of the discussion will be the complex researcher–
participant relationship during the research process and beyond, a relationship that is 
imbued with power dynamics, expectations and affects. The writing of this chapter I 
regard as not only an important reflexive practice but also an ambition to strive for a 
more ethical representation of my research participants, making their  expressions of 
agency visible in a text that involves their narratives, or, as McGarry puts it: ‘active in 
the construction and negotiation of their own biographies’ (2016, p. 352).
Research topic and challenges of the recruitment procedure
The research project I will be describing constituted my doctoral dissertation 
(Sixtensson 2018) in which, from a qualitative and in-depth perspective using inter-
views and focus groups as methods, I examined the everyday life of a group of 
teenage girls between 16 and 19 years old. The analytical focus of the research was 
on how the young women encountered and negotiated with unequal socio-spa-
tial gender structures, class relations and processes of racialization in their everyday 
lives. Some of the participating girls, among them Leila and her group of friends, 
had parents with migrant background and had experiences of being constructed as 
‘non-Swedish’ or ‘foreigners’ due to bodily features such as skin colour. As will be 
seen throughout the text, I regard these racialized experiences as especially impor-
tant concerning some of the incidents that took place between Leila, her group of 
friends and me.
The fieldwork conducted for the project was quite challenging: to some extent, 
it was difficult to locate participants, but the main problem was to schedule and 
conduct interviews and focus groups. I got in contact with potential research 
participants through secondary schools as well as through different youth activities 
in the municipality of Malmö. Via e-mail, I asked for permission to visit classes 
or groups to inform them about my research project and ask for participants. To 
gain access was not as easy as I had imagined beforehand. However, when I was 
given access to a classroom or some other place, I described the project and asked 
for voluntary participants for a focus group discussion and, possibly later on, an 
individual interview. As far as I perceived it, I generally succeeded in gaining the 
‘To say no wasn’t something we could do’ 33
young women’s interest to participate, and often they would expressly say so and/
or give me their contact details. Trying to organize focus groups and interviews, 
however, was very difficult. Participants cancelled at short or long notice or just did 
not show up at our planned meetings. On two occasions, no one came to scheduled 
focus groups. These complications, which at the time felt like rejections, affected 
my self-esteem and led me to question my ability to do this kind of research. They 
also caused stress in relation to the time aspects of the research project. Before I 
analytically explore these difficulties and my reactions to them, both back then 
and with hindsight, I will present the specific circumstances that characterized the 
relationship between me, Leila and her group of friends.
Fake phone numbers and on-and-off communication: a timeline
The first time I met Leila was when I visited her class at a secondary school. I had 
arranged with her class teacher to come and inform them about the project and 
ask for participants. I did so and, when I left, I had with me the names and phone 
numbers of eight individuals, who had written them down on a piece of paper that 
I had passed around at the end of the information session. We did not set a date 
for the focus group there and then, but I said that I would contact them. When I 
did, I got in touch with four or five out of the eight young women and arranged 
a time and place for a focus group. However, at the scheduled focus group none 
of the young women showed up. After some consideration, I decided to try to get 
in contact with this group of individuals again in the hope of rescheduling the 
focus group discussion. I had come to learn that it was difficult to arrange dates for 
discussions that suited everyone by phone or text messages, and therefore decided 
to send an e-mail to the class teacher who had welcomed me to the class, asking 
her if I could come back and try to organize a new time for the focus group with 
the young women present in the room and, preferably, set a time for it to be held at 
the end of a school day. She invited me to come again and do so. Still, I had doubts, 
partly due to my fear that the teacher would have an impact on the young women’s 
decision to participate. My uncertainty was also, at this point, partly because I felt 
that by approaching them in their school again I might force myself on them. In 
the end, however, I decided to go ahead and visit the class once more. The basis of 
my decision to do so was that the young women who signed up the first time had, 
in my interpretation, seemed genuinely interested to participate in the focus group. 
Would I not let them down if I withdrew myself solely due to the fact that none 
of them had turned up the first time? Accordingly, I entered the classroom again. 
The teacher introduced me, but left the classroom when it was my time to talk to 
the young women, as I had asked her to do. In the fieldnotes made after my second 
visit, I wrote:
I told them that I would still like to meet them for one focus group discussion, 
something that is totally voluntary. I suggested we do this in connection with 
the end of a school day. I also said that I wished to talk only to the ones who 
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were interested, and I underlined again that it is voluntary. I said that the ones 
who were still interested to talk to me could stay on and the others could 
leave. Four girls stayed […]. One of them said, ‘I have a great deal to say’ when 
I yet again briefly told them about the project and what we would discuss in 
the focus group.
From the notes, I can see that I was anxious, stressing the voluntary aspect of partici-
pating several times. At the time, this was my way of trying to secure the formalities 
of informed consent that I had learned, in research with young participants especially, 
should be addressed and readdressed several times throughout the process (Gallagher 
et al. 2010). The girl who said ‘I have a great deal to say’ was Leila; and as the focus 
group took place shortly after this meeting, to my relief she and her three friends 
showed up as agreed upon.
We met up outside their school and walked a short distance to a public building 
where I had booked a room for us to conduct the focus group discussion. Leila, 
as well as the rest of the group, did have a lot to say, as Leila had stated. Two cen-
tral themes of discussion concerned the young women’s experiences of living in a 
neighbourhood that is discursively constructed as ‘deprived’ and about experiences 
of encounters of everyday racism. In connection with the theme of everyday racism, it 
is vital to highlight that such experiences, with regard to the whole research project, 
were articulated almost exclusively in focus group discussions. When I readdressed 
the topic in individual interviews, their accounts were short. In the focus group, 
however, experiences of racism were often articulated in unanimity and in a sort of 
collective agreement. The young women would finish each other’s sentences, used 
the pronouns ‘we’ or ‘us’ and sometimes nodded in agreement as they described 
these experiences. In the focus group that Leila participated in, an example of this 
consensus could be seen in the following quote:
LEILA: I have also seen several times when we are out shopping that –
SEVERAL IN THE GROUP: Yes.
LEILA: the staff, they keep an eye on you all the time.
KAMILA: They follow you around.
LEILA: They think you’ll nick stuff, and it’s really humiliating, just because we 
are foreigners.
In this particular quote, it is consumer experiences that collectively are described 
as involving degrading treatment for this group of participants. A similar pattern of 
communicating collective experiences, using ‘we’, is evident in the group’s discus-
sions of experiences of living in neighbourhoods that are described in negative 
terms as violent, deprived and unsafe, a theme that they also discussed intensely. 
At the end of the focus group, Leila said to me: ‘Do you know what would have 
been good? […] some advice from me to you: that we, four “foreigners”, tell our 
side and if you interview a group of “Swedes” [too].’ The other participants nod-
ded to her proposal. I answered in an affirmative way, that to talk to young women 
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with different backgrounds and experiences was what I planned to do. American 
ethnographer Julie Bettie (2014) writes about a similar experience in a study that, 
interestingly enough, also concerned teenage females with different backgrounds. 
One of Bettie’s participants says something similar to Leila: ‘you can’t just write 
about the white girls. It would only be half a story, half a book’ (Bettie 2014, p. 
22). Leila, like the young woman in Bettie’s study, seemed to be well aware of the 
differences that are likely to appear if her and her group of friends’ experiences are 
put in comparison with white young women’s narratives of everyday life, and she 
was actively asking me not to neglect these differences. As we ended the discussion, I 
asked the participants if they would be happy to meet me for individual interviews. 
I felt enthusiastic about, among other things, getting the chance to deepen some of 
the discussions into a more personal angle during individual interviews. In my notes 
made after the focus group discussion, I wrote:
They had a lot to say, interrupting each other as well as completing each 
other’s sentences […]. All of them agreed to hold an individual interview with 
me. The proposal was to do this on Tuesdays when they have a free period in 
in their school schedule. I got their phone numbers again.
However, when I tried to organize these interviews, I managed to contact only one 
of them, which was Leila. As for the other three, I discovered when I compared their 
phone numbers, collected on two occasions, that they did not match and/or were 
incorrect. Even Leila, I learnt, had left me two different phone numbers, one incor-
rect and one that was actually hers. To get in touch with one of the young women 
whom I was particularly interested to interview, I sent a text message to Leila and 
asked if she could put me in contact with the young woman, since the number I 
had got from her was wrong. Within a few minutes, I received a number attached to 
a text message. I was astonished when I realized that that number as well was incor-
rect. In the end, I managed to obtain an interview with Leila, but I let the others go, 
not making any further attempts to reach them. In my fieldnotes, I wrote:
What’s the reason for their doing this? They seem to be very close to each 
other, they have known each other since kindergarten; have they developed 
a code for faking their phone numbers? Why don’t they tell me they don’t 
want to, if they don’t want to see me? Are they making fun of me, or daren’t 
they say no?
As seen from my notes, I tried to understand and make meaning of these incidents 
early on. The possibility of not being able, or not daring, to say no was already on 
my mind; and since for the whole project I was interested in young women’s means 
of agency and resistance, I was at first frustrated, but later intrigued, by what looked 
like sophisticated actions set up to mislead me.
I met Leila again a few months later. She had agreed to an individual interview 
and we yet again met outside her school. She gave me a hug and we entered the 
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school building and into a separate room which she had suggested for the interview. 
Once more, I repeated the voluntary aspects of participation before starting the 
interview. Leila answered all my questions, but was not as talkative as in the focus 
group, which surprised me somewhat, as she was the one who had talked the most 
then. However, now, her answers were not as developed and some of the themes, 
such as experiences of everyday racism that had been intensely discussed during the 
focus group, as I readdressed them, gave rise to only short accounts.1 She seemed to 
get restless as time passed and said by way of explanation that she had just stopped 
smoking. I ended the interview after an hour, slightly earlier than I wanted to. As we 
walked out of the school building together, I thanked her and after that we parted 
ways.
I continued to conduct more interviews with other participants before moving 
on to analytical work and the long process of writing the doctoral thesis. As the text 
eventually started to develop, narratives from Leila and her group of friends were 
given quite a large amount of textual space, and in the methodological section of 
the thesis I addressed and tried briefly to make meaning of the incidents with the 
fake phone numbers. Leila’s e-mail, which starts off this chapter, and my reply, could 
have been the end of our on-and-off communication; however, when embarking 
on this chapter, I was given the opportunity to reach out yet again to ask Leila if 
I could include parts of her e-mail in a text about dilemmas in conducting focus 
groups and interviews. Only a few minutes after I sent my e-mail, her reply reached 
my inbox stating: ‘that’s fine! ☺’.
Complexities and contradictions of consent in theory and practice
In the following section, I will try to make meaning of the incidents where Leila 
and her friends were difficult to get hold of, giving me incorrect phone numbers, 
and how they, even though they initially agreed to participate, later on acted as if 
they had not. At the centre of the discussion will be the question, ‘why did they 
not just say no?’ and how this relates to power relations at play as well as the ethi-
cal principle of informed consent, in theory and practice. Within the disciplinary 
field of children’s geographies, there are valuable methodological discussions about 
the shifting (as opposed to fixed) power relations between researcher and young 
participants during the research process (cf. Skelton 2008). Holt (2004) argues that 
the research contains shifting, contextual and embodied ‘research performances’. 
Woodyer, too, maintains that research encounters should be reframed as perfor-
mances in order to understand and deconstruct the idea of a necessarily hierarchical 
relationship between researcher and research participant. Instead, she argues that 
research encounters are a constant negotiation: ‘It is seen that power relations cannot 
be reduced to powerful and powerless along essentialized lines of difference. Rather, 
power is fluid; it is performed, and thus open to negotiation’ (2008, p. 352).
Drawing on the knowledge production on the concept of consent concerning 
sexual situations from the field of sexuality studies, David Archard (1998) discusses 
the meaning of this concept in a broad sense. He makes an interesting distinction 
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between the concept of consent and the similar concept of assent, arguing that, while 
consent is ‘agreement to something’, assent is more than that: assent is ‘agreement 
with something’. Unlike consent, assent is an act as well as a ‘state of mind’. In a 
similar way, Hickman and Muehlenhard, also coming from the field of sexualities, 
describe consent as both a mental and physical practice: to make a decision and con-
vey this decision (Hickman and Muehlenhard 1999). Moreover, consent, within this 
field, is described as a dynamical, complex and continuous process. To consent, then, 
is not a fixed decision but an open-ended process (Gunnarsson 2020). In ‘Just say 
no? The use of Conversation Analysis in developing a feminist Perspective on sexual 
refusal’ (1999), Kitzinger and Frith draw on literature that has applied Conversation 
Analysis (CA) to study individuals’ means of ‘saying no’ in everyday interactions. 
Their literature analysis together with their own research show that individuals are 
relatively good at both perceiving as well as conveying rejections, even though the 
rejections do not always contain the actual word ‘no’. Rejections commonly entail: 
delays in response, prefacings (such as ‘hmm’ and ‘well’), palliative remarks (apolo-
gies, compliments or appreciation) and accounts (explanations or justifications as 
to why not). Hence, rejections, in a direct verbal manner, they argue, are not easily 
done since, generally, rejections are not expressed in that way. Thus, rejections need 
to be understood in a broader manner, not necessarily through pronouncing the 
word ‘no’.
These discussions of consent as embodied, open-ended and complex have helped 
me to make meaning of the young women’s mixed signals. After the focus group 
they did give me fake phone numbers, which was an act or performance that inevi-
tably must be considered a rejection, a non-verbal non-consent to meet up with me 
again. To say no, as Leila writes, ‘wasn’t something we could do’. As I look back, I 
can see that to say no in a direct manner must have been difficult, partly because, as 
Kitzinger and Frith (1999) argue, rejections are normally not expressed in a verbal 
direct manner, and partly because I did not really give them space to communicate 
a possible withdrawal from meeting me again. We were sitting together in a small 
room and had just finished an interesting focus group discussion where the young 
women had been very generous in their accounts. When I asked if they wanted to 
sign up for an interview, I remember their being vaguely affirmative, perhaps out of 
politeness, but not enthusiastic. I was, however, eager to interview them individually 
and immediately started to collect their contact details and was not receptive to, or 
possibly ignored, the signals of rejection I do believe were present in the room. My 
focus at that moment was on their narratives, especially on their accounts of everyday 
racism, rather than on them as participants. I wanted to portray their stories; however, 
as Back argues, there is a fine line between ‘give and take in research encounters, 
between portrayal and betrayal’ (2012, p. 24). Nevertheless, overall, their signals were 
ambivalent, as Leila also confirms in the e-mail: ‘We were interested; but just then 
we were young, lazy girls who simply couldn’t bother.’ Leila’s statement, besides it 
confirming the ambivalence that I grasped and have struggled with, indicates that 
consent/non-consent sometimes might be very time/context-specific: at that time, 
they ‘simply couldn’t bother’.
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Moreover, I want to address the contextual circumstances that prevailed during 
the recruitment of participants and how these might have influenced the partici-
pants’ processes of consent/non-consent. Since the selection criterion was partici-
pants between 16 and 19 years old, parental consent/consent from a legal guardian 
was not obtained. However, through my technique of recruiting participants, other 
adult figures, who sometimes are described as ‘gatekeepers’ (cf. Heath et al. 2007), in 
many cases were in indirect (and sometimes direct) proximity to the participants as 
I approached them to inform them about the project. Even though I tried to avoid 
these persons’ direct presence by asking them to leave the space while I did so, this 
could have influenced the young women’s decision-making in different ways. The 
school space, being an institutional setting, likewise could have impacted on their 
often affirmative first response and later withdrawal.
In the e-mail, Leila additionally, in a somewhat joking manner, wrote: ‘at least I 
gave you the right number the second time’ followed by ‘haha {laugh}’. Along the way, 
it seems, something made her decide to give me her correct phone number after all. 
Her shift is another indicator of how consent should be treated as an open-ended 
and non-fixed process as well as an example of how participants are active in the 
research process. The exact reasons for her shift are unknown to me; it could have 
been a decision made out of politeness or a feeling of responsibility. However, I also 
like to think about Leila’s decision to give me the correct number the second time 
as connected to the discussions we had in the focus group. As mentioned earlier, 
at the end of the focus group Leila advised me not only to include her and her 
group of friends’ lived experiences but also the experiences of young women who, 
contrary to Leila and her friends, were white and hence normatively constructed 
as ‘Swedish’. By stating this, she used her agency to steer the research project in a 
direction that she believed in. If the researcher and research participant relationship, 
as Woodyer (2008) holds, is ‘open for negotiation’, it also becomes possible to recog-
nize that participants might act against, intervene in or resist requirements set up by 
the researcher. They might, too, have their own reasons (even political) for participat-
ing in (consenting to) research (cf. Hunleth 2011, McGarry 2016). Participants, even 
young, such as in this case Leila, might seek to expose inequalities or tell alternative 
stories in order to influence the knowledge production and/or resist unequal repre-
sentations, to ‘talk back’, to use bell hooks’ phrase (1989). Leila’s willingness to meet 
with me again could have been such an act.
What happens to consent when the interview ends?
A further important dimension to be taken into account is how the ethical prin-
ciple of informed consent should be understood in connection to the progress of 
time. In Leila’s e-mail, a link is established between then and now, as she addresses 
the time between the actual incidents that took place and the moment when she 
has read the published book. The long period of time that had passed between 
meeting me during the fieldwork and receiving the book had made her forget she 
participated in the study; thus, at first she thought the book had been mistakenly 
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sent to her. However, as she starts to read, she also starts to remember. The progress 
of time is also present in Leila’s explanations of what took place between us dur-
ing the fieldwork. She makes a brief reference to the group’s activities today and 
claims that what happened then would not have happened now: ‘Today, we would 
never have done what we did back then’. She also describes her reactions when reading 
my accounts of the methodological dilemmas that included her and her friends 
as teenagers; these, at least to some extent, I categorize as negative since it caused 
her feelings of shame: ‘I was embarrassed when I read about it in the book’. She is also 
apologetic. Leila writing to me could be understood as her taking responsibility 
for, or explaining, actions that in the research report actually are disconnected from 
her through the process of writing up the analysis and not in the least through 
the process of anonymization in which I changed her name to Leila, a procedure 
that is ethically complex too, as described by Kolankiewicz in this volume (see 
also Djampour 2018). However, the girl I named Leila naturally reads the text 
differently: she finds herself and her words in the text and she remembers, and 
these memories are to some extent hurtful to her. These remarks, I argue, need 
to be problematized in connection with what lies in the meaning and practice of 
informed consent. I rhetorically ask myself: When does the ethical guideline of not 
causing harm to participants end? What happens to consent when the interview 
ends and the writing of the text starts?
Trained in qualitative methods within the social sciences, I tend to arrange the 
research process into separate spatial and time-specific compartments: first, con-
ducting interviews, or doing fieldwork, and second, the writing process, which 
often takes place at home or in the office. During the latter process, I distance 
myself from the material, and tendencies in the overall material at this stage of the 
research process become more important than individual testimonies. According to 
anthropologist Kristen Bell, it is during this process of writing up that the principle 
of informed consent, as stated by formal guidelines and ethical boards, in practice 
becomes challenging. She writes:
Informed consent, as originally conceptualized, is about agreeing to be ‘done 
to’ in the context of the data collection itself. The key issue is that in ethno-
graphic research – in any of its disciplinary formulations – for the most part, 
the ‘doing to’ doesn’t happen in the fieldwork situation but, rather, in the act 
of writing up.
(2014, p. 516)
Ethnographer Julia O’Connell Davidson, in turn, states that consenting to research 
is really consenting to be objectified. While the researcher moves from the field to 
writing, the participant, in the writing hands of the researcher, is not moving and 
developing with time. As the participants in their own lives, as time passes, move on, 
develop, change, grow and so forth, their narratives, in the research report, become 
an irreversible ‘freeze-frame-version’ of themselves (2008, p. 57). The knowledge of 
this, or reading a publication, O’Connell Davidson (2008) argues, could be harmful. 
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The ‘freeze-frame-version’, might be uncomfortable or, as for Leila, embarrassing 
when faced with it many years later. Giving more transparent information to par-
ticipants about this academically taken-for-granted process where personal life sto-
ries become data would possibly diminish negative experiences of ‘being done to’ 
(Bell 2014). For Leila’s part, reading about the fragments of her 16–17-year-old self 
in my book seems not only to have evoked negative feelings, but also more positive 
ones as she writes that it was fun as well as interesting to read her own words. She 
also writes that she was glad that I ‘managed to see the positives in it all’, which in 
my interpretation refers back to how I framed the methodological dilemmas in the 
book. Her e-mail is thus a mix of emotional responses deriving from her reading of 
the book. This duality in her response also indicates how multilayered, contradictory 
and emotionally mixed participating in qualitative research might be for those who 
agree to do this.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have discussed how the implementation of the formal ethical 
principle of informed consent in practice, in my research project, was not a rational 
but a rather contradictory, open-ended process. Asking for consent might give rise 
to replies that shift over time or due to context, mixed or non-verbal signals or even 
silences. The practice of consent might also have an impact on participants beyond 
the actual research process: for instance, as for Leila, when faced with the researcher’s 
interpretation of their personal interview accounts. This all, I argue, requires an 
overall long-term reflexive (re)thinking that not only settles with the participant’s 
signature on the consent form but is perceptive towards ethical and methodological 
dilemmas, broken-off communications, silences and mixed signals that might occur 
throughout the process. Moreover, acknowledging the shifting power dynamics at 
play between researcher and research participant, during the fieldwork as well as 
when writing, not only might contribute to a more dynamical understanding of 
methodological dilemmas (such as informed consent), but could also lead to the 
recognition of participants as agents in the research process.
The reflexive practice of going back in time to revisit and make meaning of 
methodological dilemmas and discomforts of the past that I have undertaken for this 
chapter has been a valuable learning insight for me as a researcher. I have taken the 
time to reflect on, and to some extent revalue, methodological dilemmas that I was 
faced with during the fieldwork and how these dilemmas could be understood from 
a distance. Overall, I would characterize the fieldwork I conducted for this study as 
fragmented in the sense that interviews were often, but not always, short; scheduled 
interviews did not always happen; participants whom I thought I had recruited sud-
denly and silently, or with an excuse, withdrew themselves. Due to this, at the time 
of the fieldwork I undervalued my research skills, as well as the empirical material 
that came from it, while admiring researchers who established closer relationships 
with their subjects of study and thereby, I imagined, were able to hold longer and 
possibly richer interviews. Today I see this somewhat differently. As I have shown in 
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this chapter, even reluctant participants who are not very talkative, who are difficult 
to get hold of, who speak in fragments or only when they feel like it (even 5 years 
later, such as Leila) have significant narratives to tell. Needless to say, my reactions to 
the difficulties I faced also capture the interesting relationality that exists between 
researchers and those we research, especially regarding how dependent researchers 
are on participants’ consent, their acts and the quality of the empirical material that 
participants ‘generate’.
Note
 1 For further discussions on how some stories might require a group constellation that 
shares similar experiences for these experiences to be verbalized, see Sixtensson (2018).
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3
CREATING KNOWLEDGE THROUGH 
COMMUNITY THEATRE
No Border Musical and the making of 
representations
Emma Söderman
When I started to participate in the No Border Musical, I was hidden [gömd], so 
it was a bit difficult for me to go out and be visible, but then I thought that I 
must be visible and show that this is unfair and, yeah, and then I thought that 
it is important to be in this musical and inform people [about the situation 
for undocumented people].
(Nima, panel discussion, 09.11.2013)
In this quote from a panel discussion after a performance of the No Border Musical, 
Nima, who was an actor in the performance, puts forward that due to residing as 
an undocumented migrant with an overhanging threat of expulsion, he was sup-
posed to be invisible. Nima had contested this invisibility by entering on stage, thus 
making himself visible in public. Initiated by activists in the local migrant rights 
movement in Malmö, Sweden, the No Border Musical was created in 2011 and con-
tinued until 2013. The ensemble was constituted by people linked to the migrant 
rights movement; about half of the participants resided as undocumented during 
parts of the 2-year period of working together in the ensemble. Those residing as 
undocumented had sought asylum in Sweden as unaccompanied minors, but had 
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received a decision of expulsion due to the Dublin II Regulation.1 One important 
motivation for the No Border Musical was to illustrate the consequences of restric-
tive asylum policies and violent migration control. Immersed in the context of the 
local migrant rights movement, while critically addressing inequalities, the creation 
of the musical performance shares characteristics with theatre practices commonly 
described as ‘community theatre’ (van Erven 2001).
My aim in this chapter is to analyze the making of the No Border Musical, from 
the perspective of a politics of representation, meaning that I analyze how specific 
practices of representation play out in a particular time and place (Hall 1997; see 
also Introduction in this volume), in this case a community theatre in a context of 
migration control and the migrant rights movement in Sweden. I address the poli-
tics of representation through an analysis of the relationships between the stories 
performed on stage and the actors’ own biographies, the contestation of invisibility 
connected to migration status, as well as through exploring the absences in the 
making of the musical’s performance of representations of experiences of migra-
tion. Absences in this chapter work as an entry point to discuss some aspects of ten-
sions in the making of representations. Furthermore, community theatre as a way of 
explicitly working with experiences and representation may also give new insight 
to the politics of representation played out in practical and performative work (cf. 
Kaptani and Yuval-Davis 2008).
The following chapter is a reflection on the methodology used in the study 
Resistance through acting: Ambivalent practices of the No Border Musical (Söderman 2019). 
It was an ethnography of the musical in which I participated as a researcher as well 
as a non-professional actor with a background in migrant rights activism. Besides 
having taken part in the processes I study, I had thus also been engaged in the larger 
context of migrant rights activism within which the musical took place. This meth-
odological entry point can be referred to as ‘activist research’ (Hale 2008), which I 
address further below.
Before discussing activist research, I continue with a section situating the chapter 
in relation to discussions within research on theatre, specifically different forms of 
participatory theatre. I furthermore provide a short description on the content of 
the No Border Musical’s performance, followed by the analytical parts of the chapter 
where I discuss different tensions in relation to the musical’s working process of 
creating representations of migration control. I conclude the chapter with some 
suggestions on how activist research and community theatre as research method 
can provide in-depth knowledge concerning how the politics of representation is 
played out in practice.
Theatre and the politics of representation
As I mentioned in the introduction, the No Border Musical could be understood as 
community theatre. Community theatre, as a form of collaborative performance and 
working process of theatre production, can be traced back to various forms of coun-
tercultural, radical, anti- and post-colonial, educational and liberational theatres of 
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the 1960s and 1970s (van Erven 2001). Today, the combination of artistic and politi-
cal practices in theatre production has many names: community theatre, commu-
nity-based theatre, grassroots theatre, theatre for social change, social theatre, applied 
theatre, etc. The Brazilian writer and theatre director Augusto Boal has been very 
influential in the field of community theatre with his work on the theatre of the 
oppressed (Boal 1979), where theatre is understood as a form of ‘rehearsal’ for revo-
lution. Community theatre connects to political and popular theatre in the sense of 
trying to create platforms for addressing political issues. Furthermore, community 
theatre also aims for a collaborative working process including people living in 
communities affected by issues addressed in the performance (Salverson 2011). The 
aim of creating the No Border Musical, in a context of borders and violent control 
of migration, was to make visible the consequences these processes have for indi-
viduals in need of protection. The musical thus combined aesthetic expression and 
a collaborative working process, with an ambition to transform the present society.
One underlying assumption about the work of the musical seems to be that 
increased ‘approval’ of refugees will come from facing them and gaining knowl-
edge of their experiences as refugees. Within the field of participatory theatre, this 
is a common assumption, which can be connected to Levinas’ ideas of ‘the face’ 
(Thompson 2011). In the meeting with the face of the other, Levinas traces an 
actualization of an ethical responsibility, combined with a realization that we can-
not fully know the other. Inspired by Levinas, theatre scholar Thompson writes: ‘the 
face can be conceived of as having a force that operates at the level of affect, and 
one that suggests, or makes us feel, the restriction in our capacity for understanding’ 
(Thompson 2011, p. 162). In regard to the assumption of affect when meeting the 
face of the other, creating a theatre about bordering and migration control together 
with actors having experiences of these issues, in a context of the asylum system and 
of provision of refuge to refugees, is still a balancing act. For example, there is a risk 
of reproducing a rather violent ‘imperative to tell’ (Thompson 2011, pp. 56 ff.) to 
prove oneself worthy of receiving protection within the state. Participatory theatre 
is argued to ‘tread a precarious line between producing validation, on the one hand, 
and victimhood, on the other’ (Jeffers 2008, p. 217).
Theatre can, furthermore, in itself be understood as a space of transformation, 
of boundlessness, where the actors are at least temporarily transformed by acting 
in character and where there is potential for the audience to be transformed by 
the performance (Wittrock 2011). The artists on stage acting in character are not 
themselves, at the same time as they are not not themselves (Schechner 1985). In 
other words, the audience will read the actor through notions of what the looks and 
actions of the actor signal to them, in combination with the character performed 
by the actor (Wittrock 2011). In a context of theatre performances addressing issues 
of asylum and refugees, theatre scholar Caroline Wake uses the concept of faceness 
to capture the conflation between the actor and the character: ‘Faceness refers to 
the vague and generalized humanity that an audience grants asylum seekers when 
they see a face that looks – to them, at least – like what an asylum seeker’s face 
might look like’ (Wake 2013, p. 113). Wake uses the concept of faceness to analyze 
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the phenomenon of actors acting as someone else, but at the same time being cast 
due to their personal (in contrast to professional) biography, as well as actors acting 
as themselves.
Together, the ensemble created a performance addressing experiences of migra-
tion control and asylum processes, where some of the actors could also be read by 
the audience as carriers of these experiences; thus, fruitful for exploring how the 
politics of representation is played out in practical and performative work. As I will 
discuss below, the musical could be understood to blur and/or fuse the relation 
between the biography of the actors with experiences of migration control and the 
characters illustrating similar hardships on stage. Before proceeding with the analy-
sis, I provide a short note on my role as a researcher and participant in the musical.
A short note on activist research
If theatre in general, and community theatre in particular, could be understood as 
boundless or as boundary-crossing, in terms of transformation of character/actor/
audience, and in terms of crossing boundaries of politics and art, then this chapter 
could also be seen as resting on yet another crossing of academic work, activism 
and art. My fieldwork was thus, for me, not just a time for collecting the material 
for my thesis. I was part of the ensemble and, during the approximately 2 years of 
working with the musical, it was a large part of my everyday life. I shared an apart-
ment with participants in the musical, met participants when we rehearsed and per-
formed, or in the streets, over a cup of coffee, for interviews, etc. Some participants 
in the musical were already friends of mine, as we had worked together in the local 
migrant rights group prior to joining the ensemble, and other participants became 
my friends and interlocutors during the process of creating the performance. The 
overall context to which I and the musical belong/ed can be described as a network 
of friends, activists and acquaintances who in one way or another are involved in 
or sympathize with political organizing, seeking to transform injustices in society, 
including injustices facing people subject to violent migration control. The aca-
demic research was integrated into this context and its point of entry was an insight 
that academia is yet another arena in which the struggles against injustices can and 
need to take place through knowledge production. Representing and analyzing 
processes and practices of the No Border Musical was one such project.
Frequently grounded in feminist epistemologies, the combination of academic 
work and political involvement has sometimes been called ‘activist research’ (Hale 
2008). It is related to the praxis of critical ethnography as it often involves cre-
ating knowledge setting out from some kind of participation in the communi-
ties and issues being studied. The musical was a forum for dialogues, struggles and 
knowledge creation around some of the pressing issues of our time, such as asylum, 
migration, belonging, recognition, injustice, redistribution and borders, played out 
in specific ways according to the times and locations of the performances. From my 
experiences of working with the musical, I suggest that the boundaries between the 
knowledge created within academia and the knowledge created through activism 
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need to be questioned (see also Chesters 2012). I further suggest that theatre as part 
of methodology can provide possibilities to create new knowledge (cf. Kaptani and 
Yuval-Davis 2008): in this chapter, knowledge about the politics of representation 
played out in practice in the context of community theatre and migration con-
trol. The musical’s working process and performances formed a ‘possibility of radi-
cal perspective from which to see and create, to imagine alternatives, new worlds’ 
(hooks 2004, p. 157), simultaneously also being permeated by dividing lines con-
nected to precarious legal status.
Warm-up before one of the earliest shorter performances by the No Border Musical. 
Photograph: Amelie Herbertsson.
The musical performance included stories of experiences of migration and seek-
ing asylum in Europe, as well as addressed questions of who enjoys the privilege 
of travelling without constraints. It also illustrated a utopian world without borders 
where people themselves would be able to choose which locations to call home. 
The scenography was simple, with black boxes being moved around to represent 
borders, tables or a podium for speakers during a political rally. To portray the shift 
between a no-borders future/present, and a bordering present/past, different light-
ing, music and textiles were used.
The overarching narrative of the musical performance patchwork was situated in 
the future, where the characters met to celebrate the anniversary of the abolition of 
nation-state borders. Through the different characters, the audience was then shown 
how things used to look when borders sorted, differentiated and separated people. 
The audience met characters working for the Swedish Migration Agency, charac-
ters residing as undocumented, and characters who were charged in court due to 
helping detainees to escape. The performance also told stories of how the borders 
were abolished, and how numerous small acts of resistance together overthrew the 
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system. The performance lasted for about 1 hour and 40 minutes. The musical was 
performed in Malmö, Norrköping and Stockholm during 2012–2013.
First page of the programme distributed when the musical was performed. Illustration: 
Sofie Persson
Experiences of migration control on stage
The musical’s script was based on stories gathered from persons connected to the 
local migrant rights movement, but not necessarily participants of the ensemble, 
drawing on their experiences as asylum-seekers, undocumented persons and/or 
engaged in migrant rights issues. Thus, whilst the performance was aimed at making 
experiences of migration control and the violence of borders visible, it did not claim 
to represent any of the actors’ personal experiences of seeking asylum. At the same 
time, the actors with experiences of seeking asylum and residing as undocumented 
were not not performing their experiences, either in relation to how they were 
viewed by the audience or other participants, or in relation to how they themselves 
talked about the performance.
When I first came to the musical, I didn’t know what it was all about. Then 
I realized that the story was about Jawad [a character on stage]. That it was 
about a life very similar to my own. So, I thought, it’s good to participate and 
perform in front of people because this is my life too.
(Alireza, interview, 09.10.2012)
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This is my life too, says Alireza, thus highlighting that, although he had not shared 
his personal experiences as a starting point for writing the musical’s script, he felt 
that what he was performing on stage was similar to what he had experienced as 
a migrant seeking refuge. That some of the actors had experiences similar to those 
performed on stage was also highlighted by participants without personal experi-
ences of migration control:
I think that it [the musical] gave a voice and face to the people who have gone 
through this, that it’s super-important for all these stories and experiences to 
be given a voice and identity, and not just a sad identity but one that perhaps 
has experienced nice things or perhaps is both angry and happy, frightened 
and brave and so on.
(Lena, group interview, 28.09.2015)
What Alireza and Lena are each talking about, although from different positions, is 
the idea that to be face-to-face with the other opens up possibilities for a deepened 
understanding of the other (Thompson 2011). At the same time, the other is irre-
ducible to the representation of the face (Burggraeve 1999). Partly, this is what Lena 
is talking about: through the process of creating a theatre about migration control 
and bordering practices, the other has been made visible to her in more complex 
forms (as ‘angry and happy, frightened and brave’), and she thinks that this more 
‘full’ or ‘complex’ face of the other might be visible in the musical’s performance as 
well. To this discussion, the concept of faceness adds a caution that when a person 
racialized as brown/black performs experiences of migration control on stage, inde-
pendent of whether their personal biography accords with those experiences, the 
actor is understood as, and maybe also limited to, being a carrier of the experiences 
of flight, bordering and migration control (see Wake 2013). As Lena said, this was 
partly the purpose: to provide these experiences of seeking asylum, and of migration 
control, with a face, a face that would signal a more complex human being than 
would appear when limited to viewing people only through categories of asylum-
seeker or refugee. This makes visible a tension: on the one hand, to use a category, or 
experiences, as a point of departure for political mobilization to make visible what 
mainstream society has not acknowledged; on the other hand, the risk of reproduc-
ing the very category one aims to dismantle.2
In relation to racism specifically, Burggraeve (1999), building on Levinas, argues 
that:
the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or the failure to appreciate, 
similarities between people, but in the denial of, or better said, failure to 
appreciate and value, people’s differences, or better still, the fundamental and 




That is, unique in the sense that they are not possible to fit into any given category, 
or to be given any specific label. The point of departure for the participants of 
the musical was that in the act of highlighting experiences of bordering practices, 
partly through having actors with these experiences on stage, a critique of the 
migration regime was included. Simultaneously, this type of mobilization seems 
to carry a danger of saying that, ‘Look, even though they are refugees, they are like 
us (they can be happy, brave, sad etc.).’ Furthermore, besides a couple of excep-
tions, the whole musical was in Swedish, which could be understood as a way 
to communicate to a (Swedish) audience that, ‘Look, they [refugees] are like us 
[Swedes] as they can speak Swedish.’ By only viewing the performance and not 
knowing anything about its context, this analysis could certainly be put forward. 
Through my participation in the working process of the musical, however, I know 
that it leaves out some important aspects. Performing experiences of migration 
control on stage can be put in contrast to the experiences of being made invisible 
in society, as one participant said about residing undocumented: ‘It felt as if I was 
far away from society’ (Alireza, interview, 9 October 2012). The seriousness of this 
experience, of being ‘far from society’ or being made invisible, has been empha-
sized by research concerned with undocumented persons in a Swedish context 
(Sager 2011, 2018). Sager highlights the fear of being unseen, at the same time 
as one fears being seen, in the sense of being detected as undocumented (Sager 
2011, 2018).
The participants in the musical who resided as undocumented with an over-
hanging threat of being expelled all expressed fear as a constant companion in 
their everyday life. Fear of being detected as undocumented affected how they 
moved around in the city, their mental and physical health, how they made contact 
with new people, and of course also the work of the musical. During the 2 years 
of working together, the issue of safety for participants residing as undocumented 
was discussed continuously and different measures were taken to decrease risks of 
detection. The fear of participants being detected as undocumented also affected 
my entry point for understanding the experiences of performing on stage for those 
residing as undocumented, where I thought that performing would necessarily be 
intertwined with strong feelings of fear. Contrary to what I had expected, Nima, 
upon my question about how he had experienced standing on stage as undocu-
mented, answered:
When I was on stage, I did not even think of the police or that I’m undocu-
mented. I just felt that I’m part of a musical and I’m on stage and I’m going 
to perform well.
(Nima, interview, 15.04.2014)
The first quote in this chapter was also from Nima, where he said that he had felt 
a need to be visible and to inform others about the situation of undocumented 
people in Sweden. Through performing different stories related to experiences of 
migration control and bordering practices, the musical sought to create knowledge 
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and, through knowledge, change in the migration regime. The stories told in the 
musical were understood in relation to what the actors signalled to the audience 
through their bodily appearance, and the actors themselves also talked about the 
stories performed in relation to their own experiences of migration control, or as a 
way to give these experiences a ‘face’. However, as Nima’s quote points to, perform-
ing in the musical was also about being part of a theatre group and of doing well 
when on stage, of creating a good performance.
‘Right kind’ of visibility
Migrant protests often involve struggles to be visible and audible; at the same time, 
making oneself visible includes a risk of being subject to migration control (Tyler 
and Marciniak 2013). Although the point of departure is the situation of undocu-
mented individuals, Sager (2016, 2018) argues that the tension between invisibility 
and visibility in the Swedish context is not limited to the category of undocumented, 
but also concerns people subject to racialization in general. Critical post-colonial 
and antiracist research has brought to light that ‘the approach of the Swedish wel-
fare institutions towards racialised citizens and residents, as well as political debates 
on issues such as migration, racism, discrimination and colonialism, is characterised 
by an interaction between invisibility and hypervisibility’ (Sager 2018, p. 176). The 
experiences of racism of groups subject to racialization are not acknowledged and 
those groups are denied representation as part of Sweden in the labour market 
and in the social and cultural spheres – and are thus made invisible. At the same 
time, these groups are subject to hypervisibility, where they are represented through 
images of criminalization, victimization, pathologization and stigmatization in gen-
eral. Quoting Lacatus, Sager highlights that: ‘Sociocultural visibility is a process, a 
continuous and dynamic negotiation for the right kind of exposure’ (Lacatus 2008, 
p. 125, cited in Sager 2016, p. 118). The musical could be seen as a negotiation of 
the ‘right kind’ of exposure and visibility and as providing a chance to choose an 
arena from where to be seen, from where to speak, as well as what subjects, and from 
which angles, to address.
One text in the musical’s script was written by a person who had been deported 
from Sweden to Afghanistan. He was never part of the ensemble but contributed 
by writing this poem, which was then reworked into a song in the performance. 
His words travelled from Afghanistan to Sweden. Traces of this travel remained in 
the text: there was sometimes an absence of the letters å, ä and ö (it was written 
in Swedish) and he occasionally included an explanation of pieces of text inside 
brackets. For example, after the sentence ‘thunderstorms cause terror now in skies 
that are quite clear’, he wrote ‘(thunderstorms in clear skies are bombs dropped in 
Afghanistan, last week 87 died in my hometown)’.
This poem is a story beginning with his experiences of residing as undocu-
mented in Sweden, of being detected, put in a detention centre and then deported. 
His voice was clearly not supposed to be heard or represented in public. By being 
detained and deported from Swedish territory, he had been made into a mere 
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commodity to be stored (detention centre, förvar in Swedish, translates as ‘storage’ 
or ‘warehouse’) and transported. However, his words travelled to Sweden – first 
to Malmö and, eventually, all the way to the Young Royal Dramatic Theatre3 in 
Stockholm. While it did not change the fact that he had been deported, it did con-
test the act of deportation as an act of silencing and of making invisible. The poem 
he wrote that became a song in the musical was called Sick system:
I travelled over half the earth
asking for no more than a little peace
the pens in their hands were like knives and they made red crosses at my name
Refrain: I got lost on streets that lay in darkness the sun was shining but I cast 
no shadow the system is sick
thunderstorms cause terror now in skies that are quite clear (thunderstorms in 
clear skies are bombs dropped in Afghanistan, last week 87 died in my home 
town)
straight roads are like mountains that have to be climbed
I was not cold behind doors that were closed
but felt the chill of their hearts that were cold
handcuffs and cells have made me disappear
what will they do now? for I will not stop fighting
Refrain
faked smiles and bent words on paper disappoint
(the Migration Agency uses strange language in its letters, they say one thing 
and mean something else)
I knew that all they wanted was to play
how can human beings be illegal
I don’t understand, can someone explain
they block the way between the doctor and the sick
can someone tell me how much lower they can sink
Refrain
sometimes I just want to let go of it all
I got tired, the pressure was too great
some fine people came and taught me a lesson, my fate is for myself alone to 
decide,
now I want to reach out my hand for the others for that’s my only way to 
avenge
These words were read on stage in a spoken-word style by four actors (two sharing 
the author’s experiences of residing as undocumented in Sweden and two actors 
without these experiences), and a choir of actors sang the refrain in between each 
verse. In the refrain, ‘the sun was shining but I cast no shadow’ may be interpreted 
as referring to the existential dimension of being made invisible in relation to the 
experience of residing as undocumented. In this sense, to have the experiences as 
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undocumented represented on stage can be understood as a contestation of being 
made invisible, of being non-represented (or of being represented in ‘wrong’ ways, 
as a criminal for example). Furthermore, the poem does not end with the deporta-
tion. Instead, it ends with a desire to avenge. And this desire is formulated as an act 
of solidarity: ‘Some fine people came and taught me a lesson, my fate is for myself 
alone to decide, now I want to reach out my hand for the others for that’s my only 
way to avenge’.
In the song, there is resistance against the condition of being undocumented 
and there is also a rising-up and an aim to avenge. Another form of visibility, break-
ing with the limitations of invisibility or hypervisibility, is created in this song. The 
poem may be viewed as a process of struggling for the right kind of visibility, where 
the poem addresses invisibility (‘no shadow’) and hypervisibility (being criminalized 
through detention and deportation) but ends with a form of visibility that is rebel-
lious and based on solidarity.
Tensions in the making of representations
Besides the poem/song referred to above, the musical performance included rewrit-
ten versions of popular songs, as well as lyrics and songs written by the musical’s 
participants themselves. These varied in style and included punk, rap, spoken word, 
electro and singer-songwriter. The musical genres may be linked to the milieu of 
activism from which the No Border Musical grew, and the songs from the musical 
have also been sung at a number of protests and demonstrations after it was per-
formed. Absent from the performance were music and songs originating from the 
countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Palestine) where some of the ensemble 
had grown up. This absence points to some of the tensions in terms of the making of 
representations in the musical; added to that, the process of making some stories or 
experiences visible always carries the risk of unintentionally contributing to other 
issues staying invisible (Fernandes 2017).
Considering which characters were played by whom, it seems as though it was 
easier for actors with personal experiences of migration control to cross over and 
play, for example, the head of the Migration Agency, police officers and prosecu-
tor, than for actors without such experiences to cross over and stage experiences of 
flight and separation. This happened only once, with two undocumented characters, 
where the focus was more on resistance than on the suffering produced by violent 
migration control.
All actors with bodily appearance who could be read as performing their personal 
experiences of migration control were young men from Somalia and Afghanistan 
(except for a woman who joined later in the process), a reflection of the contact net 
of the local migrant rights group at the time. Besides the young male actors with 
experiences of flight, the majority of the rest of the ensemble were white women/
queers in their 25s–35s. Despite this rather specific composition of the ensemble, 
the different bodily appearances of the actors in terms of perceptions of gender, race 
and/or nationality were hardly ever brought up in the ensemble.
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One exception was when the young woman, who was part of the ensemble 
in its later stages, pointed out in a panel discussion after a performance that, 
before she joined, there were no women with experiences of migration control 
in the group:
‘where are all the undocumented women?’ I mean, they are here in Sweden; 
I know that they exist. I’m proof of that! But where are they? Why are they 
not seen or heard?
(Salam, panel discussion, 09.11.2013)
Furthermore, I recall only once that the issue of how the audience would perceive 
the characters in terms of race was discussed in the ensemble. A participant with 
experiences of residing as undocumented said, when we were recreating a scene of 
a deportation and border control, that it might not be clear to the audience what 
would be happening on stage, as the actors playing the roles of the border guards 
had ‘black’ and not ‘yellow’ hair. In the end, it was decided not to change the casting 
to a border guard with ‘yellow’ hair because the content of the scene was presumed 
to be sufficiently clear without such a change.
Although not explicitly voiced by the participants, this discussion is closely 
related to the ‘faceness’ of the actors. An actor signalling a personal biography of 
flight and migration control to the audience was perceived to be less suitable for 
playing the role of a border guard, whereas an actor perceived as white was pre-
sumed to provide a clearer picture of a border guard in the story told on stage. A 
white body was thus assumed to represent violent border controls in a clearer man-
ner. Both Salam’s critique and the rehearsal of this scene shed light, as mentioned, 
on the fact that the actors with experiences of migration control, when playing 
certain characters, both understood themselves and were read as revealing their 
personal experiences, although the script was not based on these. Nonetheless, how 
the roles were distributed between the different actors was not subject to any in-
depth discussions with the whole ensemble. At the same time, there seemed to have 
been an assumption related to the bodily appearance of the actors with experiences 
of flight and migration control, as can be inferred from the quote above, of giving 
these experiences a ‘face’. During the working process, however, there was silence 
around what the bodily appearance of the actors meant for the performance, both 
in terms of gender and race.
The absence of discussions on matters of the different bodily appearances of 
the actors on stage can be put in relation to issues of representation within the 
migrant rights movement. In Sweden, the migrant rights movement was founded 
in the 1980s, in a context marked by restrictive migration reforms and racist and 
antiracist mobilizations (Jämte 2013). According to a governmental study from 
1999, the migrant rights movement (termed ‘flyktinggömmarna’ [refugee hiders] 
in the study) was part of a new generation of movements in Sweden, linked to 
the broader antiracist movement. The early migrant rights movement has gener-
ally involved individuals born in Sweden who, due to religious beliefs or political 
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conviction and/or due to encounters with rejected asylum–seekers, have chosen 
to act (SOU 1999, Rosengren 2009). Although not all participants in the musical 
had a background of involvement in the migrant rights movement, a majority of 
the participants without experiences of migration control took part in activities 
and/or were in different ways engaged in the milieu of extra-parliamentary activ-
ism. Contemporaneous with the period when the musical was active, there were 
ongoing discussions in the local migrant rights movement and its wider extra-
parliamentary leftist context about who was perceived as an ‘activist’ and what 
this label entailed. These discussions also included problematizing the experienced 
homogeneity and whiteness of the activist scene. The migrant rights movement 
in this context stood out as it involved more people with a migrant background 
themselves, most of whom were women/queers (Hansen 2019). In the ensemble, 
however, a vast majority of those with a background in the migrant rights move-
ment or extra-parliamentary left were women/queers without personal experi-
ences of racism and/or migration control. The idea behind the musical also came 
from activists without any direct experiences of seeking asylum or being subject to 
migration control; even so, partly as a consequence of being situated in a migrant 
rights movement where discussions linked to issues of representation were on the 
agenda, the ensemble came to be constituted both by people with experiences of 
residing as undocumented and by people without these experiences. Yet, despite 
the discussion on representation within the migrant rights movement growing 
during the period the ensemble was working together,4 the issue of represen-
tation in terms of how the actors would be read by the audience with regard 
to, for example, gender, nationality or race was not something discussed to any 
great extent during the working process of the musical. When it was discussed, it 
focused on the risks of being detected and arrested for those who could be read 
as undocumented.5
I suggest that the absence of discussions in the musical around how differ-
ent actors would be perceived by the audience may be related to the fact that 
the migrant rights movement, at least previously, has often prioritized prob-
lems of racism in relation to state practices of migration control – maybe at the 
expense of engaging in questions about the risk of reproducing problematic 
representations through the practices within the movement. Further, in rela-
tion to risks of detection and deportation, self-representation may have been 
perceived as too risky in many situations. The ambition to assess and prevent the 
risk of participants being detected as undocumented was a central issue during 
the musical’s working process. Furthermore, for the individuals risking deporta-
tion, contesting this expulsion may be articulated as the first priority, and the 
focus of the migrant rights movement on repressive state practices (instead of 
on internal representation) may be understood as a response to this priority as 
well. Nonetheless, I do still find it remarkable that, during the period that the 
ensemble (including myself) was working and performing together, issues of 




Thank you for seeing me, when the law forced me to be invisible
Thank you for daring to be visible, despite it being dangerous
(Script, No Border Musical)
This quote pinpoints a central aspect of the work of the musical: of highlighting 
experiences of migration control and of residing as undocumented in Sweden. Fear 
in relation to those actors residing as undocumented being detected by the police 
was present throughout the work of the musical, and the above quote is part of a 
scene that formulates both the act of making oneself visible and of seeing the person 
made visible, as acts part of an abolition of borders.
I started this chapter by suggesting that the musical performance and its mak-
ing illuminated a politics of representation, understood as the relation between the 
actor’s biography and the character they played, contestation of invisibility con-
nected to residing as undocumented, and tensions in the making of representa-
tions of migration control. I also suggested that community theatre as part of a 
methodological point of entry could give new insights into how the politics of 
representation is managed in practice. Analyzing the matter of making representa-
tions of migration control in the context of the musical showed that one issue of 
representation, that of being made visible as undocumented on stage, as in the quote 
above, was continuously addressed in the musical’s work. This, while discussions on 
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the issue of perceptions of the bodily appearances of the actors in terms of gender, 
race and/or nationality, to a large extent were absent, which I understand to have 
been connected to challenges of representation in political struggles, specifically the 
migrant rights movement.
Community theatre as method in my case provided an analytical angle that could 
move beyond seeing the work of the musical only within the framework of a violent 
imperative to tell in order to be accepted as a refugee, to valuing the work of the 
musical in terms of contesting the existential dimension of invisibility connected 
to residing as undocumented in Sweden. It also provided an in-depth knowledge 
about how the script and the performance were created, including those aspects of 
representation that were absent from the process of creating the performance. My 
background in the local migrant rights movement and my participation in creating 
the musical performance, simultaneously with doing fieldwork for my thesis, gave 
insight into the complexities and difficulties of activism through community theatre, 
here analyzed in relation to the politics of representation, an analysis which I suggest 
is relevant both for an academic and an activist audience. This because methodologi-
cal questions and activism involve not only ‘premises about truth and how it may 
be known and understood’, but as important also is ‘how one goes about acquiring 
that knowledge’ (De Genova 2005, p. 21, italics in original). At a time when bordering 
practices become ever more violent and far-reaching, researchers engage in struggles 
setting out from a common ground (in this case, to participate in creating a perfor-
mance), and may contribute to the issues at hand, whilst also contributing to discus-
sions about the complexities and difficulties of practices of solidarity in precarious 
settings. Finally, it may also spark possibilities of imagining and creating alternatives.
The pain experienced as a consequence of strict migration control and racism is 
severe, and to focus on how this can be resisted, how alternatives can be created, as 
well as visions for another world, are as important now as when the musical was per-
formed. Sweden follows the European (and the rich parts of the world in general) 
trend to pour money and resources into practices of detention, deportation and bor-
der control. Furthermore, not only migrants are criminalized but those in solidarity 
with migrants also face criminalization, which might make the support and politi-
cal work for migrant rights even more difficult. The solidarities that can be created 
in this context are precarious, probably temporary and need to adapt to a rapidly 
changing landscape of racism and migration control. A fundamental concern is, of 
course, to be cautious about how these solidarities might also reproduce aspects of 
the same structures of oppression that they aim to dismantle. Meanwhile, to work 
towards their creation, and prolonged presence, even if inchoate, is of utmost impor-
tance. I’ll give the final words to the musical:
Initiating fight mode
All passports in the sea
There’s a new time ahead of us
Where we’ll all be free
(Song, ‘Nations are bad for you’, No Border Musical)
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Notes
 1 The Dublin II Regulation is a binding measure of European Community law, which stipu-
lates that the first EU country to which the asylum-seeker arrives is responsible for process-
ing the application. If the asylum-seeker seeks asylum in another EU country, he/she will 
in most cases (there are exceptions to this rule; however, they are applied restrictively in 
Sweden) be deported back to the first country of arrival. Signed by Sweden in 1995, the 
Dublin Convention was replaced by the Dublin II Regulation in 2003; that Regulation 
was in turn replaced by the Dublin III Regulation in 2013. The participants in the musi-
cal fell under the jurisdiction of the Dublin II Regulation.
 2 This is by no means a new discussion but has, for example, been part of the feminist 
movement and the mobilization, as well as theoretization, setting out from ‘women’s’ 
experiences (Mulinari and Sandell 1999).
 3 Two of the last performances of the musical were staged at the reputable venue of 
the Young Royal Dramatic Theatre in Stockholm, where theatre intended to attract a 
younger audience is created.
 4 This was also related to mobilizations initiated by young people in Malmö, who them-
selves had experiences of coming to Sweden and seeking asylum (see Djampour and 
Söderman 2016).
 5 During the period of working with the musical, Malmö was part of a pilot project 
(REVA) for making deportations from Sweden more effective. Partly due to this project, 
there were numerous ID controls carried out by the police in the streets. Generally, in 
recent years the police have also received ever-increasing resources to carry out internal 
control of foreigners (Arena idé 2014 [Arena Think-Tank 2014] and Rikspolisstyrelsen 
2009–2012 [the National Police Board 2009–2012]).
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WAITING
The shrouded backbone of ethnographic 
research
Pankhuri Agarwal
My fieldwork in Delhi (India) for 7 months in 2019 documented the lived experi-
ence of how internal migrant workers1 in the informal sector navigated the legal 
system. Even as citizens, internal migrants lose access to welfare rights once they 
cross the physical boundaries of their home states and move to Delhi because wel-
fare provisions (such as housing and food) are dependent on their proof of residence. 
The lack of portability of welfare provisions together with the precarious nature 
of their work such as in sex work, brick kiln work, construction work and others, 
often leads them to being rescued under the bonded labour and anti-trafficking laws, 
whether by force, choice or accident.2 After rescue, they are taken to district courts 
for determination of their legal status (victim, accused or none), to prisons or shelters 
depending on their legal status, to courts for trial and to various other state offices for 
paperwork and rehabilitation assistance. This is a tedious, uncertain and long process 
that is not linear or time-bound. The aim of my research was to document the post-
rescue experience of the workers and its impact on their everyday lives.
The first 3 weeks of the fieldwork were spent waiting in various civil society and 
government offices, seminars and public events, in an effort to meet people who 
could introduce me to internal migrant workers. Eventually, I learnt that internal 
migrant workers may not live in Delhi and may come there only for legal pro-
ceedings when ordered by courts or other state institutions from their home states 
(covering distances as far as 1,300 miles). Even when they lived in Delhi, they usu-
ally travelled long distances to these locations. So, there was no option to interview 
people away from those sites. Expecting them to do so would mean their losing that 
day’s wage, missing transport back to their home state, or even being doubted and 
scolded by their employer for delays caused by the interview. The only occasion 
that most of them had any time off from work was when they visited these sites. 
Therefore, accompanying people to law offices and waiting with them were the only 
opportunities to do research. For this, I not only needed to know the right place and 
Waiting 61
time to meet people but also to be able to access the sites myself (which required 
a lot of paperwork for permissions) when workers are there, so as to contextualize 
their narratives as embedded in these sites with related law enforcement stakeholders.
But this proved difficult in a culture where not being on time is the norm, wait-
ing is normalized and casually filtering information is the sarkari3 way of doing 
things, as with most bureaucracies around the world. Moreover, relying solely on the 
observation of interactions between workers and related stakeholders seemed tricky 
because these interactions usually lasted just a few minutes, preceded and followed 
by a prolonged wait. I could not follow and document these shorter moments of 
interaction between the workers and stakeholders over an extended period of time. 
This is because of institutional and personal constraints around funding, and other 
issues4, which did not allow me to conduct research for more than 7 months. At 
the same time, too, I was unable to schedule anything with the workers outside of 
these locations, as mentioned above. The only way to do research was therefore to 
gain permission to enter the law offices and wait with the workers. The fieldwork 
thus constituted two kinds of waiting: a) waiting outside the research sites to find 
contacts, network and gain permission to access the sites and b) waiting for and with 
the workers inside those sites in order to do research. Documenting this waiting or 
even using it as an analytical and methodological tool was, however, not intended or 
realized until the end of the fieldwork. In this way, reflecting on the experience of 
waiting was central to the production of knowledge in this research as all research 
happened in waiting – whether it was waiting to gain access to research sites to 
engage in participant observation; waiting for legal case files for analysis; or waiting 
for and with the participants to conduct interviews.
Gradually, a few interlocutors introduced me to different groups of internal migrant 
workers who were at different stages of legal proceedings. As an oppressed caste5, internal 
migrant workers, whether working in Delhi or travelling there because of legal proceed-
ings, endured chronic or prolonged waiting in state and other official sites. Therefore, 
working with a civil society organization to accompany people to these sites and waiting 
with them afforded me a lot of time to have conversations that ran to several hours’ dura-
tion. I learnt that their legal cases had lasted between a few months to 37 years.6 But as I 
was using this waiting time as an opportunity to do ethnographic research, which would 
otherwise have been impossible; for the participants, this waiting time was a space of suf-
fering, lost wages (as a result of losing the day’s work), increased debt (due to expenses 
on travel and subsistence to visit legal sites) and of being in limbo for years. Further, 
our differing social locations did not democratize the experience of being in the law 
offices or even that of waiting. My middle-class and upper-caste background meant that 
I had the skills of language and acumen to acquire information to navigate the process 
of paperwork and legalities. I was also not compelled to wait and could exit these sites 
whenever I wanted to, while the workers had to continue to wait for the outcome. To 
conduct fieldwork within these constraints, fieldwork methods included conversational 
interviewing, participant observation and a study of legal case files.
In this chapter, I begin by discussing the tensions between the constraints of neo-
liberal time and the debates on what is considered ‘real ethnography’. The following 
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section will draw upon the literature on waiting to demonstrate the scope of wait-
ing for contextualizing participants’ narratives in the wider socio-political locations 
even before the participants occupy research sites or when the researcher is waiting 
to access ‘the field’. The third section, based on Bourdieu’s (2000) conception of 
time and power, will discuss waiting from the perspective of the participants, where 
waiting is used to exert control and power over workers’ time. I will extend this 
conception of waiting by arguing that waiting with the participants offers an oppor-
tunity to build relationships based on trust and respect, within time constraints. The 
final section will conclude by arguing that even though waiting is an intuitive and 
expected state of being in ethnography, actively acknowledging it as a method-
ological tool in its own right is instrumental to the production of knowledge in the 
neoliberal university.
The tension between neoliberal time and the pursuit of ‘real 
ethnography’
… the secret, beating heart of ethnographic method remains deeply human: 
getting out with a voice recorder, pen and pad, writing, negotiating, hanging 
around, watching, listening, waiting, typing, checking.
(Hamilton 2015, p. 564)
Having roots in anthropology, ethnography presupposes fieldwork and the research-
er’s immersion in the field from the point of getting access to knowing the field 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Hanging around and waiting in the field is inte-
gral to ethnography as ethnography is ‘an open-ended, iterative, non-prescriptive 
vision for social science, where the researcher is encouraged to acknowledge the 
complexity and unpredictability of the research encounter’ (Mills and Ratcliffe 2012, 
p. 155). However, in contemporary times, there are wide concerns and debates in 
doing ethnography in relation to its traditional form – studying a defined spatial site 
through participant observation while spending elongated periods of time in the 
field. Gupta and Ferguson (1997) argue that the fixed notion of ethnography on 
what constitutes ‘the field’ restricts knowledge production as the meaning of ethnog-
raphy is expanding with field sites becoming fluid and people being on the move.
Moreover, contemporary academic requirements and constraints around fund-
ing, mobility and visa issues7 do not always allow for spending long periods of time 
in the field. This reduction in time in the field comes with its challenges amidst the 
requirements of the neoliberal university to be ‘academically productive’ and to do 
more in shorter timeframes (Mountz et al. 2015). Even in the field, researchers are 
expected to practise reflexivity without having the time to do so; they are expected 
to be effective and credible without always having the time to build relationships 
in the field; they are also expected to analyze findings and publish within con-
strained time limits, lest the data be outdated (Hunt 2010). Institutional approaches 
to research view research time as buckets to be filled with productive tangible 
research activities (Bissell 2007). Thus, what can be done in the field is ‘shaped not 
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simply by intrinsic methodological merits, but by the institutional conditions of 
intellectual production’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, p. 23). The increased ‘bureaucra-
tization of time’ (Jeffrey 2008, p. 954) in the 20th century cannot be felt more than 
in the requirements of academic research, where, as Moran argues (citing Henry 
Lefebvre), waiting becomes an ‘inevitable product of the bureaucratic appropriation 
of everyday life’ (Moran 2004, p. 219) and hides the exertion of power over people’s 
time by demanding and producing submission. All of this can lead to curtailing the 
conditions under which traditional ethnography can be done.
Accordingly, what is needed is to decentre the notion of what is conceived as ‘the 
field’ from its privileged position in anthropology (which presupposes the resources 
of time and funding at one’s disposal) and to resituate traditional ethnography as one 
element in a range of methodologies for producing ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway 
1988). Gupta and Ferguson argue that this transition from a fixed notion of what 
comprises the field to ‘a sense of a mode of study that cares about, and pays atten-
tion to, the interlocking of multiple social-political sites and locations’ (1997, p. 37) 
will increase the opportunities for knowledge production where the field cannot 
be defined by spatial boundaries and people cannot be expected to exist in those 
spatial boundaries over extended periods of time. This representation of the field 
is even more necessary when one is researching people on the move, especially in 
migration and mobility studies.
While the relationship between time and power (Bourdieu 2000) and that of 
bureaucratic practice has been well studied, waiting has received relatively less schol-
arly attention (Auyero 2012). Some research has considered waiting as an analytical 
lens to study waiting as resistance for political mobilization and protest through (in)
action (Kracauer 1955, Conlon 2007) as well as active time spent working towards 
anticipated futures (Axelsson et al. 2015, Brun 2015). Other research discusses waiting 
as domination to produce exclusion and marginalization by the state’s control on peo-
ple’s time (Auyero 2012, Sutton et al. 2015, McNevin and Missbach 2018, Carswell 
et al. 2019). Even less research exists on looking at waiting from a methodological 
lens to do useful fieldwork (Mannay and Morgan 2015) or as a period of time where 
nothing is achieved in the field (Carter 2004, Bissell 2007). However, despite the 
many usages of waiting to describe the everyday life of people and also their relation-
ship with the everyday state, in disciplines ranging from anthropology, urban studies, 
sociology and medicine, there exists very little work on the relational experience of 
waiting in the field as a methodological tool in its own right, and even less in relation 
to resisting the imperatives of neoliberalism, including that of the neoliberal university. 
Thus, while waiting is common in ethnographic research, its role is underexplored in 
writing about the theoretical and methodological aspects of fieldwork.
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As discussed in the introduction, the experience of waiting in my fieldwork, 
just like the field itself, was a series of fragmented threads with untethered stitches 
where ‘the field […] was not one place that I visited regularly, it was an assembly of 
places that were continually disrupted, suspended, variously lost and found’ (Zengin 
2020, p. 346), thus disrupting the traditional notion of ethnography in researching 
a defined spatial field over extended periods of time. This created the discomfort 
of questioning whether what I was doing was ‘real ethnography’. Accordingly, my 
initial instinct in field encounters was to fight and negate the experience of waiting, 
emanating from the fear that, due to long waiting periods, the research might not 
go anywhere. But, gradually, following people through various sites, making use of 
waiting time and how people interacted with waiting spaces, along with my own 
waiting in these spaces, enabled an embodied and relational experience of waiting 
with the participants (as discussed in the following sections).
Waiting thus provided an alternative, nuanced way to understand people’s post-
rescue experience with the law by allowing the time to observe the field in ways 
that went beyond the immediate people or settings needed for research – the body 
language of people, their interaction with space, the objects they carried, the doc-
uments they were asked to produce – all of which gave insights into both the 
experience of waiting, and the working of the everyday state in India, negotiating 
which formed a central part of migrants’ lives. Further, these observations provided 
an understanding of the physical characteristics of institutional spaces, of (lack of) 
accessibility, temporal indeterminacy, and the key aspects of the lived experience 
of the law. This is more than ‘thick description’ (Picken 2013, p. 360) (based on 
the expectation of spending elongated time in the field) as a general orientation in 
ethnography because this embedded knowledge in waiting required a heightened 
awareness of space and time. By contextualizing the narratives of the participants in 
the wider social and political systems, waiting made the pursuit of thick description 
in ethnographic research merely a means and not an end. However, while waiting, 
for me, was filled with opportunities to interact with the participants and to contex-
tualize their lived experience with the law, for the participants, waiting was a source 
of suffering and uncertainty.
Waiting to enter the research sites
This lived experience of ‘unjust waiting’ was visible in the fieldwork even before the 
participants occupied the research sites. This was when I set out to meet various 
district, state and central government officials with the hope that they could intro-
duce me to field participants and give me permission to enter research sites. These 
included police officers, district magistrates, ministry and state department officials 
and labour officers. Finding their contact details, phone numbers and addresses, fix-
ing meetings and getting to their offices entailed a lot of waiting time and going 
around in circles as contact details on their websites were not always updated. Many 
a time, the buildings had no signposts or directions to rooms. Often, travelling there 
took a combination of bus, metro, taxi and auto-rickshaw, costing significant money 
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and time, not to mention the drain of energy in Delhi’s weather. Despite this, in 
most cases (barring a few exceptions8) there would be hours of waiting as the offi-
cial concerned would be busy. At other times, it was not because the offices were 
inaccessible or the official was busy, but because they would not allow access despite 
my having written permissions from the relevant department controlling access 
into closed spaces such as women’s shelters and prisons. I was made to go around 
in circles between various state officials for over 2 weeks, and a wait that lasted a 
month, to get signatures and stamps from various officials. Despite all of this, I was 
denied entry into some of the spaces.
All of this entailed discomfort that the research might not be going anywhere. 
However, it was this waiting and going around in circles that gave insights into the 
working of a bureaucratic system where, despite having networks and knowledge, I 
could not fit in many meetings at a time. Although this experience of going around 
in circles, of waiting, of finding the right offices and accessing them, was nothing 
compared to that of the participants who had been waiting for years, I still experi-
enced how discomforting and debilitating the experience of waiting can be. There 
could be waiting for an entire day or even weeks. After a while, this waiting time 
at sites became a source of curiosity into the everyday functioning of state systems, 
which formed an important part of my research in terms of studying the participants’ 
access to the state and why the laws did not work for them. In hindsight, trying to 
interview officials who dealt with their cases seemed a near-perfect way of experi-
encing it first-hand. This pursuit of knowing how waiting impacted the experience 
of internal migrant workers in accessing the law is palpable in one of my fieldnotes 
after waiting in a government office that dealt with human rights violations:
The pass is made. I am sitting in a waiting area, waiting for a senior state 
official. There are four clerks working under this officer. One is making tea, 
another is passing files, the third is doing entries on the computer and the 
fourth is reading a newspaper. The room is so silent that two different clocks 
can be heard, ticking separately. It is now 1.5 hours I have been waiting. The 
official has moved from one meeting to another as I can see him walking past 
the hall. This is understandable. This place deals with urgent cases of human 
rights violation. It is now 3 hours I have been waiting. The clerk who was 
reading the newspaper has passed it on to me. He is now drinking tea. He 
abruptly says, ‘All decisions by Sir9 only.’ I respond by asking, ‘What decisions?’ 
He replies, ‘From buying a chair, meeting people, to giving punishment.’ I 
nod in agreement. There is a poster behind his desk which has a slogan about 
coming to the office on time. I ask him, ‘So, what are your working hours 
here?’ He replies, ‘Official time is 9am to 5pm, but we have to stay until Sir 
leaves.’ At this point, Sir comes, looks at me and says, ‘Oh, you have come! 
Give me an hour more.’ It is now 3.5 hours I have been waiting.
This experience of waiting gave insights into the functioning of a government 
office where power is centralized and there is also significant power in the control 
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over the time of subordinate staff. However, while I was sitting in this office next 
to the official’s clerks, other people who had come in respect of their cases had to 
wait in a central reception area in the building with no means of checking when 
they would be called. In this way, some waiting areas showed how the spaces for 
waiting were designed to remind people of their social standing. Who could wait, 
where and why is indicative of one’s social position, purpose of visit and level of 
knowhow (jaan-pehchaan). Waiting in a state office that engaged with everyday cases 
of informal labour rights violation, I observed that:
There is a group of buildings in this large compound. Some washrooms can 
be seen in a row. One of them reads, ‘officers’ toilet’. After asking people here 
and there, I have finally found the right building, floor, hallway and room. I 
have been standing outside an official’s room for 5 minutes. A subordinate 
member of staff comes and says, ‘Please wait in the visitors’ room.’ This room 
has the dirtiest chairs one could find. One of the walls has a calendar from 
November 2018. The ceiling has a small fan. There is also a very dirty water 
filter nearby with plastic cups on the side. There are a few filing cabinets 
gathering dust. After waiting for 2.5 hours, I get to go inside ‘Sir’s’ office. This 
is the biggest office I have ever seen. It has more than two air conditioners, 
good chairs, a huge desk, shining tiles, two computers, clean glasses and more 
than one 2019 calendar.
This time, I did not get to sit with the staff and instead shared a visitors’ room with 
other people who had come concerning their cases and were frantically sorting 
their documents should they be called in suddenly; the system appeared to be ran-
dom, with no queue or numbering system. This difference in spaces (the visitors’ 
area versus the officer’s lavish office in the previous excerpt) to designate social 
inequality can also be seen in classes of train fares, flight tickets and waiting lounges 
at airports (Gasparini 1995). In this way, space is used as a marker of social difference 
where a person’s social standing is reminded to them. Space, then, can also be a tool 
to condition people into accepting their place. However, it was not only the stark 
difference between the waiting areas and the officer’s office, but also the treatment 
that people in these waiting areas were met with. In a state court which dealt with 
women’s protection issues, there was an interesting dimension as to whose waiting 
was acceptable, where and how:
After an hour, at 10am, I have finally found the right floor, which is housed 
in a building with no signposts and looks like a ruin. The waiting area is not 
separate, but a set of benches lined against a busy, narrow corridor. There is a 
row of rooms on the other side of this corridor. Each room has a staff member 
standing outside it with a list of cases to be heard on the day. People come 
in the morning, show their papers and the staff member ticks their name 
on the list. It is now 11am and I am waiting. Woman after woman comes in, 
some alone, others with family or friends. At noon, I ask the person standing 
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outside ‘Ma’am’s’ room when I will be called. He replies, ‘I don’t know when 
Ma’am will come. Everybody is waiting.’ It is 1.30pm now. Ma’am is here. 
Besides me, there are two tribal women dressed in lehenga choli10 with dupatta11 
covering their faces. A woman staff member walking in the corridor tells 
them in a raised, angry voice so everyone can hear, ‘Put your feet down and 
your dupatta up!’ The women shift in embarrassment. There is also a very old 
woman waiting for her turn. She accuses the man standing outside Ma’am’s 
office that he is allowing other people to get in when it is her turn. The man 
replies angrily, ‘It is now lunchtime from 1.30pm to 2pm. The court does not 
run by your whims!’
Comparing the above three excerpts, the fact that the four clerks in the first excerpt 
allowed me to sit with them and that the tribal women in the third were a source 
of annoyance shows how social position determines what stool or bench one can 
occupy and where. Time and space both get graduated in these encounters, where 
a person’s social standing determines what space they can occupy. Drawing on 
Foucault, Jeffrey (2010) argues that the state uses its power in very specific ways to 
condition people to act in certain ways. It can be seen in the state’s use of spaces 
where people must wait, or in its treatment of people in these spaces. The above 
excerpts show that this power to condition people, to remind them of who they 
are and where they belong, is also visible in the physical spaces of the state and law 
institutions. This waiting is not instrumental or technocratic, but is more about hier-
archies, by exercising power through people’s time while producing a false notion of 
development, hope and justice because of which people continue to wait.
These observations are a reminder of Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial (1998). Kafka’s 
universe is a performance of ‘absolute and unpredictable power’ (Bourdieu 2000, p. 
229). In my fieldwork, the iterations that preceded any given meeting with a state 
official, ranging from making the trip, to finding offices, waiting in the visitors’ 
room, to the actual meeting, are certainly Kafkaesque. Yet, rather than there being 
the boundary of the gate as in Kafka’s universe, such as the issuance of passes in the 
first excerpt of this section, it is a multilayered reality as though access is carefully 
graduated, with a stool outside the office, a bench in the hallway, a staff member 
outside the office. Neither is it the same as the state in Kafka’s world where nothing 
gets done. Something does eventually get done through these graduated, moderated 
interactions with the state, albeit slowly and incoherently. One file is passed on, one 
hearing is held, and one signature or stamp is approved, even though each of these 
seemingly small tasks may take weeks, months or even years. This institutional face 
of the state is visible in how time is understood, experienced and moderated by 
those who inhabit it through waiting.
Thus, an observation of the physical design of the waiting areas as well as the 
embodied relational experience of its inhabitants gave unexpected insights into 
the social worlds of the research participants even before they occupied these spaces. 
Observation, recording and reflecting as to how people inhabit the waiting spaces, 
how they arrive and occupy them, the institutional variations in these waiting 
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spaces, and what they understand from it offers the researcher an opportunity to 
contextualize the social worlds of the participants. This ethnographic experience 
that is accessible within these waiting times (outside of actual research sites or 
‘the field’) is an underexplored tool in ethnography to contextualize participants’ 
narratives in socio-political locations, especially when there are time constraints in 
fieldwork.
Waiting with and for the participants inside research sites
My fieldnotes have many reflective questions which indicate the central role of 
waiting in the research: ‘How much longer do I wait for the official? Why are people 
made to come to law offices early in the morning and then made to wait for the 
whole day as if they have nothing else to do?’ As more time was spent with the 
participants in law offices, they expressed anxiety which accompanied this waiting. 
They often asked me: ‘How long do we wait for? So, do we come tomorrow again? 
Did you understand what was just discussed or should we wait to ask someone?’ 
Most of the time, I did not know what we were waiting for, for whom and for 
how long. Even though we often asked these questions (amongst ourselves), we did 
not feel overly frustrated. After a while, there was a sense of acceptance in waiting. 
We would comfortably fold our legs on a chair or a bench and have conversations 
for hours while waiting. Waiting with the research participants and ‘waiting upon’ 
(Palmer et al. 2018, p. 427) them gave insights into the background conditions of the 
legal journeys of the people which were not immediately visible.
On some occasions, even when the interviews and observations in research 
sites were completed, I continued to accompany the participants to those sites and 
waited with them. I also waited for them when they were sometimes late to arrive 
for a court hearing. This helped in building trust, a sense of comfort and commit-
ment to the participants as well as the research. One day, I was waiting outside a dis-
trict magistrates’ court for Abeera12, an oppressed-class Muslim domestic worker in 
Delhi. It was the day when, finally, she would be ‘heard’ in the case of non-payment 
of minimum wages and physical violence at work. She was a few minutes late as 
she had to complete cleaning people’s houses before coming to the court. She came 
running in. I told her to relax and that we would probably have to wait anyway. She 
sat down, caught her breath and said, ‘I am always the one waiting from morning to 
evening in courts. Nobody has waited for me before.’ Even though the power rela-
tions between the researcher and the participants are an undeniable presence in the 
field, the shared moments of waiting provide the opportunity to respect the ‘others’ 
time and to address power imbalances, by postponing research needs to make space 
for the needs of the participants.
As I continued to wait with Abeera in various law offices, we did not always 
talk. We shared glances, sighed in frustration while enduring indefinite waiting, and 
offered water and food to each other. But I still learnt a lot about the background 
conditions of her everyday life which were affected because of the legal proceedings. 
She spent money on travelling to each of these sites, not to mention the significant 
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physical and mental impact on her body for over 3 years. While waiting, she would 
constantly call and check on her three children – had they eaten food? Had they 
taken their medicine? She also went outside many times to meet her husband, who 
was a rickshaw driver and would come to see her to take updates whenever he did 
not have a passenger. She also evolved through the months as she gathered infor-
mation, made contacts and tried to figure out ways to please or navigate the state 
bureaucracy by becoming a disciplined worker who could wait for hours. Thus, in 
waiting spaces, a lot happened – checking on family, arranging food, asking ques-
tions, sorting paperwork, gaining knowledge, etc. This suggests that, for those wait-
ing, life goes on through the experience of elongated times (Povinelli 2011).
With Abeera, courts also became a site of unique revelation where it was nor-
malized to see a poor person’s time and their existence as disposable and unim-
portant. The court hierarchy had different kinds of waiting areas. High courts had 
waiting rooms, whereas at district courts one had to wait in corridors. The num-
bering system in high courts was on a digital board, while in district courts it was 
printed on a sheet of A4 paper outside the courtroom. The numbering system was 
a super-confusing one that only lawyers and people in the system could understand. 
The list was released a night before unless someone was coming from outside Delhi, 
in which case they were notified further in advance. People came to the court in 
the morning and waited till evening. The lawyers would know when their clients 
would be called, and they arrived accordingly near the time. Since the workers lived 
far away, the lawyers preferred that they came in the morning and waited, rather 
than risk their clients being late. Many a time, workers were not required at all 
hearings. However, their destitute appearance13 suggested the urgency of the case 
itself. Sometimes, even after waiting for the whole day, they would not be called 
because either the day was over, or one of the counsels was not present, or simply 
for other reasons. The workers would go home, again incurring travel expenses. On 
one of the days, waiting in a district court with three oppressed-caste women who 
had journeyed for three days over 1,300 miles from Assam to be present for a court 
hearing in Delhi, my fieldnotes read:
I come with them to the court at 9am. We sit outside the judge’s office on a 
bench in a hallway. There is a small fan diagonally placed on the wall outside 
this office. The clerk keeps switching it on and off. One of the women has a 
5-month-old baby boy in her lap. When the fan is off, the child cries and she 
takes the child to another hallway where a fan is on. It has now been 3 hours 
and we are still waiting. After 3 hours, when we are called inside, the judge’s 
chamber has an air conditioner and looks newly built, unlike the hallway we 
were sitting in with gloomy walls, paint peeling off them. The lawyers are told 
that no statement will be taken today because the public prosecutor is on elec-
tion duty or something. He will come after a week and then we must come 
again for the statement. The women worry about their old parents in a village 
in Assam. The court also does not reimburse their food receipts nor give them 
a place to live for this week when they must wait for the next hearing.
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The above excerpt illustrates how much is happening in the waiting time. Most 
officials do not function on time, yet it is the oppressed who is expected to arrive 
early and wait in anticipation with hope and documents. People are kept in the dark 
regarding the length of waiting time and what paperwork is required. So, when a 
person meets the state through a window counter or in an office, they are told that 
someone is not present, or some paperwork is missing. They are told to come back 
some other day. Not knowing what to expect is part of the strategy of domination, 
where ‘interactions with the state have their one-way streets, their no-entry signs, 
their things to say and not say and things to do and to avoid doing, their obligations 
and penalties’ (Bourdieu 2000, p. 161).
But this waiting happens not only inside law offices, but also outside them. 
People who travelled from other cities or states to take part in legal proceedings 
usually spent time living in night shelters in deplorable conditions and did not have 
the money for food and other necessities. The woman in the above excerpt shared 
in the court hearing a week later: ‘The shelter is dirty. Drug addicts live there. 
When we go out to the court, they talk behind our back that we must be doing 
some shady work.’ She had taken out a loan for food and travel to Delhi. She was 
constantly thinking about many problems at once as a result of this extended period 
of waiting for the hearing: the worry of repaying the debt, along with taking care 
of her child and old parents in Assam constantly distressed her. This experience of 
delayed time is also experienced as that of ‘otherness and failure’ as it ‘occurs when 
people are required to live up to the hegemonic temporalities that are set by others, 
but [are] not provided with the means to do so’ (Kjærre 2018, p. 3). In a way, by 
making people wait for the entire day only to be told to come later, it provides ‘a 
critical insight into the everyday socio-spatial constitution of power – not despite 
but because of their banality’ (Secor 2007, p. 42, cited in Auyero 2012). Therefore, an 
exploration of the relational knowledge of waiting inside and outside the research 
sites challenges and expands the boundaries of what is considered a research site or 
the field in ethnography.
Waiting at law offices shows not only the state’s power which dominated people’s 
time and made it difficult for them to access justice at every step of the way but 
also how the system was broken from within: sometimes, even the state did not know 
how to access itself. Though each government office has a theoretical organizational 
structure (usually displayed on a board outside), its working on the ground is rather 
muddled. In some ways, the state is unknowable from both the outside and inside. 
One day, I was waiting in a police station with Malin, a Dalit informal worker from 
Uttarakhand, so that he could be taken to the magistrates’ court to record his state-
ment against non-payment of wages and physical violence in Delhi. My fieldnotes 
from the day read:
Malin and I have travelled for 2 hours and have been waiting in this police 
station from 10am. Waiting here is not a very comforting experience. There 
are dark, dingy, smelly locker-rooms. Police personnel are running from here 
to there attending to something. We are sitting on a bench. A well-off man 
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dressed in branded clothes and shoes with sunglasses walks in with confidence 
as if this is his own house. The police attend to this well-off man immediately 
and he walks out of the station in no time. It is now 2.5 hours that we have 
been waiting. A police inspector has now ordered his subordinate to bring a 
car out so we can go to the district court. The subordinate gets worried and 
is trying to find where the court is. It is 1pm now and they bring a car and 
tell us to sit in it. We enter the court and it is like the busiest railway platform. 
The court’s staff are working peacefully amidst this chaos as if they are in a 
meditation centre. The police personnel are trying to find the magistrates’ 
court. They find the room, but it is empty. A man (clerk to the judge) comes 
from behind and tells the police, ‘Sir is having lunch. Wait outside.’ There 
are not enough chairs to wait on. So, I ask Malin to sit since he looks dehy-
drated and sick. After an hour, we ask the clerk, ‘When will Sir come?’ He 
responds casually, ‘Can’t say. He is now in a meeting. It can take half an hour, 
or even one hour.’ Malin is worried that if he spends too much time here, his 
employer might fire him from the job. After an hour, Sir comes, and a stream 
of people follow him. We stand there looking up at him, as he sits on a huge 
chair behind a magnificent table on a heightened cement platform in the 
room. And then half an hour later, our turn comes, finally!
The case was not completed despite this waiting, but that is a discussion for 
elsewhere. Bourdieu’s (2000) work shows the role of time in people’s everyday 
life and how it determines how people navigate power relations. He shows the 
difference in how privileged classes manage to enter, navigate and get through 
complex spaces and fields. However, the poor, being in a subordinated posi-
tion, lack the resources, networks and knowledge as they lack ‘the spatio-tem-
poral acuity that comes with routine success’ (Jeffrey 2010, p. 20). So, workers 
in my research knew, and had become habituated to, waiting, not being heard 
or answered, being neglected, ignored or taken for granted. They entered these 
sites knowing they would wait. In such research encounters, the researcher’s role 
in the waiting field becomes even more important. Waiting for the participants, 
taking into account their time and delays, as well as waiting with them, the eth-
nographer can also lend support, and embrace the uncertainty and long waiting 
times by prioritizing people’s needs before their own research requirements. As 
Palmer et al. assert, ‘The researcher’s waiting is thus always relational: they wait 
upon another’s needs and priorities in a way that supports the other to partici-
pate, as they also wait for the other to make their contribution so that the project 
can proceed’ (2018, p. 428).
This acceptance of the other’s time is an integral part of ethnographic encoun-
ters. In the fieldwork, as a fieldworker who was accompanying people through these 
various law offices, I was responsible for writing formal letters and getting them 
stamped by officials on the participants’ behalf. These acts happened in the waiting 
field, when the participants usually either looked over my shoulder or sat silently. 
These were also times when we shared our collective anger, anxieties, worries and 
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modes of navigating the legal process, although in different contexts (they were part 
of the legal process and I was merely an outsider to it). In this way, waiting provided 
an opportunity for not only the building of trusting and respectful relationships and 
to address the power relations, but also moments of shared time and recognition in 
the field that is otherwise all about domination and inequality. It enabled the shap-
ing of questions and issues together with the participants by making the experience 
of waiting a tool for explaining the concept of state domination in my research.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the practice of waiting, even though expected and intui-
tive in ethnography, is underemployed in writing on methodology. I have argued for 
the role of waiting as a fieldwork tool in its own right to sustain a methodological 
commitment to ethnography in the presence of institutional and other constraints. 
The quote from Hamilton’s work that started the section on the tension between 
neoliberal time and ethnography illustrates how ‘hanging out’ and ‘waiting’ is part 
of ethnography (Hamilton 2015). I would like to contend that this hanging out and 
waiting is also crucial outside of the research sites, as illustrated in the section on that 
aspect. As shown, for the researcher, waiting time is active time spent on collecting 
the empirics (waiting itself as a source of knowledge) when scheduling meetings 
with participants in defined space or time is impossible. It helps the researcher to 
contextualize participants’ narratives in the wider social and political systems in 
ways which might otherwise be impossible when faced with time constraints. From 
the standpoint of the participants, waiting shows a difference in social standing 
even when people are not occupying the research sites. When people occupy these 
spaces, it shows the role of power relations, marginalization and domination over 
their time to exclude them even as citizens.
A meta-reflection in writing this chapter has been about the limits of writing on 
waiting. The waiting time as shared between the participants and myself is certainly 
not equal in fieldwork. The experience and representation of this experience are also 
indicative of that inequality. In fact, the writing of this chapter feeds into neoliberal 
academia by producing something that will hopefully benefit my academic career. 
Ethical dilemmas surround the benefit which I have been able to draw from this 
experience, while the participants continue to wait. Thus, reflecting on waiting and 
writing about it from the standpoint of the researcher and the participants – what 
is gained and lost; what is active and passive; what comprises the field and what 
does not – are all constitutive of the ethnographic experience and raise ethical 
discomfort.
This chapter also invites a more general engagement with waiting as an 
opportunity for building trusting relationships, contextualizing the past, present and 
future narratives of the participants as well as to practise relational reflexivity – all 
of which are core components of ethnographic research. The universe of waiting 
described in this chapter during fieldwork could easily be the state in various 
situations of the social world of oppressed, stigmatized groups and will be interesting 
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to those doing ethnographic research at multiple sites where the field cannot be 
marked spatially, where there is no control of time, where the researcher must submit 
to the clock of these sites and the routines of its people, thus incurring waiting such 
as in hospitals and factories. It will also be useful to those in migration and mobility 
studies to contextualize their methodological dilemmas and discomforts while 
constantly moving with the participants in limited timeframes and with institutional 
and other limits.
In the midst of a world pandemic, with further deliberations about new think-
ing on ethnography, waiting as a methodological tool is a useful way to think about 
what constitutes the ethnographic field: many are in a country of fieldwork but not 
in the field; the connotations of entering the field, being in the field, and leaving 
it are also evolving with the changing meanings of seeing the field as more than a 
physical boundary; the experience of time globally vis-à-vis the neoliberal univer-
sity is being felt differently. In other words, waiting is becoming a more relational, 
transitory and embodied experience at the centre of understanding and respecting 
the past, present and future locations and experiences of researchers, the research 
and the participants. It is no longer the time between events or actions; it is at the 
centre of all events and actions in the field. It disrupts, expands, discomforts and 
redefines an ethnographer’s vision of the field through complete submission to the 
clock of ‘the field’14.
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Notes
 1 Internal migrant workers move for work or other reasons within India. For context, see 
Abbas (2016), Deshingkar (2017) and others.
 2 The laws that address bonded labour (The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976) 
and human trafficking (Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956) in India presume a rescue 
and rehabilitation approach. ‘Rescue’ means the legal removal of a person from a work 
situation that is perceived as forced and exploitative under the above two laws. For con-
text, see Shah (2014), Ramachandran (2015), Kimberley (2016) and others.
 3 Meaning the state’s accepted way of working. This is indicative of the tacit knowledge 
of the state’s functioning as embedded in the wider bureaucratic culture which no one 
talks about explicitly, but everyone is expected to know. For example, when one enters 
a government office, it is with the assumption that one must wait because there will be 
delays. This would be one of the ‘sarkari’ ways of knowing or doing things. On the state’s 
functioning in India and other bureaucracies around the world, see Scott (1998), Gupta 
(2012), Mathur (2016) and others.
 4 I am grateful to the Socio-Legal Studies Association for supporting me with a fieldwork 
grant, which allowed me to spend 7 months in the field. Besides funding and visa issues, 
gendered and personal constraints around how much time one can spend away from 
‘home’ also determine the time in the field.
 5 Workers who are from the oppressed caste such as Dalits. On caste and the caste system 
in India, see Vishwanath (2014), Guru and Sarukkai (2019) and others.
 6 Research participants are at different stages of the legal process, awaiting completion of 
rehabilitation assistance for as long as 37 years. During these years, because of the promise 
of state rehabilitation, workers keep waiting while continuing with their life, engaging in 
similar or more exploitative work than that from which they were first rescued. For some 
other workers, such as those engaged in sex work, they wait for the trial to end so that 
they do not have to appear at court hearings and can continue with their work.
 7 Even if a researcher is doing fieldwork in a country in which they are a citizen (like India 
in my case), long-term fieldwork with adequate university permissions and ethical clear-
ances is equated with ‘excess absence’ and can be used against the researcher in future 
visa applications in the country of study (in this context, the UK). Many international 
academics have been subjected to this hostile and ambivalent interpretation of visa regu-
lations in the UK. See Dowson (2018), Scialom (2020) and others.
 8 Some state officials, lawyers, social workers and comrades (who remain anonymous here) 
were very receptive towards my research. They helped me to contextualize the field in the 
past and present socio-political locations, enabled access to research sites and introduced 
me to the field participants. I remain grateful to them for their engagement and inspiration.
 9 ‘Sir’ and ‘Ma’am’ are used to address or refer to those in authority, for example, teachers, 
professors, government officials and colleagues in higher positions.
 10 A traditional Indian attire comprising a long skirt and a blouse.
 11 A long piece of cloth used with traditional clothing to cover the front of the body and 
the head.
 12 All the field participants’ names have been replaced by pseudonyms to protect their iden-
tities. I would like to express my gratitude and indebtedness to them for their time, trust 
and generosity in sharing their stories and for their ongoing involvement in the research.
 13 Many a time, some social workers explicitly asked the workers to take off their jewellery 
or to not arrive in good clothes. On the other hand, for some workers, these visits to law 
offices were the only times they could ‘go out’ and so they wanted to dress properly, even 
with limited means.
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 14 Besides the co-authors and workshop mentors involved in this volume, I would like to 
express my appreciation to the following friends and colleagues for their labour and time 
in critically reading various parts and drafts of this chapter: Angelo Martins Junior, Joel 
Quirk, Judith Onwubiko, Julia O’Connell Davidson, Katie Cruz, Maayan Niezna and 
Simanti Dasgupta. Their feedback helped me to question my biases and assumptions in 
critical methodological writing.
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Research object and fieldwork performance
Katrine Scott
In 2012 (February, and October–December), I engaged in fieldwork with uni-
versity students in Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan. It was a relatively peaceful 
moment in the city situated in a region affected by ongoing war and conflict. 
The findings in my dissertation show that narratives of apolitical middle-class 
aspirations were central in students’ accounts of a liveable future beyond polit-
ical conflict and war (Scott 2018).
I participated in lectures, conversations and recorded interviews with 
students at both the private American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) and 
the public University of Sulaimani (UOS). AUIS was established in 2007, to 
provide a liberal arts education in English, four years after the US-led invasion 
in which Denmark took part. UOS was free of charge, and education was in 
Sorani Kurdish, Arabic and English. I talked with students mainly in English, 
and for a few interviews there was an interpreter present to help translate 
between Sorani Kurdish and English. I had learned to navigate, with basic 
language skills, in Sorani Kurdish. With my mobility privilege from holding a 
Danish passport, I had stayed in Sulaimani several times between 2008 and 
2012. I was visiting Sulaimani not only as a researcher, but also as a family 
member since my partner at the time had grown up in the region. Prior to the 
fieldwork in 2012, I had also been part of organizing a workshop on youth 
activism together with both Kurdish and Danish youth, and I had been 
engaged in carrying out interviews for my BA thesis in gender studies with 
different activists and organizations in Sulaimani working with gender 
perspectives and women’s rights.
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Middle-classness in different places
‘If they are just like us, why should we read about them?’ This question was posed 
to me at a research seminar in Scandinavia, while discussing my unfinished work 
with university students in Iraqi Kurdistan and their middle-class aspirations. The 
question pointed out a central tension in my study about middle-class commonali-
ties and differences across geographies: a tension that I was trying to grapple with 
and understand, and might not, in the draft prepared for the seminar, have succeeded 
very well in unfolding. The question also indicated that an audience in the Global 
North expects to read in research about lives that are ‘different’ in the Global South. 
I do not recall exactly what my response was at that moment, but the fact that I 
remember the question so clearly is connected to my indignation at the possibility 
of asking this question as if it were the most obvious thing in the world. The fact 
that it was possible to ask this question could be understood as a general uninterest 
in ordinary everyday life outside of Scandinavia. This type of question, or uninterest 
that I had also experienced at other times, spurred my already-existing determined-
ness to highlight commonalities in global patterns of middle-classness in my study 
as a response to what I perceived to be a desire for difference that I felt uncomfort-
able. This determinedness was also related to my initial motivation for the research 
project that grew out of the context of Denmark, where I resided, being part of the 
US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003, and the lack of nuanced media representations of 
the region in Denmark. Ordinary, urban middle-class everyday life was not part of 
the media coverage on war and conflict, and the effect was to create representations 
of populations in war-torn regions as ontologically ‘different’ from the middle class 
in Europe consuming these news stories. With my research, I wanted to challenge 
that representation. I heard the question at the seminar as an academic version of 
the media’s interest in war only.
One aspect that could be read from the ‘If they are just like us, why should we read 
about them?’ question is ideas of ‘appropriate’ research subjects for critical  feminist 
research. Esther Priyadharshini studied privileged university students in elite MBA 
programmes in India, and she describes how she was likewise asked: ‘Why do we 
need to study these people?’ (Priyadharshini 2003, p. 424). Risa Whitson was asked 
why she had decided to do research with privileged women working as direct sales 
consultants instead of ‘meaningful’ research with less privileged groups of people. 
This question led her to ask herself: ‘Have I chosen the wrong group to work with? 
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Maybe direct sales consultants are not an appropriate subject for critical feminist 
research’ (Whitson 2017, p. 302). In the ‘If they are just like us, why should we read 
about them?’ question regarding my project, I found it analogous to the questioning 
of the importance of studying relative privilege.
Another aspect to the question is that it shows Eurocentrism at its finest when 
expressing interest in all that is pointed out as ‘different’ from one’s own  position 
so that one’s position stays stable and unquestioned. The question bubbling to 
the  surface in the setting of the academic space for collective thinking shows an 
 underlying desire for the ‘exotic’ in the seminar room and thereby placing the 
‘ ordinary’ in the Global North – a desire for consumption of difference or, to use 
bell hooks’ phrase, ‘eating the Other’ (hooks 2015[1992], p. 21). This desire and 
consumption was ‘no news’ at a time when the figure of the heroic Kurdish female 
fighter became a poster girl in Western media representations (Dirik 2014). To meet 
a version of this expectation and desire for ‘difference’ in the seminar room told me 
just how rooted and normalized a colonial gaze and construction of the ‘Other’ is 
also in research settings presenting themselves as critical. Research is never only an 
individual project; texts are shaped also by academic discussions. The question, and 
other similar questions, or simply uninterest, for the project I have met along the 
way did not open up for an important discussion of commonalities and differences 
between middle-class trajectories in the Global South and North. What I perceived 
as uninterest stood in the way of the possibility to collectively develop critical and 
complex academic thought that questions colonial structures in the knowledge 
 production in which I was embedded.
As a PhD student located in Sweden and Denmark and doing research with 
students in Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a concrete geographical distance between 
the context of the students’ lived experiences and the official academic place of 
validating the written analysis. This distance played into the discussions of my 
work on middle-classness, and questions about commonalities and differences have 
followed me during my research process. I recently told a new colleague about 
what the research project showed in relation to the university students’ middle-
class aspirations, and I was surprisingly met with the comment that the colleague 
had engaged in a similar project with young people in Denmark about their future 
aspirations. This was a cross-geographical comparison between Scandinavia and 
Iraqi Kurdistan that I have rarely come across.
In this chapter, I will revisit my fieldwork and written analysis from a distance 
of several years later. Imagining the research project as a patchwork of different 
pieces of material, I will zoom in and look at the stitches that held together my 
methodological and analytical approach in the study. I argue that my attempt 
to highlight commonalities in global middle-classness created both opportuni-
ties but also obstacles. I will give examples of where my ethnographic approach 
sometimes limited me, and where it at other times enabled understanding. Today, I 
look at the study that I conducted as an attempt to ‘study sideways’ (Nader 1972) 
between myself as a PhD student with middle-class background and aspirations, 
and university students in Iraqi Kurdistan with middle-class background and/or 
80 Katrine Scott
aspirations. I did not use the concept of ‘sideways’ at the time of my fieldwork or 
in my analysis, but I am using it here as a productive tool to reflect on both meth-
odological and analytical questions and pitfalls related to representations of com-
monalities and differences in my study with university students. I suggest thinking 
about ‘sideways’ across geographical contexts as complex, shifting and embedded 
in unequal power relations. I reflect on how this attempt to meet students side-
ways does not step outside of the uneven distribution of mobility privilege and 
the colonial legacy of being able to do ‘international’ research in Iraqi Kurdistan 
and constitute myself as the knowing subject as a scholar from Scandinavia. I argue 
for a critical reflection of what are perceived as commonalities in research, and 
when these are considered interesting, and at the same time I also want to broaden 
the concept of ‘sideways’ and the perception of when and where it is possible to 
study commonalities.
The chapter is structured as follows: First, I discuss the concept of ‘sideways’ 
together with the methodological concept of ‘matching strategies’ (Gunaratnam 
2003). Through the concepts of sideways and matching, I revisit reflections on what 
it entails to study middle-classness among university students while at the same time 
embodying a middle-class position as a researcher from a university in Sweden. I 
explore the tension between middle-classness both as a research object and what I 
call a fieldwork performance by the researcher. I discuss how fieldwork performances 
can both enable and set up limits to knowing. I consider a central moment of dis-
comfort in writing about, analyzing and participating in performances of gendered 
and heterosexual middle-class respectability (Skeggs 1997) that keep up appearances 
and risk reifying unspoken differences by assuming a common gendered respect-
ability. Finally, I discuss fieldwork performances as taking place both in the field and 
as representations in the written analysis.
Directions: Studying sideways and matching strategies
In a famous text on methodology, Laura Nader (1972) writes about ‘studying up’ in 
one’s own society, stating that anthropology in the US in the 1960s was preoccupied 
with marginalized people’s experiences, described as ‘studying down’, and less on 
studying the upper or middle classes. Nader writes about the directions of studying 
up versus down that ‘[w]e are not dealing with an either/or proposition; we need 
simply to realize when it is useful or crucial to study up, down or sideways’ (Nader 
1972, p. 292). My study with university students from middle-class background or 
with middle-class aspirations while I was a graduate student and had a middle-class 
background myself can be described by Nader’s term of ‘studying sideways’ (also see 
Bowman 2009 and Plesner 2011), which I will expound, question and develop in 
this chapter since positions in hierarchies are not that simple. I am using the concept 
of studying sideways here to reflect on directions in research and questions of com-
monalities and difference.
Studying other students while being a student oneself is described by Laura 
E. Hirshfield, who studied graduate students in chemistry while she was herself a 
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graduate student, as studying sideways when studying her ‘peers’ who were people 
‘like her’ (Hirshfield and Ramahi 2018, p. 2). Hirshfield, as a graduate student in 
the field of social science, was both a ‘naïve observer’ in the field of chemistry and 
at the same time a ‘native graduate student’ (Hirshfield and Ramahi 2018, p. 6). She 
describes how she and her research participants met in a shared position as gradu-
ate students in the power hierarchy of the university, but also how that shared posi-
tion contained assumptions about shared similarities that were unfounded. On the 
other hand, Hirshfield notes that the graduate students in her study ‘did not feel 
judged’ by her (Hirshfield and Ramahi 2018, p. 8). Studying sideways among her 
presumed ‘peers’ gave Hirshfield opportunities in terms of sharing equal positions 
in the university setting, but it also created assumptions about sameness. Hirshfield’s 
reflection on the taken-for-granted and therefore unexplored assumptions about 
sameness among students is a central concern in studying sideways since the direc-
tion of sideways builds on the idea of similarity. My study with university students 
as a graduate student myself also contained questions around shared and different 
experiences and positions. Like Hirshfield, to a great extent, I also experienced 
a connection with (some, not all) students as another young adult and as some 
kind of student who was not their teacher in a higher position in the university 
hierarchy.
While the concept of studying sideways provides an image of a horizontal line 
and the idea of standing side by side as researcher and researched, ‘matching strategies’ 
is another term used in qualitative methods looking more into the content of sup-
posed matching through similarities between researcher and researched. ‘Matching 
strategies’ are sometimes used in qualitative interview studies with the aim of better 
communication if interviewer and interviewee share some perceived commonalities 
such as gender and ethnicity/‘race’ (Gunaratnam 2003). The focus is on the stra-
tegic choice of trying to find a match between researcher and researched, whereas 
the concept of studying sideways indicates a somewhat fixed analysis of positions 
in hierarchies and power relations. The idea of matching as a deliberate method-
ological strategy demands reflection around those perceived shared experiences 
and positions. Yasmin Gunaratnam discusses the complex idea of ‘racial matching’ 
(Gunaratnam 2003, p. 103), that risks not only presupposing shared commonalities 
based on ‘race’ but also not seeing differences despite ‘racial matching’, such as, for 
example, class. But on the other hand, ‘racial matching’ in research on racism – not 
as a solution but as one strategy – might have the potential to open for conversations 
about racialized experiences. The tension lies in how to take into account the lived 
experiences and materiality of a racialized world while at the same time questioning 
the category of ‘race’ in fieldwork and analysis (Gunaratnam 2003). The concept of 
matching also brings into focus the fact that matches and mismatches will always 
affect the study regardless of the researcher’s awareness. Looking back at my own 
research, I somehow tried to ‘middle-class match’ as a research strategy. While ‘racial 
matching strategies’ might have the aim of creating spaces to talk about lived experi-
ences of racism and of being dominated, middle-class matching points to a very dif-
ferent kind of shared experience of privilege and dominance. What I was trying to 
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‘match’ was an experience of relative privilege in terms of class position and aspira-
tion, thereby situating myself as a PhD student side by side with university students 
in Sulaimani in what I presumed to be somewhat middle-class matching positions, 
with the risk of not being attentive enough to mismatching and differences (also 
see Lacy 2019 on strategies for studying black middle classes in US suburbs). Based 
on my experience, I suggest thinking about the concepts of sideways and matching 
as fluid and unstable. I argue for not limiting the idea of studying sideways to a very 
narrow understanding of what and where a shared context can take place. I also 
argue that the direction of ‘sideways’ needs to be thoroughly examined as to how 
power relations shape the research process and fieldwork.
Unseen areas when studying sideways and trying to match
My research centred on exploring young, well-educated people’s everyday lives 
and dreams in the big city scene, to capture and investigate what I saw as relative, 
fragile privilege in a region affected by war. My drive inspiring this exploration 
was to study aspects of life that I imagined, and had previous experiences of, would 
in some ways relate to and reflect patterns of global middle-class life in many big 
cities – a life in some ways resembling the one that I also lived myself. Looking 
back, this could be seen as a fixed category of class transcending social context 
and sidestepping a more specific focus on differences in the relationship between 
researcher and researched. In my methodological approach, that I label as an attempt 
to study ‘sideways’ and to ‘middle-class match’, I was determined to see myself to 
some extent as standing alongside students due to my initial motivation to study 
their unspectacular everyday lives and dreams in the city. I did not assume similarities 
in the same way as Hirshfield did in her study with graduate students in chemistry, 
but I placed experiences on a horizontal line side by side, categorizing them as 
the same – placing students’ middle-class dreams of a future beside the dreams of 
students globally.
An important aspect that could be overlooked when viewing from a horizontal 
perspective is different possibilities in mobility. I experienced a couple of students 
who asked how to apply for scholarships to study at a Swedish university. They 
might have participated in interviews with me in the hope of getting informa-
tion and help to go abroad and study. I provided information and showed stu-
dents where they could read more about opportunities to study in Sweden, but I 
went no further in assisting students with this. Nobody asked for my more specific 
help – maybe because I did not volunteer it. I could have practised providing more 
information and assistance in an organized way such as some scholars do in critical 
migration studies, but I was not prepared (see Düvell et al. 2009). A central question 
is to ask how Global North–South relations were present and ‘disturbing’ or ‘haunt-
ing’ the fieldwork and analysis (also see Gunaratnam on how structural whiteness 
can ‘haunt’ and ‘disturb’ an analysis (Gunaratnam 2003, p. 92). The example of ask-
ing for information about scholarships shows how Global North–South relations 
were present and affecting my meetings with students. I was in a position of power 
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to provide them with knowledge about admission to a system of education that 
could potentially provide them with a degree from abroad that could transform 
into a good job in Iraqi Kurdistan. The value of degrees from a European university 
was ambivalent for me since I held a privileged position in a Eurocentric ranking 
system of higher education that I did not politically approve of. I was confronted 
with my own unspoken hope to meet indifference to this ranking among stu-
dents and pride in local higher education, a hope from a secure position with my 
privilege of being able to travel and do research at a university abroad that also 
added value to my doctoral education. The uneven distribution of mobility privi-
lege positioned me and my research participants differently, and this inequality was 
a backdrop to our everyday encounters. The immersion into the everyday life I was 
trying to navigate put practical matters at the forefront, such as arranging meetings 
with students, building relationships and thinking about whether people wanted to 
meet and talk with me or not. The inequality in mobility was often just a distant 
jarring sound on top of which everything else happened. Now, several years later 
when the experience has turned into text, it is much easier to reflect clearly on 
the unequal distribution of possibilities of movement and access to what counts as 
highly ranked universities and how that plays differently into the possible horizon 
for future aspirations.
Matching gendered respectability
As a specific example of studying sideways and trying to match, I experienced an 
ongoing occupation of dealing with boundaries in performing the right kind of 
respectability, especially in my encounters with female students. Matching is not 
only a strategy that can be methodologically thought about beforehand, but it is 
also a fieldwork performance that we can engage in as researchers. My notion of 
fieldwork performance is inspired by Butler’s concept of performativity (Butler 
1990) since I want to capture the contextual doings of researcher and researched 
in fieldwork. An example of this is a conversation I had with Sehla and Avin, two 
female students from AUIS. In my thesis, I write about the experience of wait-
ing and highlight a conversation where we talk about time and making family 
plans. During the conversation, I say that I am not in Sulaimani on my own, and 
was previously joking about my partner taking care of reproductive work while 
I take care of my research career. The conversation illustrates my shifting posi-
tions as a participant observer between researcher and a respectable middle-class 
young female:
KATRINE: (…) if I was just here alone, I think it would be… lonely.
AVIN: It would not be easy.
SEHLA: It is much better [to have a family].
KATRINE: But there is also a lot of family business to do. You know, I clean 
the family’s house.
AVIN: Here, everything is based on family.
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KATRINE: Washing the dishes, and ‘Okay, now we have to go there, and now 
we have to go there.’
SEHLA: Yeah, exactly. [Laughter]
KATRINE: It is not my own will, it is just ‘okay’! [Laughter]
SEHLA: ‘Okay, then I will come.’ [Laughter]
KATRINE: So, I will always bring necessary things, and a toothbrush in my bag 
because I never know where I am going to sleep. [Laughter]
AVIN: That is right, here it [planning] is influenced.
SEHLA: Yeah, exactly.
AVIN: You know, at the moment I go home, I see my family: ‘Oh, come to the 
car,’ and then I am in my aunt’s home. [Sehla laughing] It is just like that, 
you never plan. [Laughter]
In this excerpt, I move away from my position of researcher towards one of female 
family member by stressing my own experiences of family life in an attempt to 
share and match experiences with Sehla and Avin. In my dissertation, I point out 
how in this situation I negotiate my position in the field and position myself as 
someone who is also embedded in collective family decision-making. In hindsight, 
I will add that at the same time I took part in a performance of female respect-
ability together with Sehla and Avin by stressing how I participate in reproductive 
housework; this is usually not something to mention specifically, so my vocalizing 
of it shows how in the conversation I am trying to hyper-perform as the right kind 
of helpful family member. I am trying to consolidate and get confirmation of my 
belonging to the social context. It generates a conversation around participating in 
middle-class family life as a collective movement by driving around in cars between 
different homes, but I will of course never know how Avin and Sehla would have 
talked about this had I not framed the conversation with my own presence. The 
conversation is an example of how I am trying to match and talk about experiences 
of local family life from the perspective of a young woman, a matching that would 
not have been possible if I had been there just as a researcher. I participated in these 
performances of respectability in continuously shifting positions on a sliding scale 
between knowing and not-knowing, partly outsider and partly insider, shifts that 
are always implicated in participant observation (Råheim et al. 2016, p. 4). These 
shifts can be understood as shifts between matching and mismatching with students. 
Maybe Avin and Sehla would have told me other things if I, in a different position 
as a more distanced researcher, had asked them about their everyday family life, and 
maybe we would not have discussed this kind of collective planning and reproduc-
tive work because I would not have thought about it had I not encountered it in 
my own embodied experience. I do not argue that the idea of a ‘neutral’ researcher 
would have produced better, more ‘objective’ knowledge. I am arguing that, to fully 
understand the subtext of the conversation, we also need to pay attention to the 
social situation and the fieldwork performances of both researcher and researched. 
There is no underlying ‘truth’ behind the performances; they are all there is, and 
we will not be able to know something more ‘real’ behind that. I am suggesting an 
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analytical and methodological attention to desires and performances of attempted 
matching in fieldwork in order to get a rich understanding of what is going on and 
the knowledge that is produced from the specific social context. In the following, 
I shall look into how fieldwork performances create limits to knowing.
Unrespectable questions and answers: Fieldwork performances of 
gendered middle-class respectability
We were waiting for the elevator at the University of Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan, after 
an interview. Xezal and Tara were female students at the Department of Education. 
Tara suddenly asked me if I had had a relationship (which I inferred as meaning a 
sexual one) with my partner before we got married. Or maybe it was not suddenly, 
but it felt like it, since I had no prior experience in this context of being asked 
questions about my relationship. I had just asked Tara a lot of questions myself, and 
now I felt the power of questioning in turn on my own body. I answered Tara that, 
yes, my partner and I had known each other as friends but that, most importantly, 
now we were married. What could I have learned from Tara about performances 
of gendered middle-class respectability (a central aspect of my object of study) if 
I had answered her question differently? What kind of conversations could that 
possibly have started if I had not closed down on talking about romantic and sexual 
relationships outside of marriage, what I automatically labelled as ‘unrespectable 
behaviour’? And why was my performance of respectable marriage so important?
Upon arrival in Sulaimani in 2012, I had decided to visually perform a properly 
married heterosexual field persona, and I had bought a ring to symbolize the status 
of marriage. I had been in Sulaimani several times prior to this visit as a partner 
and family member without a ring. Starting the so-called fieldwork for my PhD 
research had made me take this decision (more on this below). When I waited for 
the elevator with Tara, I was confronted with my own performances of respect-
ability. Sociologist Beverley Skeggs has worked on the concept of female respect-
ability (Skeggs 1997). Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, Skeggs shows how 
English working-class women struggle with doing the right bodily performances 
and appearances in order to be perceived as respectable from the point of view of 
the scrutinizing middle-class gaze (Skeggs 1997). I felt caught in a kind of ‘game’ 
(Angrosino and Mays De Pe’rez in Råheim et al. 2016, p. 8) together with, espe-
cially, female students. A game of performing what I thought was the right kind of 
respectability that led to a closed door in terms of engaging in conversations outside 
of that script. My shying away from answering Tara’s question about sexual relations 
before marriage was a detour to avoid the cracks in my respectability performance, 
which created tension and discomfort. Embodying the respectability, that I tried 
to study, hindered me in this situation from engaging with what could be labelled 
as ‘unrespectable behaviour’, and it hindered me from knowing. Tara’s asking me a 
direct question also broke with my powerful position as the researcher being the one 
to ask the questions, thereby reversing the positions, and the question demanded of 
me to be accountable in private ways. This moment made it very clear to me how 
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I, without thinking deliberately about it, to some extent performed a specific kind 
of professional researcher in the field, and when this boundary was questioned I 
engaged in a respectability performance, which made me realize at a very embodied 
level how I, together with others, engage in these everyday performances all the 
time. When feeling a boundary being questioned, I saw and felt the whole game 
we were in together very clearly. I kept the door open to my own participation in 
an arena of respectability performances but closed it against getting to know more 
about the actual doings, and also instances of falling short, of this presumed shared 
gendered respectability. I realize now that my focus on being a respectable, cor-
rect version of myself as researcher actually made things weird, and I got stuck in a 
respectability trap with unanswerable questions that I could not engage in. This was 
not my plan, but it was the outcome. This hindered the analysis from going deeper 
because I myself stood in the way. Priyadharshini writes about coming ‘unstuck’ by 
arguing how ‘[u]nraveling the assumption of a coherent and stable identity for the 
researched also obliges the researcher’s identity to come unstuck’ (Priyadharshini 
2003, p. 432). This means that the researcher does not ‘arrive’ in the field as a uni-
fied subject (Visweswaran in Priyadharshini 2003, p. 433), which points to a central 
tension in my research in that I performed and embodied a respectable gendered 
arrival in the field that I got absorbed into. I tried to hold together an impossible 
coherent subjectivity with which I could arrive smoothly in the field. This points 
to the difficulty of living and dealing with a post-structural theory of multiple 
selves in everyday life, as fieldwork is, and a slight slippage into a positivist ideal of 
the researcher as a person with a fixed subjectivity separate from what happens in 
the field. I was emerged in the field I was researching by participating in perfor-
mances of gendered middle-classness, thereby becoming specific versions of myself 
in meetings with students in the concrete context. Following a post-structuralist 
Foucauldian understanding of the omnipresence of power, Priyadharshini suggests a 
methodological interest in nonstable and nonfixed positions for both researcher and 
researched, and a focus on ‘the ways in which powerful individuals’ multiple subjec-
tivities are produced within the discourses in which they participate, and the points 
at which contradictions in those subjectivities arise’ (Priyadharshini 2003, p. 429). 
In new future engagements with ethnographic fieldwork, I would try to be more 
attentive to my own grip of holding myself together as a coherent fixed researcher 
subjectivity that was evidenced here by my respectability performance. To truly give 
space to those kinds of reflections while engaging in research and writing up can 
be challenging when working at a fast academic pace. Linda Finlay stresses how a 
positivist hegemony still prioritizes what is perceived as the ‘substantive story’ over 
a reflexive account with the word limits in academic journals (Finlay 2002, p. 543). 
The question is then also what kind of support structures for early career researchers 
there are at universities. Inspired by Priyadharshini, I suggest using time and space to 
collectively explore how those weird, awkward moments of discomfort can come 
‘unstuck’ so that we can learn something valuable from it. It appears that a focus on 
understanding how fieldwork performances by researcher and researched can both 
enable and stand in the way of knowing.
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To dress up and paint a picture of oneself
As feminist researchers, let us ask the question of what pictures of ourselves 
we are trying to paint and seriously consider how this informs our research 
decisions.
(Whitson 2017, p. 305)
Risa Whitson discusses the balancing act between reflexivity around researcher 
subjectivity as self-indulgence and as an act that says something important about 
the research process and analysis. Whitson specifically reflects on how researcher 
subjectivity can be a matter of what she describes in the quote above as painting a 
picture of oneself. Writing about and engaging in fieldwork performances are inter-
twined and both aspects are part of the same reflexive manoeuvre where we present 
ourselves as researchers. When I engaged in fieldwork, I dressed up and presented 
myself in a certain way. I was wearing a dark-blue jacket for days when going to 
campus, to look more ‘professional’. Students, especially, at the American University 
were very dressed-up in my eyes. Most female students at both universities wore 
quite a lot of make-up. I usually did not, but I made an effort with mascara. I did 
not in any way succeed in looking like the very well-dressed students, but going to 
the campuses was part of my social life, and I felt that an attempt to slightly match 
the dress code would help me fit in. My aim was that students would want to hang 
out with me during lunch in relation to my research, but I also wished just to match, 
be liked and to somehow fit in since this was also to be my everyday life for several 
months. I wrote in an email to my supervisor: ‘Never have I had such an opportu-
nity to cultivate a feminine look with styling, outfits, make-up and hair’ (email 21 
October 2012). It felt to me almost like ‘dressing in drag’ to conform to a certain 
kind of heterosexual femininity.
The decision to wear a ring was part of dressing up in my fieldwork perfor-
mance. I had gone to the bazaar (the marketplace in the city centre) to find a pair 
of silver rings to make sure that my relationship looked ‘right’. I was performing a 
partial act of being what Meera Sehgal symbolically describes as a ‘veiled’ researcher 
by hiding aspects of my identity (Sehgal 2009, p. 12). In my notebook, I wrote:
I have bought a ring, and I remember to put it on my left hand’s ring finger 
most days before I go out of the door. I make myself understandable as 
a married woman, not sure if it makes a big difference, but maybe in my 
own head.
(Fieldnotes, Sulaimani, October 2012)
My notes underline the fact that I was the one who cared about that ring, and that 
I tried to control how I was perceived by others. This attempt to control was linked 
to my preconceptions regarding how others might think about me in the city and 
based on my knowledge of the generally accepted standard of couples who live 
together before marriage. One side of this picture was to visibly wear a symbol of 
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marriage that felt important for me to signal when moving around on my own in 
taxis. And the other was that I envisioned being perceived as a proper adult, a body 
that could be read as a professional university employee doing ‘serious research’. I 
had previous experiences in general of being perceived as a young student rather 
than a researcher, based on my gender and age, since I did not embody the classic 
image of research authority. Trying to pass as a ‘proper researcher’ stands in contra-
diction to the idea of studying sideways and trying to match with students, which 
shows my shifting positions as a researcher. In the whole process of gaining access 
to the university campuses through formal meetings with university staff, I wanted 
to be taken seriously and signal ‘proper research’. When thinking about it now, it 
might just as easily have been my young student look that gave me official access to 
carry out research at both campuses. I met a fellow graduate student in Sulaimani 
who was also interested in gaining access to AUIS but had not succeeded. To me, 
he better fitted the image of a real grown-up adult, and like the ‘proper’ figure of a 
European male researcher. I wonder if my performance of respectable young female 
researcher in gender studies positioned me as a somewhat innocent researcher to 
have running around on campus and whether that helped me gain access. I can only 
guess. So much for the pictures that we try to paint of ourselves that end up being 
outside our control.
Priyadharshini writes about studying within academia and stresses how the terms 
of which kinds of access are granted to fields also shape the research (Priyadharshini 
2003, p. 421). This is important in terms of understanding the power structures that 
we are operating in as researchers and researched. My access to the university insti-
tutions played a role in defining the ‘field’ I was studying. I did not just meet young 
people in town or in their homes; I met them as students in an institution that had 
granted me permission to be there. I was very cautious not to hang out with lectur-
ers and staff, in order to stay as much as possible on the same level as students and 
clearly signal that I was interested in talking with them and keeping what we talked 
about to just amongst ourselves.
Using or telling the self
Moving from fieldwork to analysis, a way for me to try to nuance how ideas of 
respectability played out in the social arena was to clearly situate myself in the 
context and show in the analysis how I too performed respectability, so that I did 
not write a text about everybody else’s concern about this respectability that I 
clearly also cared about myself. In my thesis, I was in some sections inspired by 
autoethnographic writing to make myself visible as the researcher where I found 
my situatedness to be relevant for the analysis. The autoethnographic writing of 
the researcher into the text both shows how knowledge is produced by a certain 
embodied researcher, but it is at the same time also a specific representation of 
the researcher in the text. One example of this is the elevator scene that I also 
included in my thesis, but I did not dig deeper into it – in a way, I closed off in 
order to present myself as a proper scholar in the text. This shows that we do not 
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only perform as researchers in the field, but also in the representations of our-
selves that we create in the text more or less explicitly. Another example of how 
I wrote myself into the text was related to trying to understand how having a car 
of one’s own was connected to the performance of middle-classness. I did not 
hold a driver’s licence, so I got into the routine of taking a taxi to the university 
campus in the morning. But a worry from family members about my moving 
around on my own led to a decision by my partner and myself to rent  a  car. 
Some days, my partner would drive me to campus, and on other days, I still took 
a taxi. I wrote about this in my thesis:
[W]ith the rent of a car we became credible as a respectable middle-class 
couple moving around within the boundaries of ‘safe spaces’. I just did not 
tell anybody when I behaved otherwise. Maybe people knew anyway, but 
this was an agreeable compromise settling the issue, keeping on the track of 
respectability.
(Scott 2018, p. 184)
This embodied experience made me aware of the way cars are a class marker and 
a respectable and ‘safe’ way of moving around in the city. In the text, I did not just 
stay with my own experience as described above, but dug deeper into experiences 
of gendered and classed mobility among students.
Whitson, with experience from the field of human geography, points out the 
tension between reflexivity around researcher subjectivity as part of the research 
and as self-indulgence (Whitson 2017, p. 301). The risk of writing about oneself 
in the text is to end up spending too much time on the researcher and less on 
the researched. Skeggs, from a sociological perspective, is critical towards an over-
emphasis on the researcher writing about herself, and she argues that reflexivity 
should focus on research practice and research participants (Skeggs 2002, p. 303). 
Skeggs states that ‘[t]he telling of the self becomes a manifestation and mainte-
nance of difference and distinction’ (Skeggs 2002, pp. 303–304). Anthropologist 
Anna Lærke, on the other hand, points out how she has written her own experience 
into the writing up of research in classrooms in the UK on the regulation of chil-
dren’s bodies (Lærke 2008). In an attempt to ‘relinquish the power of ethnographic 
authority’ (Lærke 2008, p. 145) she provides information to the reader about the 
specific person writing the text:
Explicitly and deliberately using my self as a methodological tool became my 
way of making sense of emotional entanglement. Finding a respectable bal-
ance between navel-gazing and personally grounded intellectual curiosity is 
not easy – but neither is it impossible.
(Lærke 2008, pp. 144–145)
Making visible the situatedness of knowledge production (Haraway 1988), where 
the researcher’s embodied and always partial view is made visible, treads a fine line 
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between Lærke’s ‘personally grounded intellectual curiosity’ and Skeggs’ critique of 
‘telling the self ’ as a manifestation of difference. My practical everyday and analyti-
cal engagement with middle-classness as the point from where I have been writ-
ing, that I have tried to make visible, carries a tension with a tradition of colonial 
anthropology where the European researcher is centred as the only knowing sub-
ject. While the methodological attempt to study sideways values students’ experi-
ences and narratives, I am in the end responsible as the author and storyteller of the 
specific piece of text that was examined as my thesis. As researchers, we are always 
framing and co-constructing narratives and experiences in the field. I believe it is 
honest and transparent to show how we are embedded in the fields we research 
to make it visible how we, both as researchers and researched, are positioned in 
various ways. My own partial view from a middle-class position was shaping how 
I understood and listened to students’ experiences. What I herein describe as an 
attempted manoeuvre and wish to ‘study sideways’ was also connected to meet-
ing students as individuals with agency, and not as a predefined vulnerable group. 
My focus was to meet students at eye level in the same way as if I had engaged 
in research with students in Copenhagen (Denmark) or Lund (Sweden), whom I 
would not have predetermined as a specifically vulnerable group and hence with 
a direction of ‘studying down’. What I am reflecting on here is that this attempt 
to meet sideways in the category of studentness – inspired by Jette Kofoed’s con-
cept of pupilness (2008) with a focus on the doings of the category of pupil – and 
middle-classness risks overlooking all the contextual differences outside of these 
categories.
Reflecting on my research process and writing, in retrospect I see how I have at 
moments practised what I could name as a mirroring of sameness through inserting 
my own embodied research persona into the performances of middle-classness that 
I was analyzing, with the risk of overstressing sameness, such as universalizing what 
it means to be a university student, and what it entails to have middle-class aspira-
tions. Heidi J. Nast uses the mirror metaphor to critique the ugly process of how 
difference is produced when defining oneself as different from the ‘other’ through a 
reflection in the ‘other’ as a passive surface (cited in Skeggs 2002, p. 6). Turning that 
imagery around, the idea of mirroring sameness might in other ways leak difference 
through moments of mismatching. When I avoided meeting Tara’s question frankly, 
I upheld an assumed common respectability but without the possibility to get it 
confirmed and nuanced. At the same time, I upheld a specific presumed difference 
between life in Copenhagen and Sulaimani that was not tested or verified. My 
attempt to fit in to what I perceived as correct behaviour left certain conversations 
(in this case regarding romantic relationships and sexuality) unable to be explored 
in all their complexities – the non-existent conversations reifying presumed unspo-
ken differences. In the analysis, even when the telling of my own embodied per-
formances of female respectability was a way to analytically grasp what was going 
on from a wider perspective, it still produced difference and distinction despite the 
belief of a mirroring of sameness and a determinedness to study sideways.
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Conclusion: Unravelling the stitches
I argue that the concepts of studying up, down and sideways are not fixed categories, 
but complex and shifting and show the limits and possibilities in ethnographic 
fieldwork. Participating in transnational research questions simple and fixed ideas 
of being able to clearly define what is up, down and sideways in terms of power 
relations between researcher and researched. The directions of up, down and 
sideways pertain not only to power relations but also to questions of difference 
and sameness. Studying sideways presumes a certain amount of recognizability and 
sameness between researcher and researched. Looking back, I describe the study that 
I have been engaged in as a complex, unstable and often failing kind of sideways 
across geographical and political contexts. This methodological approach opens up 
possibilities of capturing/seeing/analyzing global patterns of middle-classness, but 
at the same time risks creating unobserved areas in terms of unequal Global South–
North relations. On the one hand, I argue for a critical reflection on how research 
can become stuck in narrow ideas of sameness, but I also want to expand on the 
concept of sideways and of whether something is the same or similar.
When I was asked the question ‘If they are just like us, why should we read about 
them?’ at the seminar, it touched on an important discussion of how to perceive, 
represent and analyze commonalities and differences, and how to develop critical 
and complex academic thought collectively that questions colonial structures in 
knowledge production. Revisiting my irritation at this type of question has made 
me better understand my own methodological approach.
Inspired by an image of a patchwork, I have been examining the methodological 
stitches that my research project was made of both in terms of fieldwork perfor-
mances and reflexivity around my own position in the analysis. Several years later, it 
is much easier for me to look at that specific version of myself in time and place and 
see what was going on, and reflect further on the methodology used in my thesis. 
In this chapter, I have reflected on middle-classness, and especially respectability, as a 
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research object in between the movement of holding together and coming undone. 
I have tried to show points of holding together in order to enable them to come 
undone. It takes time to release the tight grip of holding researcher and researched 
subjectivities together. Inspired by Priyadharshini’s picture of ‘coming unstuck’, 
I imagine loosening the fabric that is sewn together in the patchwork so that there 
is space to breathe. The process of writing reflexively and allowing the tight grip to 
loosen, and putting on display the undone, is a productive research vulnerability that 
can make us think deeper and do better. By engaging with vulnerable reflections 
on fieldwork and analysis, we can pinpoint the preconceptions, expectations, social 
structures and power relations that we face and must navigate as researchers and 
researched. I argue for vulnerability in writing as a force for analytically grasping our 
positions in unequal global power structures and letting research be less of a sealed 
ready-package where we cannot learn from mistakes, problematic experiences and 
the moments of discomfort that these cause. When the economy of universities is 
based on productivity, including the ability of PhD students to finish their research 
on time, seminars where drafts are discussed become by default more focused on 
how to ask questions that are possible to answer and how to answer them in ways 
that will not delay the research process. Explorations of moments of discomfort, 
which become sidelined (partly due to the fast pace of academia), open to a reflex-
ive self-investigation of how we as researchers are participating in fieldwork perfor-
mances embedded in power structures. To create space for the production of this 
kind of reflexive knowledge, and to engage in vulnerable conversations about how 
to learn from the failures experienced, has transformative potential to think and do 
research in new ways. Time and space to engage in this ongoing reflexive process is 
crucial as it is never a quick fix to dwell on and try to learn from our moments of 
discomfort and failures in order to continually do better.
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DILEMMAS OF REPRESENTATION IN A 
STUDY OF SOCIAL WORKERS
Analyzing non-evident forms of social 
transformation
Vanna Nordling
Prologue: The theme of my thesis
…it just has to be that one gets to know a youth, and then they become a 
Dublin case1 and they are to be deported… and who sends youth [back] to 
Malta or Italy? Who can sleep well after doing that? If you have heard these 
accounts, what they have gone through, there is not a chance. And you can’t 
just say, ‘Well, go somewhere else and hide’ either, so it becomes a responsibil-
ity: what the hell should I do?2
In the quote, a social worker describes her reaction when some of the young 
persons she is meeting through her work are to be deported. They tell her about 
experiences of violent border controls, as well as other traumatic experiences, 
and she argues that her awareness of these gives her a responsibility: she needs 
to act upon the situation. In this case, the social worker helps some of the young 
persons to avoid Swedish authorities, something that goes clearly beyond her job 
specification. In an interview study of social workers within the Swedish welfare 
state who actively had been giving support to young people risking deportation, 
I analyzed such experienced responsibility and the dilemmas that it brought up 
(Nordling 2017).3 Central to the analysis was a tension between actions reaffirm-
ing the status quo and acts calling for the recognition of rights claims based on 
ideas of justice (Isin 2008). I argued that the social workers’ support was maybe 
not changing the system, but that it could be understood as destabilizing ideas 
of responsibility and of who is included in a community. My analysis discussed 
how to understand forms of social transformation that are not straightforward; 
the social workers were both a part of oppressive structures and made efforts to 
challenge these same structures, and it was sometimes problematic to bring these 
nuances forward in the analysis.
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Introduction: Discomfort of representation
But why social workers? Aren’t they the ones taking the children from 
 immigrants?
The question above was asked at my dissertation. I perceived it as a friendly ques-
tion aiming at reflexive discussion, but it wasn’t the first time I’d received this kind 
of comment in an academic setting.4 This has made me reflect upon how my study 
was perceived and understood: is it possible to write about social workers giving 
support to persons risking deportation in a way that still takes the exclusionary 
tendencies of the welfare state into account? Presenting an analysis that fronted 
the accounts of social workers was a balancing act due to their power position in 
relation to the youth to whom they were giving support. They were employed 
within a welfare state organization that was experienced as exclusionary by many 
of its service users. Their support to the youth did not lead to social transfor-
mation, in the sense of making fundamental changes in society (Khondker and 
Schuerkens 2014), and often their support was arbitrary. When giving support there 
is, generally, a complex relation between ‘helper’ and ‘helped’, where the ‘helper’ 
has the power to decide who is ‘deserving’ of support (Panican and Ulmestig 2016). 
Therefore, social work practice, even if supportive at an individual level, often rein-
forces the present relations of power. At the same time, the social workers whom I 
interviewed went beyond what was formally expected of them, and their support 
could be understood as a form of resistance to exclusions; this created a tension 
that caught my interest.
Like many critical theorists, I saw, and still see, knowledge and action not as sepa-
rate but as linked together: with this perspective, the researcher must be concerned 
with the consequences of knowledge (Dant 2003; see also Introduction in this 
volume). As a participant in social movements, I was well aware of the ambivalence 
inherent in most efforts to create systemic transformation that at the same time use 
the (almost always) insufficient means at hand.5 I drew on my experiences from the 
Swedish No Border movement, where the tension between humanitarian aid meet-
ing urgent needs but not challenging the border regime, and more far-reaching cri-
tiques of the system through campaigns and other forms of activism, were discussed 
and problematized at the time of writing my thesis (Sager 2015). I recognized this 
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tension in the social workers’ accounts. My interest in the social workers’ practices 
was hence less about finding a case that would neatly illustrate a theoretical point 
than about searching for tools that could help me to explore complex and often 
contradictory ways of trying to transform society through everyday practice. I found 
that this kind of practice could sometimes be difficult to place into a theoretical 
framework: there was too much ambivalence and I couldn’t analyze the support as 
either resistance or oppression.
My selection criterion had been social workers crossing their professional 
boundaries in order to give support to persons risking deportation, and initially 
I didn’t focus on diversity in this group. However, the study’s participants were 
diverse, for example, as to age, gender and/or whether they were participating in 
social movements or not. Many of the social workers also had their own experience 
of migration, and they described how this affected their relationship to the youth. I 
have later realized that I didn’t always make such experiences and differences visible 
in the analysis, as my research interest made me focus on social transformation 
and on the social workers’ practices. Due to this focus as well as to concerns of 
anonymization, I presented the social workers by their professional titles. As I will 
discuss in more detail below, the professional title is often associated with ‘neutrality’ 
as well as whiteness, and this has made me wonder if my analysis would have been 
received differently if I had succeeded in providing a more nuanced representation. 
Would another way of representing the social workers, bringing their individual 
experiences to the fore, have made it easier to see their agency? Would I then 
have faced the same questions about social workers as potentially oppressive actors? 
What did my analysis bring forward and which starting points or assumptions made 
me perform it in the way I did? When making analytical choices, there might be 
unforeseen consequences, and this chapter is an attempt to reflect back upon, and 
learn from, this process.
The chapter focuses on ethics of representation and I discuss the balancing 
act between different views of social workers when ‘writing up’ the analysis. The 
representation of social workers as complex actors, neither ‘doing good’ nor only 
being repressive, on many occasions led to tensions and moments of discomfort 
when presenting my study. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to analyze obstacles 
when trying to represent the social workers as complex actors who sometimes 
practise resistance while still being a part of exclusionary structures. After a brief 
presentation of social work in a Swedish context, where I highlight that social 
workers are often associated with neutrality and a supposedly ‘good’ welfare state, I 
reflect upon my analytical choices. I discuss the choices I made when representing 
the individual social workers in the analysis, especially the decision to present the 
research participants using their professional titles. This might have added to the 
idea of the ‘neutral social worker’, but it also helped me to focus on institutional 
conditions and the limits set by ideas of ‘professionalism’. After that, I reflect upon 
what my theoretical lens allowed me to see, and what actually became a main 
focus in my analysis: the ambivalent relation between social work and activist ideals 
of social transformation. I identify a tension between social transformation and 
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everyday practice that often was difficult to communicate to different audiences, 
but that helped me to constantly go back and reflect upon my material. I argue that 
the methodological dilemmas I faced, and the tensions I struggled with in terms of 
representations and different expectations from different audiences, actually brought 
the analysis forward.
Background: Social work and borders in a Swedish context
Now, again we need to decide what Europe we want to be. My Europe wel-
comes people who flee from war, is solidary and united. My Europe doesn’t 
build walls; we help each other when the need is great.
And if we carry the mission together, we can make a difference for people. 
Sweden and Germany can’t do it by ourselves. All EU countries must help.
(Speech by Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfvén, 
Regeringskansliet 2015, my translation)
On 6 September 2015, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfvén gave a speech that is 
often shown as an example of the government’s first response to the increased num-
ber of people on the move who arrived in Sweden in 2015. In the speech, Löfvén 
expressed a view of Sweden as an open country, and as a country taking responsibil-
ity. During the following months, the official rhetoric rapidly changed into a story 
of ‘crisis’ and of a need for restrictive migration policies and closed borders. Only a 
year later Löfvén said in an interview that ‘the combats in Mosul indicate a need for 
continued border controls’ (Magnusson 2016, my translation), demonstrating a shift 
in priorities from the situation of people fleeing war zones to an idea of ‘protecting’ 
the Swedish borders.
The quote from September 2015 is in line with an image of Sweden as humani-
tarian and a conception of Sweden as an advanced welfare state (Martinsson et al. 
2016). This was an important context for my study: when studying representatives 
of the Swedish welfare state one must, in one way or another, relate to these, deeply 
rooted, images. My interviews were performed before 2015, and at that time the 
idea of Swedish exceptionalism was less questioned than it is today – even though 
there were critical analyses of the erosion of the welfare state (Schierup and Ålund 
2011), indicating that the changes in practice and rhetoric have been gradual. The 
strong connotations of the modern, ‘good’ and universal welfare state – an inter-
national reputation (Lister 2009) as well as a national self-image (Martinsson and 
Reimers 2020) – might lead the audience of my research to expect representations 
of welfare workers ‘doing good’. Furthermore, in a Swedish context, social work as 
a profession has been developed in close relation with the formation of the welfare 
state, and most of the professionalized social work is practised by social workers 
employed by the Swedish municipalities. Social workers may within this context 
uncritically be perceived as neutral bureaucrats. This image can also be connected 
to ideas of whiteness. For example, ethnographer Sabine Gruber (2016, p. 95) shows 
how ideas of professionalism, in the sense of being able to represent the values of the 
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Swedish welfare state (such as gender equality), are tied to ideas of having a ‘Swedish 
background’, and hence to racialized ideas of who can perform certain work tasks.
Perhaps it is needless to say that the view of Sweden as generous and open was 
criticized by the No Border movement long before 2015.6 There is also a long-
standing academic tradition of studying social welfare institutions as markers of bor-
ders and boundaries separating citizens from non-citizens and producing hierarchies 
of ‘deservingness’, linked to colonialism and racism (Balibar 2004, Nyers 2008). In 
this context, it is crucial to bear in mind that social workers are in a position where 
they sometimes have a far-reaching power over people’s lives. Social workers belong 
to one of the groups that are engaged in negotiations of the boundaries of citizen-
ship, in relation to migrants’ access to social services and benefits (Nordling 2017). 
A growing research literature, as well as accounts in news media and from activ-
ists, pinpoints the exclusionary aspects of the welfare state and the fear that certain 
(not least the racialized) populations experience in relation to the social services 
(Wikström 2013, Gruber 2016). As indicated in the initial quote in this text, fear 
of the social services in relation to child protection, and especially of losing one’s 
child, is well-documented (Nordling et al. 2020). Moreover, persons with an irregu-
larized status (residing as undocumented) often hesitate to contact social workers 
or other welfare state employees due to a fear of deportation (Hermansson et al. 
2020). When, as in my study, focusing on social workers who actually give support 
to youth risking deportation, there is a risk of losing sight of such exclusionary 
tendencies. Along the way, I learned especially to underline the fact that the border 
is materialized in the encounters between the social services and persons lacking 
Swedish residency: in the decisions as to who is ‘deserving’ of support and through 
an ever-present risk of deportation.
In a Swedish context, it has been argued that the relatively inclusive welfare state 
has led to a stronger focus on border enforcement (Hammar 1999). Irregularized 
migrants’ access to welfare services has been limited, but in 2013, new laws were 
introduced giving irregularized children access to schooling and healthcare, and 
irregularized adults access to healthcare that cannot be deferred (Nielsen 2016). This 
shows that irregularized migrants’ access to social rights was on the political agenda 
when my interviews took place. In the case of the social services, however, access 
to social rights such as food and housing has been more limited and disputed. The 
social workers in my study were expected to follow the decisions of the Swedish 
Migration Agency and to psychologically ‘let go’ of the young people they were 
working with in case they were denied asylum. At the same time, as I discussed in 
my study, there was sometimes also an access to rights – even if it was produced in 
contradictory and ambiguous ways, often marking new borders.
As argued by anthropologist Didier Fassin (2015), state institutions are not to be 
understood as neutral but as shaped through their agents, who make  assessments 
and have feelings. Fassin (2015, p. 256) argues that ‘the agents think and act 
 simultaneously with what is said and done in the public sphere and the political 
world’. This street–level view of bureaucrats, which opens up for seeing individual 
agency, has been important to my understanding of social workers. In a Swedish 
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context, social workers’ closeness to welfare state institutions seems to make it more 
difficult to openly challenge these same institutions. Studies have shown that social 
workers are afraid of voicing protest and that they express a fear of being seen as 
unprofessional by their colleagues and also of negative reactions or reprisals (Hedin 
et al. 2009, Lauri 2016). Instead, in many cases the protests are of a more silent 
 character, indicating that social workers’ protests need to be assessed in other ways 
than when studying public forms of protest. For instance, ways to express protest 
have been through anonymous blog posts (NBTV 2015) or through performing 
social work in the ‘borderlands’ between the welfare state organizations and civil 
society activism (Aracena 2015, p. 187).
Focusing on the complexity and ambiguity of street-level bureaucrats, I 
understand social workers as both affected by established power relations and 
racist discourses as well as by ideas of resistance. The social workers in my study 
were confronting borders in their everyday work, and this sometimes led to new 
understandings of what was a responsible way of acting. They acted upon these 
understandings in various ways, both reaffirming and challenging oppressive relations 
of power, something that I discuss in more detail in the sections below.
Dilemmas of disembodied representation
More often than not research findings are presented in the form of long block 
of quotations from research respondents. These excerpts are expected simply 
to speak for themselves. The portraits of research participants are sketched 
lightly if at all and the social location of the respondent lacks explication and 
contextual nuance. Sociological data is reduced to a series of disembodied 
quotations.
(Back 2007, p. 17)
In social science research, presenting research findings usually means representing 
research participants in certain ways (Pickering and Kara 2017). For instance, my 
interpretations need to be balanced with research participants’ concerns and ethics 
of anonymization. At the time of writing my analysis, the concern that I felt most 
acutely was what I could tell, due to research ethics. The social workers did things 
that were against their work instructions, such as giving support outside of work or 
bringing persons who risked deportation to their private homes. Many of the social 
workers feared that there would be reprisals (to themselves or general limitations to 
support practices) if their practices were known of, and I felt that the ways in which 
I could present the material such that they would be acceptable to the participants 
were limited. I have afterwards reflected on whether, and how, this might have led 
to my making ‘disembodied quotations’ (Back 2007, p. 17) strengthening the image 
of neutral and disembodied social workers – and hence possibly undermining my 
argument that social workers need to be understood in context. In this section, I 
therefore discuss a practical dilemma when writing up: how to picture the social 
workers as complex actors?
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A central focus in my analysis was the idea of the ‘neutral’ professional versus that 
of an arbitrary support outside of the professional role. The social workers in my 
study reported having little power over their work situations and that they instead 
often acted within a sphere that could be described as ‘private’ when they chose 
to give support to the minors. This meant that the analysis could not be entirely 
based on the social workers acting as welfare state representatives. At the same time, 
the professional role was central to my interviews, as the social workers came into 
contact with the youth through their work, and this fact set the limits for what was 
possible to do openly. In my thesis, I argued that the acts in support of the minors 
could in many cases be placed in a space ‘in between’ the professional role and a 
private sphere. The position of the social workers was not being either welfare state 
representatives or private persons, and their acts were affected by a power position 
within the welfare state as well as by resistance to this position. In order to detect 
the space ‘in between’, I found it important to bring the professional role and the 
expectations that this role implied to the fore.
The social workers in my study described an expectation from colleagues and 
managers to keep a psychological distance from the minors. This was often connected 
to an idea of the professional social worker as ‘neutral’ and, thereby, that the social 
worker should not get too personally involved with the client. For example, one of 
the study’s participants told me that her activism in the asylum rights movement was 
an issue that she did not wish to bring up with her managers or colleagues:
…the asylum rights movement was something that you almost should not 
talk about, I felt. And you could think that it should be a merit to be involved 
in the asylum rights movement, because you work with the children and 
then you get more insights in… you can help them in different ways. But I 
experienced that it was nothing positive, more the other way around. Then it 
[the asylum rights movement activism] was suddenly a commitment without 
boundaries and that it would maybe be easier to commit misconduct.
As the quote illustrates, the social worker was perceived as being ‘too committed’ by 
managers and/or colleagues. Listening to the social workers, I learned that many of 
them worried about how their accounts in the interviews would be received when 
my work was published. During the interviews we therefore discussed what matters 
could be seen as sensitive. In order to avoid disclosing such things, I chose not to 
focus on details in the social workers’ accounts. For example, I often avoided quotes 
where workplaces or work routines were described in particular depth. Even when 
I included general comments on the support being far-reaching and against the 
work instructions, I didn’t go into detail. Instead of focusing on exactly what they 
did, my main focus in the analysis was on how the practices could be understood. 
For example, when analyzing how a social worker invited a former ‘client’ to live 
with her as a way to avoid deportation, my focus was much less on her story than 
on how the act could be interpreted (i.e. if it was divergent or not). In this way, the 
tension between social transformation and reaffirming the status quo, the aspect 
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that interested me, became more visible, although at the cost of losing individual 
accounts.
Another, related, concern was anonymization. As the social workers feared 
reprisals, I found it to be of special importance to tell their stories in a way that 
would not be possible to trace to individual social workers. My solution at the 
time was to anonymize the social workers, calling them only by their work titles 
(social assistant, personnel at accommodation centre, guardian) and to present their 
accounts thematically. I let the participants speak to each other, instead of following 
one person at a time, and various voices were combined. I sometimes did discuss 
aspects of age, gender and of sharing language and/or migration background with 
the youth, but this was not a main focus in the analysis. This way of presenting the 
social workers, of course, had consequences for the analysis (compare Kolankiewicz’s 
chapter in this volume). Was it enough to state that some of the social workers had 
their own experiences of flight, and even of residing as undocumented, when it wasn’t 
focused on in the analysis? The anonymization to some extent obscured the fact that 
the social workers had diverse backgrounds and made the reader instead focus on 
their, seemingly ‘neutral’, work titles. This image could easily feed into the image 
of social workers as distant from the social worlds of their ‘clients’. A professional 
title following each quote risked reinforcing the expectations of neutrality. It may 
also have underlined the assumption of a distant and white social worker, as no clear 
counter-image was presented. And if some stories are reinforced, other stories risk 
being obscured. If ideas of ‘professionalism’, ‘neutrality’ and whiteness are already 
attached to the image of the social worker, then what room for manoeuvre is there 
to picture social workers who do not fit into this image? Because there were indeed 
other stories among the study’s participants. One example among many was a social 
worker at an accommodation centre who told me that her migrant background 
affected her relationship to the youth:
Of course you get closer. They call me ‘aunt’, for example; they don’t say that 
to the others – the others are personnel […], so of course it’s – I get warm 
inside, it’s really tender to say that, instead of saying ‘you’, or call my name…
Even if I did discuss this quote in my thesis, the general focus of the analysis 
risked rendering such accounts, and hence the plurality among the social workers, 
invisible. It also, maybe more importantly, risked missing how responsibility can be 
mobilized in different ways depending on where the social worker is situated in 
relation to hierarchies based on race and/or the construction of national boundaries. 
Anonymizing the social workers hence affected how I could make their acts 
understandable.
Taking the representations of participants seriously, and balancing the analysis with 
the participants’ concerns, has been described as a central challenge of representation – 
a challenge that underlines the need for reflexive research (Pickering and Kara 2017). 
After finishing my thesis, I have reflected upon what consequences my concern with 
anonymization had for the representation. If performed differently, my study could 
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have contributed to a more nuanced picturing of the research participants. I chose to 
centre their position within the welfare state, but a deeper understanding of the social 
workers’ backgrounds could have informed a more multidimensional analysis regard-
ing their position in relation to the nation state and ideas of ‘Swedishness’. To tell the 
social workers’ stories would have made it more difficult to anonymize, but it would 
indeed have brought other dimensions to the analysis and increased the understand-
ings as to why the social workers did what they did.7
When reflecting back on my analysis, I realize that there were perspectives that I 
didn’t see and questions that I neglected to ask. However, this text is not to be read 
as an effort to ‘make it right’; rather, it is an attempt to critically discuss my study 
in order to learn from it. The project of nuancing the image of social workers and 
understanding their acts in relation to their own positions and experiences would 
indeed have given my analysis a different focus, but it would also probably have 
taken the focus from the tension between actions reaffirming the status quo and acts 
challenging it that interested me in the first place. Instead of individual representa-
tions, my analysis focused on what the social workers had in common: the practices 
of support to the youth from a position within the welfare state. This had been my 
selection criterion and it was what mainly interested me: the ambivalence in their 
acts, the balancing between the welfare state and civil society activism, the possible 
renegotiations of the welfare state in spaces ‘in between’.
My analysis focused on the (generalized) practices of the social workers, rather 
than on their positionalities. It thereby, to some extent, separated act from actor in 
order to make another analytical point. This may have made it more difficult to see 
the social workers beyond images of ‘neutrality’ or ‘good welfare state employees’, 
but it also facilitated a certain form of analysis that focused on practice instead of 
person: in order to study certain things, others were left out. Therefore, at the time 
of doing my analysis, I found that it made sense to present the social workers’ pro-
fessional titles rather than giving more situated and personal accounts. The titles 
could give the reader a hint of what kind of organizational limitations the social 
workers were facing – for example, a social assistant, making decisions on housing 
and schooling from her office, had a formalized role that made it difficult to give 
far-reaching support within the limits of what was seen as ‘professional’. On the 
other hand, the social assistant had more space to act in support of the minor dur-
ing her time off – a time that was divided from work hours in a much clearer way 
than in the case of social workers at accommodation centres for unaccompanied 
minors, who worked close to the everyday life of the youth but who were often 
advised not to contact the youth during their time off. The decision to focus on 
professional titles hence helped me to include the institutional conditions in my 
analysis and to highlight what was formally at stake for the different categories of 
social workers: it permitted me to see something that might have been obscured 
by another analytical lens. Instead of picturing the social workers as potentially 
close to their ‘clients’, the analysis centred on their role as social workers. It follows 
that one answer to the question ‘why social workers?’ would be that ‘social work-
ers are interesting because of their ambivalent position of power at the boundaries 
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of the welfare state’, and not because social workers are ‘good’ or that they, as a 
profession, would oppose deportations.
In the next section, I reflect upon what my theoretical lens allowed me to see, 
and what actually became a main focus in my analysis: the ambivalent relation 
between social work and activist ideals of social transformation.
Representing social workers’ dual positions
The work we do is in solidarity with those crossing the border and living 
without papers in the United States, but our grief is not necessarily in solidar-
ity; our grief is our own. I grieve the loss I feel when I part ways with some-
one in the desert, and the pain I feel because murderous politics permit mass 
graves and deport people I know. I grieve when I come across bones in the 
desert that turn out to be human, although my sorrow is inherently different 
than that of the family of the person I’ve found.
(Sandusky 2017)
In this quote, Lee Sandusky from the organization No More Deaths • No Más 
Muertes describes her grief from the position of an activist – trying to do what 
she can to support people crossing the border between Mexico and the United 
States, but knowing that she can never do enough. This ambivalent position of 
grieving social suffering and at the same time facing the power position inherent 
in the act of, as a citizen, giving support to persons who become irregularized 
through harsh migration policies is at the heart of many forms of migrants’ rights 
activism (see Söderman’s chapter in this volume). As an activist in the Swedish No 
Border movement, with its inherent contradictions of, on the one hand, wanting 
to transform the system and, on the other hand, trying to make the present system 
accept individual asylum claims, I was interested in investigating the social workers’ 
dual positions of trying to act for social transformation while also being a part 
of a welfare state organization. My interest in the social workers’ support to the 
youth was hence related to my activism. Although this helped me to identify, and 
partly understand, the social workers’ ambivalence, it led to difficulties: as I was 
positioned close to the social workers I risked taking things for granted. I also 
felt uncomfortable when being identified with the social workers, as their support 
to the youth often simultaneously reinforced exclusions and categorizations that I 
found to be problematic. In this section, I will therefore reflect upon what became 
a central interest for me in the analysis and what I tended to centralize rather than 
a representation of the social workers’ positionalities: the tension between wishing 
for structural transformation while also being attentive to individual needs. I will 
discuss how this tension led to ambivalent forms of transformation that I struggled 
to make visible in the analysis.
An important dimension that brought tensions to the analysis was the rela-
tionship between ‘helper’ and ‘helped’. Much of the critique of helping practices 
takes a starting point in the critique of humanitarian aid. As a universalist ethic, 
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humanitarianism has the idea of a common humanity and has been implemented 
in international law. A growing body of literature, however, shows that humanitari-
anism serves as a depoliticizing factor (Fassin 2007, Ticktin 2011). Some authors 
describe how an image of migrants as victims is replacing the image of the rights-
bearing refugee (Ticktin 2011). In a much-quoted text, Didier Fassin (2007, p. 
500) describes humanitarian action as a ‘politics of life’: there is a radical inequality 
underlying humanitarian aid in that humanitarian organizations can decide which 
lives should be saved and which lives could be risked. Such critiques are valid also 
in the area of social work, with its inherent power relations between ‘helper’ and 
‘helped’. As most Swedish social workers are also welfare state representatives, this 
issue became even more complicated than if I had interviewed activists who were 
more openly opposing the exclusionary sides of the welfare state. Even though 
there are ideals of social transformation connected to social work as a profession 
(e.g., Ferguson 2007), it was difficult for the social workers in my study to openly 
follow other logics than the organizational – a logic that kept the status quo. This 
meant that the social workers whom I interviewed were facing a situation where 
they didn’t feel that they could do what was best for the youth and at the same time 
act in accordance with the organizational protocol. The tension between ‘managing 
law’ and being a ‘fellow human being’ has been described as inherent to Swedish 
social work (Kamali 2015), and it was salient in many of my interviews. Having to 
balance between the ‘neutral’ professional and the ‘compassionate’ fellow human 
being created a complexity and ambiguity among the social workers: a duality that 
was different from the position of an activist within a social movement.
When performing my analysis, I was interested in ambiguities in relation to 
social transformation, and I wanted to analyze transformation that was not straight-
forward. As described above, this interest was also rooted in my participation in 
social movements. I therefore turned to theorists exploring everyday resistance to 
present citizenship regimes (Isin 2008, 2012, McNevin 2012). These theories helped 
me to pinpoint that inclusion and exclusion are not fixed, but negotiated through 
practice. I understood the social workers’ support to young people risking deporta-
tion as destabilizing ideas of rights and responsibilities in relation to the welfare state: 
a main focus in my analysis was how different forms of acts could potentially, and 
often temporarily, destabilize the status quo. As exemplified by one of the social 
workers who worked at an accommodation centre for unaccompanied minors:
I haven’t been politically active, it hasn’t been… But everything becomes 
political in that I oppose how the system is run.
In the quote, the social worker reflected upon how she would understand her own 
acts. She had begun to see her acts as ‘political’ because she was doing things that 
were in opposition to what was expected of her at the workplace. In this case, 
the reflection concerned a situation where her colleagues expected neutrality and 
distance, but where she had instead chosen to invite a young person to live in her 
home in order to avoid a deportation. She acted upon another logic than was 
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expected of her and she understood her responsibility in new ways. This was one of 
the ways in which I understood ‘destabilizations’ in my analysis.
At the same time, the social workers’ support was often based on relationships 
to specific minors as well as on ideas of ‘compassion’. The support given was often 
ambivalent and not always directed towards social justice; it could therefore also be 
dismissed as a form of ‘humanitarian’ support without any transformative potential. 
In my analysis, however, I saw how ideas of social transformation could intersect 
with ideas of ‘compassion’ and how the encounters with youth risking deportation 
could make the social workers think in new ways. For instance, one of the social 
workers in my study told me:
You know, I want you to know this: my friends are Sweden Democrats.8 
It is totally crazy what you have – in this area live people who believe in 
this way, and I have also; there was a time when I thought the same, I can 
honestly say that I have. Eh, what made me change my mind? I think it was 
when I started to teach these three youngsters, that’s when I started to see 
it differently.
This quote illustrates a shift in understandings from a support of nationalist and far-
right ideas to engaging profoundly in the everyday lives of youth with experience 
of migration, a transformation that the social worker describes as dependent on her 
meeting the boys face-to-face. New and more radical approaches may sometimes 
emerge from encounters with social suffering (e.g., Maestri and Monforte 2020), 
and change may hence come gradually. Also, just as other authors have noted, move-
ments based on humanitarian ideals are often intersecting with more radical social 
movements (Sager 2015, Picozza 2017). This was something that I recognized in 
the accounts of the study’s participants. My study was inspired by activist campaigns 
based on the idea that everyone has a responsibility to make a change: for example, 
campaigns asking employees of airline companies to refuse to deport people, or 
headmasters of elementary schools to welcome irregularized students (before the 
law change as described above). As expressed by activist and researcher Maja Sager 
(2011, p. 194):
…the struggle to gain access on an individual level is often closely related 
to collective levels of struggle for access. For example, an indication of 
the way that engagement on the level of ‘individual needs’ tends to spill 
over into other forms of politics can be seen in the way representatives for 
the underground clinics have become important voices in asylum rights 
debate.
Thus seemingly individual acts could be understood as parts of a larger social move-
ment, something that also my analysis brought to the fore. In that sense, a focus on 
possible destabilizations regarding who is a responsibility of the welfare state was 
also connected to research ethics, in the sense of doing research contributing to a 
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politics of hope rather than dystopia (Martinsson and Mulinari 2018), yet without 
denying the new hierarchies and exclusions that may emerge when challenging 
present citizenship practices.
My analysis was triggered by the idea that social transformation may be con-
tradictory; however, it seems like the same tension that triggered my curiosity 
was also causing a feeling of discomfort: I felt that the questions I received, such 
as ‘why social workers?’, indicated that I didn’t make myself understandable as a 
critical researcher. As discussed above, to spotlight destabilizations and everyday 
acts of social transformation was in accord with views present in the social move-
ments where I was based, and where my ideas were rooted, at the time of the 
study. Through my activist standpoint, I understood myself as having a critical posi-
tion in relation to present border regimes – and this included an insight into the 
exclusionary sides of citizenship. Probably this was a point of departure that was so 
obvious to me that I didn’t always think about making it evident to others. To par-
ticipate in an activist movement could in this way have been a blind spot: I risked 
overlooking the need to contextualize and explain my standpoint as I was part of a 
context, both in academia and among my activist friends, where such critique was 
their own starting point. However, my position also allowed me to see the com-
plexities of a practice that was both striving for structural changes and being atten-
tive to social suffering. Taking part in a social movement, I was positioned close to 
some of the social workers in my study and I could recognize the duality in their 
practices. However, as I mention above, I did not always feel comfortable when I 
was identified with the social workers. Geographer Risa Whitson (2017) points to 
an important difference between describing one’s position and one’s  subjectivity – 
the latter regarding the researcher’s emotions and feelings of (dis)affiliation and/or 
(dis)comfort. According to Whitson, an investigation of researcher subjectivity 
means asking questions about who I want to be as a researcher and where I am at 
ease. For example, she suggests that research subjects living in the margins are more 
easily identified as ‘appropriate subject[s] of critical feminist research’ than other, 
more privileged, groups (ibid., p. 302). This, in turn, can be related to whom the 
researcher wishes to be. In my case, I realized that I found it important to iden-
tify with my study: it troubled me when I was seen as naïve or as someone who 
idealized the social workers – this was not whom I understood myself to be. My 
discomfort with the reactions to my study can be related to this identification: 
I wanted other critical researchers to understand me and see me as an ally. This was 
also a reason why I found it difficult to legitimize my study in relation to different 
academic audiences: the topic in itself gave rise to associations that I needed to 
address repeatedly. Still, the ambivalent position of the social workers was exactly 
what caught my interest in the first place. The feeling of being questioned also 
ultimately helped me forward, as I was forced to constantly go back and reflect 
upon my material. Paradoxically, the tension brought about by the position of the 
social workers, which I have discussed throughout this text, created fruitful fric-
tions between my interviews and theoretical discussions in the analysis, but it was 
also one of the reasons for my discomfort.
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Concluding remarks: Tensions that helped me forward
What slips out of my grasp, or is easily framed as someone else’s bad habit? 
And yet, what is it that I might want to push away, but which continues to 
insist, keeps interrupting the neat narratives of self, theory, and politics I have 
a vested interest in?
(Hemmings 2018, pp. 7–8)
In this quote, Clare Hemmings, a leading scholar in gender studies, points to the 
importance of, and difficulty for, a researcher keeping to the questions that trouble 
them. This text has been an effort to critically discuss, but also to better understand, 
my analytical choices. There are many things that I could have done differently 
when ‘writing up’, and at the time of my study some of them were less visible to me 
than they are today. Going back and reflecting upon my analysis, I have learnt that it 
is difficult to address all issues at once, and that one analytical perspective – no mat-
ter how interesting it might be – easily obscures other perspectives and insights. This 
isn’t necessarily a problem, but it might be a struggle to position oneself in relation 
to different academic fields and perspectives. I also have a responsibility towards the 
participants and the way in which the phenomenon that I study is contextualized. 
The representation takes place in a societal context that is changing and that may 
be difficult to grasp. What is easy to understand in one academic room might need 
more thorough explanation in another, and may be understood in yet another way 
in an activist context. Hence, despite being unable to avoid the question ‘why social 
workers?’, I can learn to better understand it, and thereby provide better answers.
My choice to represent the social workers in a way that could be described as 
‘disembodied’ did not bring individual experiences of oppression to the fore, but 
it opened up other analytical possibilities. A central part of my analysis focused 
on how practice brings friction to theory, as practice is often complex and full of 
ambivalence: the social workers in my study were both reaffirming and challenging 
oppressive relations of power. My study focused on ambiguities in relation to social 
transformation and I wanted to analyze transformation that was not straightforward. 
The interest in the social workers’ support was rooted in my activism, but it could 
still be difficult to discuss it in terms of social transformation. What we do – as social 
workers, as activists or as researchers – is not ‘pure’ and we cannot always foresee 
the consequences.
When writing this text and making an effort to learn from my methodological 
choices as well as from my choice of study subject, I have repeatedly come back to the 
fact that the tensions are what keep me going. The dilemmas of representation, both 
of individual social workers and of social work in a larger societal context, brought 
me forward in the analysis and helped me to analyze how everyday practices create 
friction in relation to theoretical, as well as political, ideals of social transformation. 
I believe that contradictions are almost necessarily created when trying to intervene 
in society, in contrast to more abstract forms of theorizing. To me, pointing to the 
tensions that arise, and making them visible, is a good starting point. This would 
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mean a foregrounding of tensions in the analysis instead of seeking to resolve them. 
But it would also entail reflecting upon my own choices and assumptions, asking: 
where could I have gone more deeply; what questions did I overlook?
Epilogue: Changing border regimes, changing representations
We are tired now. Many of us burned out. Many with disastrous private econ-
omies. We are the welfare workers, the silver threads that the society is built 
of. We are needed. When we lose hope, you lose us. And it is about the now. 
Now many of us, who have been loyal to the construction of this society, are 
so disillusioned that we are no longer interested in bringing the society and 
the welfare system forward. Our work ethic is hollowed. Now our faith is 
disappearing.
(# vistårinteut 2019, my translation)
In an open letter to the Swedish Social Democrats, a network of welfare state pro-
fessionals and volunteers, # vistårinteut [vi står inte ut: ‘we can’t stand it’], urges the 
politicians to listen to their demands for refugee amnesty and to their experiences 
of working with youth who are living in precarious circumstances due to Swedish 
migration policies. The letter was written in 2019, 5 years after I had finished doing 
my interviews. As the letter indicates, today social workers are organized together 
with other professionals and their (collective) opposition to Swedish migration poli-
cies is much more open than it was in 2014.
Over the passage of time, I have noticed that my project has received some-
what new, different responses following the present political development. In a con-
text of even harsher migration policies since 2015, a range of welfare professionals 
have begun to speak up and protest against the effects of present policies in more 
open and direct ways than they did in my study (Martinsson and Reimers 2020). 
Evidently, more people are reacting along similar lines to the social workers whom 
I interviewed. As the frames have changed, the study’s participants may, at least 
partially, be understood in the light of an emerging movement among professionals 
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instead of as individual actors trying to ‘do good’. According to geographer Engin 
Isin (2012), duration is not only the time it takes for an event to happen; events may 
be interpreted in new ways long after they have taken place. It is too early to tell 
where more outspoken conflicts concerning migration policies might lead. Maybe 
they won’t lead to larger transformations or ruptures – but they seem to underline 
the idea of destabilizations of rights and responsibilities in relation to the welfare 
state. The openness of today’s protests also makes it less risky to write about the dif-
ferent practices of the social workers in my study, as they are already outspoken and 
can be seen as one example among many others. But new contexts also bring new 
risks; the issue of social work in relation to persons who are denied asylum is today 
more politicized in a Swedish context (Persdotter and Nordling 2020 forthcoming), 
and therefore the topic might be more debated when made visible today. Social 
workers who engage in open protests might be perceived as having a more critical, 
and thereby potentially more threatening, position in relation to the welfare state 
than the ones performing silent acts, unnoticed by colleagues and managers.
Over the last 10 years, the Swedish No Border movement has also increas-
ingly begun to question categorizations such as (citizen) ‘activists’ and ‘migrants’ 
(Nordling et al. 2017), making way for possible new understandings of agency 
and giving support – and hence questioning the distinction between ‘helper’ and 
‘helped’. A context of a more outspoken critique of such categorizations might 
help me in the future to visualize differences among the social workers without 
losing track of other analytical discussions. Such a context could therefore give me 
a possibility to develop more profoundly on differences between the social work-
ers, and possible motivations to act based on, for example, their own experiences 
of migration.
Notes
 1 According to the Dublin II Regulation, every person seeking refuge should do so by 
filing an application in the first country of arrival. This means that Sweden at this time 
(in 2012) was deporting minors to other EU countries placed at the EU borders, such as 
Malta, Italy and Hungary.
 2 All quotes from social workers are also presented in my PhD thesis (Nordling 2017) and 
are translated from Swedish by me.
 3 The empirical material discussed in this chapter draws on 14 interviews performed 
between 2011 and 2014 with social assistants (working to provide housing and schooling 
etc. to unaccompanied minors), personnel at accommodation centres (working closely 
with the everyday life of the minors) and guardians (who should see to the minors’ inter-
ests and can make decisions concerning personal, legal and economic issues).
 4 During my time as a PhD student I was situated between the fields of social work and 
critical border and migration studies. Within the field of social work, where I was situated 
academically, there was on the one hand a critique of social work practice as disciplinary, 
and on the other hand there was a tradition of seeing social workers as agents who work 
in support of service users. Within the field of critical migration studies, where I felt at 
home as a researcher, I often encountered an image of social workers as being a part of 
the deportation machinery; agents who – although maybe with good intentions – were 
110 Vanna Nordling
upholding the exclusionary welfare state bureaucracy. I could see that all these views had 
relevancy, and this fact created dilemmas in my writing.
 5 For a discussion on ambivalence within Swedish No Border activism, see Söderman 
(2019).
 6 For an overview of such critiques, see Sager et al. (2016).
 7 For example, using fictive characters or vignettes could have been a way to contextualize 
the positions of the individual social workers, and make their acts more understandable.
 8 The Sweden Democrats are a nationalist, far-right party.
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THE ETHICS OF RENAMING
On challenges and dilemmas of anonymization 
in a study of anti-Muslim racism
Marta Kolankiewicz
Anonymization is a standard procedure in social scientific research today. However, 
while formal ethical codes, including the requirement to protect participants’ pri-
vacy, are more and more broadly applied, some doubts about the feasibility and 
implications of anonymization have been voiced. Ethnographers and other research-
ers using qualitative methods have questioned whether it is in general possible to 
render their research participants fully anonymous (see, e.g., Nespor 2000, van den 
Hoonaard 2003). It has also been questioned as to what extent anonymization is 
desirable, or even ethical, in the context of participatory research (e.g., Walford 2005, 
Berkhout 2013). Finally, the impact of anonymization on data and on the analysis 
itself has been discussed (Vainio 2012).
This chapter engages with the issue of anonymization1 by exploring different 
relations between anonymization, empirical material, analysis, theorization and 
ethics. It focuses on the ways in which anonymization procedures in research on 
the topic of racism are intrinsically intertwined with the analytical and theoreti-
cal work. In my discussion, I draw on the experience of anonymization in a study 
of Swedish court cases addressing anti-Muslim violence that bear the hallmarks 
of racism (Kolankiewicz 2015, 2019). In practice, anonymization most frequently 
comes down to erasing or changing the names of the researched persons and other 
details in the material that might lead to identifying those involved in the research. 
But what does it mean to remove a name or to rename a person in the context 
of research on racism? What sort of practical procedure does it require and what 
dilemmas does such a procedure open up for? How does this practice change the 
material? What influence does it have on the analysis? What kinds of ethical chal-
lenges can this practice involve? And when and why, although performed for the 
sake of ethics, can renaming the researched participants feel unethical?
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The study and situating the practice of anonymization in different 
disciplinary traditions
The idea of the study, first written as a PhD thesis, ‘Anti-Muslim Violence and 
the Possibility of Justice’, and then published as a book, Anti-Muslim Racism on 
Trial, was to explore what happens in Swedish courts with cases that might 
involve anti-Muslim racism. As in many other countries in Europe, the Swedish 
legal system is equipped with tools to fight different expressions of racism. These 
range from the prohibition of agitation against a national or ethnic group, through 
anti-discrimination legislation, to the penalty-enhancement provision for crimes 
motivated by racism. The aims of the study were to see how these legal tools work 
in practice and in particular with regard to anti-Muslim racism, to analyze their 
potential and their limitations, and thus, more generally, to explore the possibility 
of reaching justice in court in cases involving racism. I was interested in the ways 
in which the judiciary deals with such crimes, and also I wanted to see whether 
and how the possible racist hallmarks of the acts on trial are described, defined and 
taken into consideration in judgements. To achieve these aims, I looked at the ways 
in which courts adjudicate when handling concrete cases. My choice was to access 
such cases through Brå, the Swedish National Board for Crime Prevention, which 
is a national body responsible for collecting statistics on, among other things, hate 
crime in Sweden. Brå is independent of the judiciary and has developed quite a 
sophisticated system for identifying cases of hate crimes. From them, I received 
the material on Islamophobic hate crimes drawn from a period of four years: both 
statistical and textual data consisting of crime descriptions from police reports of 
around 1,000 cases. The second step for me was to follow about 50 cases that went 
to court and collect complete police and court documents concerning the selected 
cases. These became the material for my study.
I had started thinking about the anonymization when applying for approval of my 
project from the Board of Ethics. The Board is governed by different legal regulations 
and the requirements and definitions provided by the Swedish Research Council, 
where one of the main rules is of confidentiality. The procedures of protecting 
personal data might often seem mechanical, focusing on the practicalities of keeping 
the material safe and technicalities of detaching the data from the identities of 
particular individuals. The language of the ethical codes and regulations bears clear 
reference to the field of medicine, disclosing the genealogy of the official academic 
ethical codes. Still, the codes give the impression of universality and unanimity 
across different disciplines regarding anonymization procedures.
However, protecting identities of those involved in research is not a purely 
formal obligation. Anonymization is an established practice and a default position 
in sociology that stems from a preoccupation with the protection of the identity of 
those researched. It is grounded in a long tradition of a critique of science, including 
social sciences, as running the risk of treating those studied in an objectifying way 
and exposing them to harm. It is also an expression of the awareness of the power 
of knowledge produced at universities. The practice of anonymization has deeply 
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influenced the way in which material collected through qualitative interviews and 
ethnographic fieldwork has been conventionally presented in sociological writing. 
From the very beginning, therefore, my approach to anonymization was grounded 
in two fields: the legal regulations concerning the treatment of personal data, on the 
one hand, and the sociological tradition, on the other.
At the same time, by focusing on the judiciary and its interpretation of the law in 
my project, I was also entering the field of legal scholarly tradition. In this  context, 
it is important to mention that various documents produced by courts and police 
have different statuses in Sweden. Court decisions (dom) are public  documents, 
which means that they are accessible to everybody. The status of the preliminary 
enquiry reports (förundersökningsprotokoll) produced by the police depends on what 
happens with cases. These documents become public once the prosecutor has 
pressed charges, which applied to all the police documents I wanted to focus on in 
my study. However, even then, they often contain sensitive personal data that might 
be confidential, in which cases the authority in question considers whether or not 
to grant access to a document or part thereof. The principle of public access to 
official records (offentlighetsprincipen) is very strong in Sweden. Not only is case law 
from the Supreme Court published, but anybody can request any court decision 
unless it is confidential. Moreover, those requesting the documents do not need 
to provide any particular reason for doing so and can even remain anonymous 
themselves. This principle is one of the cornerstones of the Swedish legal system 
set up not only to encourage free exchange of opinions in the democratic society, 
but also to guarantee the rule of law and transparency through citizens’ insight into 
the working of the judiciary and trials (Bohlin 2015, pp. 19–20). It is partly due to 
this tradition that anonymization is not treated in absolute terms by legal scholars. 
The precedents from the Swedish Supreme Court and from the Courts of Appeal 
are published in the New Archive of Law (Nytt juridiskt arkiv). Conventionally, the 
names of the parties are replaced by their initials in these publications, but the 
case numbers are given, so that it is always possible to track the cases and identify 
those involved in them. In legal scholarship, it is not only a custom to provide case 
numbers of the analyzed cases, but it is understood as a good practice and way of 
enabling other scholars to verify the accuracy and validity of the analysis (for how 
this practice is changing in Sweden in light of new laws on personal data protection, 
see Persson 2019). It is thus a question of the transparency of research – itself a 
crucial ethical issue. While I was cognizant of this tradition, it was only at the end 
of my research – when a judge whom I asked to read and comment on my text 
showed surprise that I had not provided the case numbers – that I understood the 
centrality of the issue of transparency and the ethical implications that it had in the 
field of legal scholarship.
By working at the intersection of these disciplines, I became aware of differ-
ent readings and traditions of the ethical codes and of the diverse tensions in their 
application. The rigid rules of ethics formulated in an absolute and universal way 
in the codes turned out to be much more disputed and ambivalent when used in 
practice in different disciplines. However, it was only in the practical work with 
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anonymization that I fully grasped the complexity of the ethics of renaming the 
people involved in the research.
Erasing names
The first step in the anonymization procedure was to eliminate proper names from 
the documents. I removed not only the names of individuals, but also places, dates 
and other details, and for that, I used a system in which the erased words were 
substituted by ‘name’, ‘date’, ‘place’ and so on. At this point, the anonymization was 
done directly in the material; the procedure was aimed at making it safe to work 
on it. While this procedure helped me to work on a large amount of documents 
without their containing any personal data, it entailed some problems. I soon realized 
that some components of the material had become difficult to differentiate: many 
people who were in one way or another involved in the cases had blended together.
This realization occurred in parallel with a new phase in my work on the 
material. By now, I was occupied mostly by the cases that went to court and reading 
the judgements. At this stage, my analytical work involved ordering the material, by 
dividing it into different categories. I was interested in discovering patterns in the 
judiciary’s way of treating the acts on trial, which led to creating a database of all the 
cases that went to the court. I used the database as a way of performing a kind of 
descriptive statistics of the cases, which would show the diverse ways in which the 
court could approach the possible racist character of the acts on trial. These ranged 
from the application of the penalty enhancement because of racist motives and an 
explicit reference to the racist dimension of the crime in the judgement, through 
a lack of any reference to this dimension in the acts on trial, to the rejection of the 
possibility that the acts might involve racism. In addition to this more quantitative 
work, I wanted to extract and use the quotes from the court documents to illustrate 
these different ways of approaching the possibility of a racist character of the acts on 
trial. I realized that it was difficult to work on the textual data as anonymized in the 
way described above. What I needed was to be able to clearly and easily distinguish 
between the roles that different people had in a trial: those of the injured party, the 
defendant and witnesses.
In order to make the material more intelligible, I decided to introduce codes 
for these different roles. Thus, I coded the names of the defendants as XX, the 
injured parties as YY, witnesses as WW, names of locations as PP, case numbers as 
The ethics of renaming 117
NN, dates as DD, ethnicity of a person or a group as EE, etc. I will illustrate how 
this kind of anonymization could work with a quote from a paper that I presented 
to a conference at that time. The anonymized quotes from court documents are 
here integrated into the analysis, and I think it is interesting to see how analysis and 
anonymization work together to create a certain effect.
Struggling for a definition, pronouncing ambiguous sentences
Two cases may illustrate the struggle to define and interpret an act as racist 
or not which took place in court. Each case was considered by two courts: 
first by a District Court and then by a Court of Appeal, with opposite results.
In Case 25 a man was accused of unlawful threat, molestation and insult. 
He had been calling by phone his ex-wife both at home and at work. On 
one occasion, he insulted and threatened her colleague, using expressions like: 
‘fucking Arab’, ‘Muslim idiot’, ‘wife-beater’ and ‘you little Arab fag’. The Dis-
trict Court found him guilty of molestation and insult and argued:
‘Although there were accusations from both sides and although there was 
only brief mention of YY’s race and religion, the acts must be regarded as 
molestation and insult and the crimes shall have increased penal value.’ (Case 
25, District Court)
An appeal was lodged and the Court of Appeal overruled this decision. 
The Court of Appeal referred to the above-mentioned legislative history in 
the discussion about whether a ‘racist motive’ or ‘racist feature’ of a crime 
took place. The court noticed that on that occasion it was decided that the 
provision should apply only to crimes with a racist motive and concluded:
‘In the light of the foregoing and considering that nothing has shown that 
XX’s motive with the acts was to offend YY because of race or the like, there 
is no reason to apply the aforementioned penalty-enhancement provision.’
(Case 25, Court of Appeal)
Scholars have discussed the question of what ontological implications and analytical 
functions the procedure of anonymization may have. Vainio, for example, claims that 
anonymization entails converting text into data. In this sense, anonymization is not 
innocent in regard to the empirical material; it actually leads to an important change 
in it (Vainio 2012, pp. 4–5). Something happens in the process, in which parts of 
material that had to do with the singularity of the stories, realities and worlds that 
the data concerns get lost. This has significant implications for the analytical process. 
In a way, anonymization has become, particularly in the sociological tradition, one 
of the tools for theorization and generalization. In some styles of sociological eth-
nography and interview studies, research participants are turned into a collection 
of people to ‘represent presupposed theoretical categories’ (Nespor 2000, p. 550). 
One of the most famous representatives of such a genre would be Goffman, whose 
accounts on asylum or stigma, for instance, create examples of places and people 
that are located in a kind of abstract everywhere/nowhere space. In this tradition, 
particular stories become unanchored and sectioned off from the ongoing practices 
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to become ‘descriptive fragments illustrating constructs of sociological discourse’ or 
‘floating theoretical exemplars’ (Nespor 2000, pp. 552–553).
This is what I was actually doing with my analysis. While I believed that the 
new anonymization technique made it easier to comprehend the analyzed texts as 
accounts of an interaction between the parties in court, it also shaped my material in 
a significant way. After my initial reading of the material, my main finding was that 
anti-Muslim racism had in the vast majority of cases not been attended to in court. 
The acts on trial would often be named, classified and judged as different types of 
crime, but the racist dimension was rarely addressed in the judgement. It was often 
not even considered. In this way, racism was made invisible in the judicial process. 
My aim, at this stage, was to document and classify this process. The statistics of dif-
ferent ways in which racism could be approached in court which I compiled served 
as the main instrument to do this. The sections of my textual material – quotes from 
police files and court documents – were to illustrate these statistics. In this sense, 
particular individuals were reduced to their role in the trial and their stories were 
used by me to prove my point. The particularities were irrelevant to the major argu-
ment. My task became to present evidence that would support my argument. As I 
have analyzed elsewhere (Kolankiewicz 2015, 2019), my reliance on the quantitative 
method was connected to a particular force and persuasiveness of the tradition of 
knowledge production that relies on statistical thinking. It also ran parallel to the 
methods used by the courts themselves to establish truth and produce knowledge 
about the events they judge.
In reaction to a silence around the type of injury caused by anti-Muslim rac-
ism that I discovered in the documents I was studying, I found myself eager 
to prove the existence of this kind of injury and of its unrecognition by the 
courts. […] I started to use the epistemological approach and methodological 
tools of the judiciary in order to produce a reliable account. My early attempts 
to analyze and present the material in a quantitative way were shaped by the 
ideal endorsed by the judiciary of what incontrovertible evidence is and how 
truth can be established and fixed.
(Kolankiewicz 2019, p. 37)
My anonymization technique seemed to be in line with this analytical strategy. 
By fusing different people involved in the trials into their roles as the defendants, 
injured parties, and witnesses, the particular cases were remodelled as instances of the 
patterns of courts’ unrecognition. The specificities and context became irrelevant to 
my main findings and argument to be proved.
Renaming
After some time of analytical work, my strategies considerably shifted, and this shift 
also involved an important change in the anonymization technique. Principally, it 
entailed abandoning the quantitative frames. I concluded that there were limits to 
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the analytical strategy when accumulating and mixing quotes detached from their 
cases in order to instantiate a particular typology or classification. There were several 
reasons for this. As mentioned above, I was becoming aware of the ways in which 
I was imitating the judiciary and its methods of presenting reliable evidence. I was 
also trying to overcome a kind of anxiety that had to do with being able to attend 
to the particularities and singularities of the stories of violence that I was confronted 
with in my material. To treat the cases as statistics – numbers and dry illustrations 
detached from the real lives of people – felt somehow strange. And I slowly came 
to realize that one of the reasons for this was that the judicial language in which 
the courts describe the cases and express their judgements was dry and distanced 
in a somewhat similar way. Giving names to the people whose stories came to me 
through the court documents was a way of rehumanizing them. It was also a way 
for me to find a writing style and language in which I wanted to speak, and this was 
done in relation to the language of the court documents.
This new writing style consisted in focusing on a selected few cases that I nar-
rated in a more ethnographic style. The cases were to help me to understand the 
rationale behind the court judgements and in particular, the reasons for the peculiar 
silence around the possible racist character of the acts on trial. From the work of 
ethnographers, I learned how a thick description of singular instances of the studied 
forms of social life can open up for an interpretation that attends to the dynam-
ics of these forms in their particularity (Sheldon 2016). Thus, my ambition was to 
capture, or more exactly to reconstruct, from the court documents particularities 
of the stories of different trials and of the acts addressed in court. I was in a way 
experimenting in doing an ethnography through an archive, being inspired, on the 
one hand, by a thick description (Geertz 1973) of the ethnographic genre and, on 
the other, by a Foucauldian historical style of describing forms of life in the past (for 
instance, in Foucault 1995). I felt that this combination helped me to reinsert the 
cases into their context, to reattach those involved to their particular stories and to 
represent them more fully. The fragment below provides an example of what such a 
description looks like in the final version of the book.
On a June night, on his way to morning prayer, Mustafa Al-Basri discovered 
that the local mosque situated in a flat in a residential block in Manby – a 
small village in Sweden – was burning. He called the fire brigade. The fire-
fighters soon arrived and put out the fire. The room’s curtains were burnt, 
as well as the rugs that stretched across the floor. The walls were covered 
with soot and the flat was filled with smoke, which had started to spread 
into the communal stairwell. Mustafa Al-Basri also found a Koran thrown on 
the ground outside the mosque. Over the following days, the police would 
receive several religious books that belonged to the Muslim community and 
had been kept in the mosque, but were now found all around the village.
In the course of the investigation, it became clear that the fire had been 
started by somebody, and a local young man, Sven Persson, confessed that he 
had entered the mosque twice that night. On the first occasion, he took some 
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books from a bookshelf and afterwards threw them away in different places 
around the village while wandering the streets with a group of friends. On 
the second occasion, he dropped a match in the mosque. Persson was charged 
with theft and arson and, some months later, his trial took place.
(Kolankiewicz 2019, pp. 102–103)
Reworking the analysis and rewriting the text meant therefore using a different 
anonymization technique. Now I anonymized the cases according to the 
ethnographic convention, using pseudonyms. Turning the abstract XX and YY back 
into persons located in the particular histories of violence and then involved in trials 
was achieved partly by restoring names to them – not their own ones, though, but 
new, fictive ones that I found for them. This anonymization technique changed the 
material in a different way, and in many senses this change was even more profound. 
Since I was committed to protecting the identities of those involved, and since 
the cases were now depicted in more detail, anonymization required much more 
intervention: not only proper names but also certain details of the cases had to be 
changed in order to decrease the risk of identification.
Names and the anxiety of representation
The new anonymization procedure helped to some extent to relieve the sensation 
of discomfort related to the treatment of those involved in the cases I analyzed as 
specimens of categories used to illustrate my argument. But, while this procedure 
was also motivated by ethical considerations, it soon transpired to bring new 
problems and dilemmas.
One of the first consequences of the procedure of naming was the realization 
of the fact that names are not ‘meaningless markers’ that denote without connota-
tion as J.S. Mill claimed (Mill 1974[1843], cited Vom Bruck and Bodenhorn 2007, 
p. 5). The process of anonymization – consisting in the elimination or reduction of 
the denotative function of proper names – made their connotative function more 
visible. Suddenly the names of those involved in trials became all about the con-
notation. And this connotation seemed to play a crucial role in the understanding of 
the cases I was studying. The first and most critical one turned out to be the ways 
in which these names were connoted with particular groups. When choosing new 
names, it was of crucial importance to retain some of these connotations. Thus, that 
a name sounded ethnically Swedish or suggested a certain immigrant background 
seemed to be relevant and important.
Although this procedure was applied to all those involved in the trials, apart from 
the members of the judiciary and law enforcement system, who were referred to as 
the generic ‘judge’, ‘prosecutor’ or ‘police officer’,2 I will focus here on the anony-
mization of the injured parties – people who had been exposed to different types 
of acts of violence. These acts were interesting to me because they potentially had 
a particular character: they could be treated as acts of anti-Muslim racism. The fact 
that the injured parties were or could be perceived as Muslims was thus of central 
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importance to my study. Although in none of the cases that I analyzed did the name 
or surname of the injured party seem to have been a direct trigger for the acts of 
violence or to have played a role in identifying the injured party as a Muslim, I 
was aware that names are considered to be one of the most important signifiers of 
Muslim identity in Sweden and ‘a forceful device of stigmatization’ (Khosravi 2012, 
p. 69). In some contexts, names could thus serve to identify an individual as belong-
ing to a particular community. While I stripped the people in my study of their 
original names, it was still important to me to retain the possibility for a reader to 
identify them as potentially perceived as Muslims. This meant that I could not just 
pick random names; I did not even know what a random name would be. I could 
change individual names, but I had to keep the generic connotation that the names 
engendered and that indicated their belonging to a group against which the acts 
that my study was concerned with were directed, that is Muslims.
Even so, this practice of renaming gave me a sensation of discomfort. It was puz-
zling that a procedure aimed at protecting those who were involved in the cases 
could actually feel somehow wrong. Initially, I took this discomfort as related to a 
more general anxiety concerning representation that was here closely linked to the 
idea that naming represented a symbolic dimension of power. In a sense, to erase the 
original names and to substitute them with new ones, that I myself selected, meant 
that I was creating a new denotation for the names. The link between the names 
and the referents – the real people – was now broken, and the new names started 
now to refer to a representation of people involved in the cases that I was describing, 
a representation that I was creating – an image that resembled the original, but that 
was not the same as the original. And the anxiety was related to the violence that in 
turn is related to the ethnographic authority involved in this act of representing (cf. 
Hastrup 1992). Still, it dawned on me that there was something more specific to the 
context of my research, that is, to the study of racism.
Names and racism
Since I worked in the post-colonial tradition, I was well aware of the ways in 
which naming played a role in the colonial project. The history of European 
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conquest of the Americas has been marked by the widespread practice of nam-
ing that was deeply embedded in the project of dominating and taking into pos-
session the conquered lands. One of the most telling examples comes from the 
journals of Christopher Columbus that witness what Tzvetan Todorov described 
as Columbus’s ‘veritable naming frenzy’: Columbus would name islands, pieces of 
land, water and everywhere he reached – giving new names to these places was 
equivalent to taking into possession (Todorov 1999, p. 27). In one of the most 
extreme of colonial institutions, slavery, such naming as a means of taking into 
possession had to do with people. Susan Benson describes the pervasive practice 
of renaming slaves in the context of European, Caribbean and North American 
chattel slavery: ‘slavery embedded in a cultural and legal milieu where the signifi-
cance of the “proper name” – the name one “answers to,” the name that defines 
an individual’s legal and social identity, is inextricably linked to western ideas of 
autonomous selfhood and of social capacity’ (Benson 2007, pp. 181–182). She 
shows how the practice of renaming was related to a privilege of recognition 
that corresponded to holding power over those renamed. Moreover, she discusses 
how new names given to slaves – that would often become conventional slave 
names – were in themselves injurious, having a function of indicating an allegedly 
incomplete personhood of the slaves. Thus, the practice of renaming has a very 
gloomy history and entailed a form of symbolic violence. I was also cognizant of 
academia’s complicity in the colonial project through its representational practices, 
well-described by, among others, Edward Said (Said 2003). Aware of these violent 
histories, I sensed the burden of the practice of representation in general, and of 
renaming in particular. Still, my feeling of discomfort also seemed to be related to 
something more specific.
Gradually, I realized that this discomfort related to what the anonymization was 
doing with the identities of the people I wanted to protect. In anonymization, the 
original name is replaced by a research pseudonym. At the same time, what kind 
of replacement was possible here depended on the common belonging of these 
names to a particular category of ‘Muslim-sounding’ names. The relation between 
the name and the pseudonym could be described as a form of interchangeability. 
Kathleen Blee writes about the fungibility of victims as the criterion for defining 
the special character of racial violence. She argues that this type of violence, in 
contrast to other kinds of interpersonal violence, can be identified through victims’ 
fungibility: the possibility of a victim being classified in the group by the offender 
is the source of the harm (Blee 2005, p. 607). It is my recourse to this very same 
sort of fungibility, in which racist practices were grounded, that made the procedure 
of anonymization awkward and difficult. This was related to the workings of inter-
changeability of certain names and to the risk of reducing the identities of those 
carrying the names to certain group (religious or ethnic) identities.
More specifically, by looking for names that could be read as Muslim, I was also 
connecting to my readers in particular ways, mobilizing certain kinds of knowl-
edge and potentially opening up certain kinds of injuries. Somehow, my own prac-
tice was mimicking those that make ‘a Muhammad’ of every Muslim. I knew that 
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some names have become such a strong sign of being a Muslim that they have 
been described as stigmas. Khosravi, who has analyzed the reasons, expectations and 
effects of name-changing by Muslims in Sweden, writes about this kind of stigma 
as one of the main causes behind name-changing in this group of people. One of 
the names that is most frequently dropped is ‘Muhammad’, which in the context of 
various ‘Muhammad cartoon affairs’ ‘has become a name to designate a person who 
is not socially and culturally connected to Swedishness. […] Muslims are turned 
into a Muhammad. Like the Cohen regularly featured in anti-Semitic jokes and 
songs, the name Muhammad also often figures in jokes about Muslims’ (Khosravi 
2012, p. 70). Khosravi writes that this type of stigmatization of names implicates the 
invisibility as an individual as opposed to visibility as a type, that is, as a member of 
a particular minority (Khosravi 2012, p. 73). And this was what the procedure of 
anonymization was actually doing: its aim was to make individual people involved 
in trials unrecognizable as individuals; to make them invisible was the main strategy 
of providing them anonymity or protecting their identities. At the same time, in 
this process, the characteristics of the proper names that could make it possible to 
identify the individuals as part of a certain group were kept, making the persons 
visible as a type.
But there was yet another dimension to this. Since I chose to carry out an in-
depth analysis of a few case studies, the risk of disclosing the identities of those 
involved was greater than in previous analytical strategies. It became even more 
imperative to conceal or change details that could lead to identification in the cases. 
One of the ways to go in such situations is to make more invasive changes that 
would devoid the case of several particularities. What I decided for my study had 
to do with the ethnic connotation of the names. So, while keeping the Muslim-
sounding names, I would switch among ethnic groups; this was feasible consider-
ing the fact that Swedish Muslims are one of the most diverse and heterogeneous 
Muslim populations in Europe. This diversity stems partly from different migratory 
histories: from Turkish labour immigration in the 1970s, through Kurds, Iranians 
and Palestinians fleeing war and conflict, as well as refugees from Somalia and 
Ethiopia in the 1980s, to large groups of Muslims from the Balkan states in the 
1990s (Larsson 2009, Sander 2004), and to Iraqis, Syrians and Afghanis in the most 
recent years. I could thus change the ethnicity by choosing from among a large 
variety of Swedish Muslim communities, thereby diminishing the risk of the cases 
being linked to the original groups. By the same token, this procedure relied on a 
treatment of Muslims en bloc: as members of one large group, again risking repro-
ducing the very Islamophobia often characterized as grounded in a view of Islam as 
a homogeneous bloc (as defined in the now classic report, Islamophobia: A Challenge 
for Us All, 1997).
Moreover, in this procedure, some important aspects of these different instances 
of violence were being lost or erased. Particular histories of marginalization, dis-
crimination and oppression were being obliterated. This was in turn somehow 
impacting on the analysis and my understanding of anti-Muslim racism. These 
particularities could be equally important for understanding today’s anti-Muslim 
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racisms in Sweden as the common experience of being targeted as a Muslim. By 
making these differences of the experiences visible, I could have told the story of 
anti-Muslim racism as a multifaceted phenomenon deeply embedded in the distinct 
histories of diverse groups in which particular genealogies and histories played an 
important part in how racism would be articulated. Different groups had disparate 
relations to the history of colonialization and migratory paths; diverse ethnicities 
and skin colours occupied distinct places in the racist imaginary; and these differ-
ences could also be visible in ways of relating to the Islamic religion itself. Thus, 
understanding the particularities of distinct collective histories of oppression across 
Muslim communities in Sweden was significant for the understanding of specific 
articulations of anti-Muslim racism. And making the belonging to particular ethnic 
groups exchangeable resulted in concealing one scale of anti-Muslim racism and 
had an influence on my analysis of the phenomenon. Moreover, and maybe ethi-
cally more significant, this was also a question of the singularities of the stories that 
I was analyzing, since belonging to certain groups could also be formative in the 
subjectivities of the people whom I was naming and representing.
This type of problem was insightfully described by Shahram Khosravi, who, in 
his auto-ethnography, recalls and analyzes how his experience of being shot by the 
‘Laser Man’3 became a public issue and what it meant to be ‘renamed, re-shaped 
and re-defined’ (Khosravi 2010, p. 82). He describes how the representation of 
himself and his story felt violent and how it was often distorted in media and books. 
One of the instances of such a distortion had to do with the anonymization: ‘To 
make it even worse, I was renamed “Ali”. Under the photo it read: “Ali thanks 
God he survived.” I was called Ali (a name with more Islamic connotations than 
Shahram) and was presented as a religious person’ (Khosravi 2010, p. 83). It is 
difficult to tell whether in the case described by Khosravi the distortion had to 
do with deliberate manipulation or rather with ignorance. In any case, the result 
was a kind of misrepresentation. So, while the risk of mimicking racist practices 
when anonymizing had to do with shameful cultural literacy in names’ significance 
and connotations, the risk of distortion could stem, on the contrary, from a kind 
of cultural illiteracy. These seemed to be two sides of the same coin, showing a 
particular place in the connotative field of Muslim names in Sweden, and more 
generally in the West. A study of racism bore a danger of reducing the racialized 
individuals and their stories to their experience of racism, and this reduction had 
begun already with the naming.
But the discomfort that I was experiencing in the process of renaming those 
whose stories I was analyzing might have to do with yet another thing. Calling the 
participants by proper names forced me to engage with the singularity of their  stories, 
and these were filled with scenes of violence. In this way, the  process  represented also 
an ethical commitment to, and suggested boundaries of, the  possibility of  relating to 
the suffering of the other.4 The process of anonymization was thus also about how 
different analytical strategies, those focusing on the general and those keeping the 
focus on the singular, open up the questions: How can we relate to the violence that 
is done to the other? What are the ethics of such engagement?5
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Speaking in one’s own name
It has been questioned and criticized as to whether anonymization is indeed the 
best tool for an ethical representation of those involved in research. Feminist 
and other scholars practising participatory research concerned with the issues 
of empowerment of marginalized groups have been advocating the possibility 
of research participants to speak in their own name. Parallel to this, within the 
tradition of oral histories, researchers have criticized the practice of anonymiza-
tion for being in contradiction to the project of ‘giving voice’ that this type of 
research aimed at. In some projects, to make it possible to speak in one’s own 
name meant making visible those who in the social realities are pushed to the 
margins and are devoid of any power, including over one’s own representa-
tion (cf. e.g., Back 2007). In other contexts, anonymity has been questioned by 
research participants themselves speaking from the position of political subjects 
shaped ‘by ethical experiences of dispossession, interconnectedness and vulner-
ability’. In such contexts, speaking in one’s own name can be vital, because in 
order to be political ‘we must somehow commit to the particularity of our own 
experience as the ground for staking a more general claim’ (Sheldon 2016, pp. 
164–165).
While these more abstract political and ethical issues point to the crucial 
intersection between knowledge production and the issues of representation and 
recognition, they resonated in the material collected in my project in a very 
specific way. As mentioned, I accessed both the accounts of the trial and the 
accounts of the actual acts on trial exclusively through court and police docu-
ments. This meant that the testimonies of these experiences came to me narrated 
in the third person and mediated through the authoritative account of the judi-
ciary (Kolankiewicz 2015, p. 127). In a sense, the workings of the legal language 
are here at their most visible – framing the accounts of the experiences of those 
involved. By using the grammatical construction of indirect speech, the court is 
speaking in their name. My concern in regard to this was that my representation, 
although trying to reclaim the voices of those involved in the trials, was actually 
also a way of speaking in their name. This revealed the limits of the knowledge 
produced in academia and its similarities to the one produced in court: I was still 
speaking in their name.
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Notes
 1 I understand anonymization here as a procedure aimed at protecting the privacy of those 
researched by removing, covering or obscuring identifiers from the data. In parts of the 
literature a distinction is made between the terms ‘anonymization’ and ‘de-identification’: 
while the former means to irreversibly break all the links between the material and a 
concrete person, the latter means a process by which the links are broken but it could be 
possible to re-identify the research participants, e.g. through a confidential key produced 
in the process. In practice, most of the time, researchers de-identify the participants; nev-
ertheless, I use the concept of anonymization since it has become a more general term 
to designate the procedures aimed at guaranteeing the confidentiality of the research 
participants or protecting their privacy.
 2 The decision to keep these generic styles of referring to those representing the  judiciary 
was also related to a particular way of treating the judiciary as a system and not  approaching 
those who act as a part of the system as situated individuals with  belonging to a specific 
class or to an ethnic or religious group. In one sense, this decision was consistent with 
how the judiciary represents itself – as a neutral and independent system in which all the 
decisions are made in a way that respects an individual’s right to a fair trial and grounded 
only in the law independent of who is actually exercising judgement. Giving names 
to judges would have made them visible as situated subjects and not just cogs in the 
machine. It could also disclose particular structural problems that the Swedish  judiciary 
faces, in terms of power relations and lack of representation of large segments of society.
 3 A serial killer who shot several people with immigrant background in Stockholm and 
Uppsala in the 1990s.
 4 I am grateful to Ruth Sheldon for making me pay attention to the distinction between 
particularities and singularities in this context and for helping me to understand my own 
anxiety when engaging with the singularities of the stories I was analyzing.
 5 In asking these questions, I am inspired by the work of Ruth Sheldon (2016). I have also 
learned from Veena Das’s discussion on what it means for anthropological knowledge to 
be responsive to suffering (2007, pp. 205–221).
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CARING ENCOUNTERS IN 
ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
Unlearning distance and learning sharing
Eda Hatice Farsakoglu and Pouran Djampour
Emergence of this text
In this chapter, we as authors enter into a dialogue in an attempt to (re)visit 
caring encounters in ethnographic research.1 The dialogue is built on our PhD 
research projects which we conducted with different groups of people with 
experiences of migration and seeking asylum in two different migratory settings. 
Eda’s dissertation project seeks to explore the everyday and migratory experi-
ences of Iranian queer migrants who apply for refugee status and wait for resettle-
ment in Turkey.2 For this study, Eda conducted multisited ethnographic fieldwork 
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that spread between the period December 2011 and February 2014, followed by 
some informal/unstructured, sporadic, online research interactions. Djampour’s 
PhD research, Borders Crossing Bodies: The stories of eight youth with experience of 
migrating (2018), retells the stories of borders through time, hope, love, dreams 
and resistance in the lives of young people who have migrated to Sweden. The 
study was conducted through ethnographic fieldwork between 2013 and 2015 in 
three cities in Sweden together with young participants who were in their early 
adulthood.
Similar to the dialogic writing of Lundberg and Farahani (2017), our text ema-
nated from different forms and layers of co-working. Since 2015, we have been 
sharing moments of un/learning as a part of our engagement in the Collective (see 
the Preface and Introduction in this volume). We have also long been in dialogue, 
reading and reflecting on each other’s works in progress, ideas and academic anxiet-
ies. Those moments and exchanges necessarily shaped the background of this text. 
Our dialogue and, thus, the text have also navigated through our research experi-
ences, fieldwork notes and memories, as well as our personal experiences of care, 
caring, illness, borders and migration. Finding commonalities while acknowledging 
differences in our experiences and subjectivities has been crucial in doing justice to 
our collective work. We write from our own perspectives as well as from a position 
of ‘us’, alternating and mixing the two at times but with awareness of our multiple 
and shifting positionings. This kind of writing, as Lundberg and Farahani aptly put 
it, makes it easier to practise the basics of academic writing: ‘knowledge production 
in dialogue with other voices, expressions and previous research’ (2017, p. 80, our 
translation).
The work process for this chapter has also undergone varied forms of collaboration. 
We began by exchanging emails and engaging in unstructured conversations to 
set the boundaries of the text. At a later stage, we had two long semi-structured 
conversations to capture and clarify our analytical points and methodological 
arguments. The second conversation was recorded, parts of it then being transcribed 
and edited for clarity and flow. The dialogue between us that is included in this 
chapter comes from this material. The remaining quotes are not verbatim but based 
on fieldnotes and memory.
In what follows, we will present some parts of our conversation on care and 
caring practices in research. We have each chosen to focus on a specific moment 
we have experienced with our research participants. While we retell those specific 
moments, we alternate between segments from our fieldwork notes, memories and 
dialogue. We then consider those moments by addressing possible causes that might 
have influenced us and engendered the discomfort. In the remaining section of 
the chapter, we reflect on what we have learned from those moments and how 
caring encounters affected our research relations and outcomes. By doing so, we also 
address some of the challenges and contradictions that may emerge from the social 
and emotional closeness between researcher and research participants. We conclude 
by offering some ideas on how to practise care as a method between researcher, 
research participant and the reader.
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Caring dialogues
During one of our conversations, Eda recalled an illuminating moment in the field-
work she conducted with Iranian queer refugees in Turkey. It took place after sev-
eral fieldwork visits, which had begun around six months earlier. It also occurred 
at the very time Eda started to feel that some degree of rapport and trust between 
her and the (potential) research participants might have been built. She had some 
reasons to feel this way. For instance, more people had become willing to participate 
in the research. Also, the number of invitations that she received from the partici-
pants to join in their everyday activities had been increasing. As well as that, a few 
households, which had a guest room or a couch to offer, had kindly and generously 
suggested that it may be time for Eda to check out of the hostel she used to stay in 
during her previous fieldwork visits. Besides, Eda was now feeling more at ‘home’ – 
or less out of place – at community events such as birthday parties, picnics or casual 
house gatherings. It was at one of those events that Kaveh3, a cheerful, witty and 
straightforward research participant, criticized Eda for being distant and secretive, 
and invited her to be more sincere in the ongoing fieldwork relations. Eda reported 
Kaveh’s comment in her fieldwork notes:
Eda, it was always you who listened to our stories. You know our problems 
and griefs, but we don’t know your story. Don’t you have any trouble, pain or 
distress? Now it is your turn to tell.
In the earlier phases of the fieldwork, Eda had been asked about her educational 
background, her motivation for and relation to the research topic, her opinion on a 
particular matter, her migration to and life in Sweden and, to a lesser extent, about 
her political convictions, sexual orientation and her love life. Eda had believed that 
she had responded to those questions in a sincere way. Her answers, however, must 
have included only rarely – if they did at all – references to difficulties, weaknesses, 
confusions, problems, doubts, guilt, anxieties or vulnerabilities in her past and pres-
ent. Otherwise, why would Kaveh ask her about her troubles, pain and distress?
Indeed, at the time Kaveh asked her this question, Eda was going through a 
difficult phase of life because of her mother’s chronic illness. Eda’s mother had 
long been living with cardiac insufficiency, an irremediable harm which had been 
caused by the inaccessibility of medicine to (proletarized) peasants in Turkey in the 
1960s. Moreover, her medical condition had taken a turn for the worse soon after 
Eda began her doctoral studies in Sweden. Doctors started to say implicitly and 
explicitly that her mother’s illness had reached a terminal stage. There was not much 
left to do except try to increase her life quality for the remaining time, whether it 
be a few months or a few years.
This is also what Eda disclosed in response to Kaveh’s question, which was posed 
while they and some other research participants were having tea on a beautiful 
summer evening in one of the Anatolian cities where the Turkish state stipulates 
that international refugee applicants must reside throughout the time they wait 
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in Turkey. With some tears in her eyes, Eda also talked about how ghorbat/ gurbet4 – 
referring to times she needed to be in Sweden – was making things more dif-
ficult for both her and her mother, who was at the time living alone in Ankara. 
Meanwhile, talking about the difficulties of absence from ‘home’ while having the 
privilege of being able to return to a ‘home country’ made Eda feel discomfort. 
After all, for other people at their table, it would be impossible or would cost a lot 
(ranging from jeopardizing their safety to losing their international protection sta-
tus) to return to Iran or another country in case they wanted to spend some time 
with, take care of or say one last goodbye to someone they loved. Also, some of them 
had already told Eda that they had to leave their loved ones behind without know-
ing when they would see them again.
Eda therefore thought that she should recognize her privilege in terms of 
spatial mobility. Shading out her discomfort from her voice, Eda added in reply to 
Kaveh’s question: ‘But, of course, I can always come to Turkey to be with her during 
hospitalization periods or in case of emergency.’ It was Mehran who kindly reacted 
to Eda’s ‘but’ with something like this: ‘Everyone has a problem, Eda. We cannot 
compare our problems. It is better to share them with each other, like our happiness.’
This is how Eda’s fieldwork notes from that evening end. Although in those 
notes Eda did not mention how she and others in the group responded to Mehran’s 
reminder, the critical exchange that took place on that summer evening and its 
emotional content had a transformative effect on Eda’s emergent understanding of 
research relationships in connection with differences, commonalities, subjectivities, 
solidarity and caring.
EDA: I was like, ‘wow, actually, I know this from political labour, but when it comes 
to research’ – which is indeed political labour too, but… Anyway, I realized 
how, even though I was informed of critical methodologies that instruct us not 
to do so, I was marginalizing them, reproducing hegemonic images of [refu-
gees]… Like, as if ‘they are the most oppressed among oppressed, and I cannot 
compete with them when it comes to suffering’. The rest of the fieldwork, 
however, proved that it was me who needed help. I needed care, I needed 
support. I was supported. I am so thankful that they made this so clear at the 
very beginning. In the rest of the fieldwork, I was more careful, actually. More 
sharing as well.
POURAN: I think there are some valuable moments that are worth sharing here. 
Not just because we will write a text about it, but also for sharing with other 
people, because it’s a circle. Like the more we get this information about forms 
of caring, about sharing and your pain, how to grieve and how to come out 
of it, then it will become easier also – I mean, for ourselves but also for other 
people. Then it will also not be unspoken and as a private area which is con-
stantly there but is dealt with as something private we should not talk about.
EDA: Exactly.
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POURAN: But I think also there’s a value in sharing these moments of… I mean, 
when your research participant makes you [think about it], [it] gives you an 
‘aha’ moment, a revelation about like, ‘Oh wait, why am I not acknowledg-
ing my suffering? Why am I pushing it away?’ Because it’s also you’re pushing 
yourself away from them, right?
EDA: Yeah, right.
POURAN: By saying, ‘you’re suffering much more than me: I am more privileged; 
you are damaged’ I mean, ‘suffering’, we can never come close.
EDA: Yeah. And you reduce everything to just one thing like citizenship status, as if it is 
the only difference between us or… as if there are no commonalities between us.
POURAN: Your story reminds me…
A couple of years ago, Pouran was going through a depression due to a life crisis. 
At the time, she was a full-time PhD student and had just started doing fieldwork. 
Parallel to her work she was engaged in the migrant rights movement, mainly in 
Malmö, which involved giving support to unaccompanied persons for housing, 
applying for economic aid, writing, reading and translating various documents, etc. 
During a period of her fieldwork she shared a flat with a young person who was 
living undocumented and waiting to seek asylum anew, and who later also became 
one of the research participants of her study. They shared several other parts of 
their lives together too and, as they could communicate through the same mother 
tongue, a certain intimacy was established between them. Mostly, however, the rela-
tionship was formed by Pouran taking on a self-imposed supportive role.
POURAN: And then when I was in this depression, I don’t even remember how the 
conversation started because I was used to being the one supporting them, 
hugging them or patting their back when they were having anxiety attacks or 
whatever. So I wasn’t used to opening up.
But during that time, she did open up and started sharing how she was feeling 
unwell and did not feel motivated at all. She used to wake up and feel an intense 
burden of having to get through the day, wanting the day to end so that she could 
go back to sleep and be unbothered. As she was sharing these intimate and pain-
ful feelings, her flatmate affirmed her experience, saying that this was exactly how 
they felt every day. The anxiety of living undocumented had transformed them into 
this depressive person, which, according to them, had become their normal state of 
being. By Pouran opening up to her flatmate, something shifted in their relationship.
POURAN: And I would never have understood them if I had never opened up and 
told them about where I am. And, you know, that also changed something in 
our relationship. They were giving me support, they were also telling me, ‘I feel 
you, I understand you.’ My suffering wasn’t, of course, [to be] compared to 
theirs. But in the interaction we had, they said: ‘Yeah, I feel a very similar feeling.’
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This intimate moment of connection that took place was nothing that Pouran 
had anticipated. The difference in their citizenship status had permeated the very 
foundation of their relationship. They could talk and get close in the sense that they 
would speak in their mother tongue, but this closeness was never in depth and recip-
rocal. This was mainly the result of Pouran’s perception that the difference between 
them was greater than the commonalities they shared. After all, her flatmate was in 
such an existential crisis – the prevailing risk that the police could find them and 
deport them from Sweden, or that they would have to wait even longer with the 
risk of again being denied residency. This uncertainty pervaded their everyday life, 
along with having been separated from their home and family, and not knowing 
when or if they would ever be able to reunite. Pouran’s privileged position of having 
residency, and her family being quite close and financially comfortable, made her in 
a way situate herself ‘above’ her flatmate, which hindered her from seeing how they 
could communicate on an equal level.
POURAN: Yeah, when I realized that, I also felt embarrassed. I remember how that 
was a strong feeling I’d had until then, thinking that we couldn’t be close. 
And that I was surprised that we had a connection. It was really one of those 
moments – you know… lessons, life lessons I carry with me.
Reciprocities of care
What is common to our stories is that they illustrate the methodological, ethico-
political and personal value of ‘revelatory moments’ (Trigger, Forsey and Meurk 
2012) and caring encounters in research. To begin with, the moments and exchanges 
we describe above enabled us to practise reflexivity in the research process, instead of 
being reflexive only in the writing process (Skeggs 2002). A reflexive research process, 
as Sultana puts it, ‘can be a transformative process whereby the researcher is not only 
aware of but accounts for power relations, changing subjectivities, and overall effects 
over time and space’ (2017, p. 1).
The revelatory moments we experienced early in our doctoral research process 
revealed immediately the social and emotional distance we had imposed between 
us and our research participants. This was unexpected for both of us because, when 
these moments took place, we had perceived ourselves as caring, warm, understand-
ing and respectful researchers. While some other research participants may have 
perceived us in that way too, these moments confirmed the well-known method-
ological fact that the position of the ethnographer vis-à-vis the research participants 
is dependent not only on how they perceive themselves ‘but also how participants 
respond to and perceive them – which can include many different experiences even 
within a single community or field site’ (Davis and Craven 2016, p. 60). Facing the 
self-imposed distance between us and our participants was stunning also because we, 
novice ethnographers informed by critical methodologies, had been striving to dis-
sociate ourselves from positivist notions of detachment by ‘rejecting the separations 
between subject and object, thought and feeling, knower and known, and political 
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and personal’ (Stacey 1988, p. 21). Therefore, the tacit invitation we received to 
review how we relate to people with whom we work was timely and crucial.
Not to diminish the importance of the work of researchers who argue for close-
ness in social science research (Hill Collins 1986, Behar 1996, Anzaldúa 2012, Back 
2012), the legacy of maintaining a boundary-like separation between researcher 
and research field is, however, still intact in traditional academic disciplines. Our 
stories illustrate that it may take time to unlearn these powerful logics and to prac-
tise critical methodologies. ‘I remember […] thinking that we couldn’t be close,’ 
as Pouran puts it, is a striking example in this regard. Her starting point from the 
outset, with inspiration from her activism of helping and giving support to others, 
had been to enable closeness in her fieldwork towards the research participants. But 
allowing the research participants to come close to her had not occurred to her as 
equally relevant. Similarly, Eda, herself a young migrant woman and a minoritized 
doctoral researcher in a Western European context, felt discomfort while disclos-
ing her sorrow and suffering across borders because of her privilege of mobility 
between Sweden and Turkey. Her discomfort not only distanced her from people 
she worked with but also pushed her to de-emphasize her suffering and sorrow. As a 
result, she overlooked what they (she and her research participants) had in common: 
empathy, care and the precariousness of migranthood to which each of them was 
exposed differentially vis-à-vis the multiple and intersecting power relations within 
and across migrant groups.
Reflexivity requires us not only to account for our positionalities but also to 
recognize that ‘all knowledge is the product of specific relations in specific times and 
places, and that specificity is part of the essence of understanding and making sense 
of research’ (Jones et al. 2017, p. 117). The critical exchange in our stories directed 
us to the question: Would we act, think, feel in the same way if we had worked with 
a non-migrant social group or, more importantly, with another group of migrants, 
say so-called highly skilled migrant workers or lifestyle migrants? Might it be the 
case that we had internalized some of the main pillars of the migration and border 
regimes, such as: the radical dichotomy between ‘us and them’, and the internal 
hierarchies within those regimes as reflected in myriad distinctions ‘imposed by the 
state and general public on migrants’ (Luibhéid 2005, p. xi)?
Caring relationships pervade all kinds of research, although it is usually caring 
performances of researchers that are addressed, recognized, problematized or even 
celebrated in research accounts and narratives (Toombs et al. 2016). The unidi-
rectional perception of care contains a risk of othering and patronizing research 
participants, and this risk can be stronger in research settings that are hegemonically 
associated with service-oriented notions of care, such as research on homelessness, 
or humanitarian or disability studies (ibid.). We argue that the hegemonic images 
of refugees and asylum-seeking migrants as ‘powerless’, ‘vulnerable’, ‘desperate’, 
and ‘undifferentiated subjects of international humanitarian assistance’ (Said 2001, 
Bauman 2002), along with migration research which is still too often influenced 
by a psychological understanding (Andersson et al. 2010, Eide 2012, Ascher 2014), 
could have influenced our perspective and performances of care. Being used to 
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seeing the asylum-seeking migrant subject foremost as ‘in need of care’, it did not 
occur to us that we were transferring this stereotype during our encounters with 
our research participants. Pouran’s story exemplifies this by her being accustomed 
to ‘being the one supporting them, hugging them or patting their back’. It had not 
dawned on her that she could also be cared for by her flatmate and that her pain 
could be worth sharing. From this very important revelation, Pouran’s view towards 
and relationship with her research participants gradually shifted. Periods of feeling 
sad or unwell were met by text messages of encouragement and home-cooked 
meals being delivered to her home. Her parents, brother and friends started devel-
oping their own relationships with the research participants as a result of sharing 
intimate moments such as birthdays and holiday festivities. Pouran also started feel-
ing comfortable about sharing her (family’s) post-migratory life story of growing 
up in a suburban area in Stockholm, Sweden, during the 1980s and 1990s, with the 
hopes and sorrows of her parents’ and family’s struggles in the failed Iranian revolu-
tion that overshadowed her childhood, and the sense of betweenship5 (Jagne-Soreau 
2019) that had developed through complexities of intergenerational diasporic lived 
experiences along with her identity of Swedishness.
Eda’s research progressed in parallel with the deterioration of her mother’s 
health. This marked later stages of fieldwork with deep sorrow, anger at the struc-
tural factors that had worsened her mother’s illness, self-reproach for not manag-
ing to be a ‘good’ caregiver across borders while amidst the anxieties of being a 
doctoral student, and the accompanying ripple of guilt for not doing justice to 
her PhD studies at the times when she needed to give transnational care, as well as 
waiting for the devastating loss of her mother to happen. Yet, these were also times 
that were pleasantly marked by, among other things, small victories against ill-
ness, moments of wellness, the joy of becoming a teacher and researcher, and the 
caring relationships that emanated from the research. Caring relationships in her 
research not only enabled Eda to better reflect on differences and commonalities 
in terms of the multiple and shifting positionings and diasporic experiences in the 
field (see also Naldemirci 2013, pp. 53–56), but also eased her affective struggles 
embedded in (transnational) care work. A few examples of this occurred when 
she had to interrupt the fieldwork upon a telephone call letting her know that 
her mother had been hospitalized or that Eda needed to stay in Ankara longer 
than planned when she came to Turkey to conduct fieldwork. In such moments, 
research participants around her provided Eda with various acts of care such as 
checking in on her regularly, sending best wishes (or prayers if they were spiritu-
ally minded), and sharing their similar experiences of caring for a beloved one, 
illness or grief.
Caring relationships also enabled Eda to invite her research participants to her 
mother’s home at times when they were in Ankara to complete a bureaucratic 
procedure regarding their asylum applications. Not all of them could, or wanted, 
to come. Some preferred to meet outside. A few came for a short visit to have 
tea or lunch together, while a few others stayed for 1 or 2 days, either alone or 
with a partner, or with a family member visiting from Iran. Those visits generated 
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close (and sometimes complex) encounters across multiple subjectivities and axes 
of power such as generation, class, sexuality, gender, culture and citizenship. Before 
those encounters, class mobilities and temporary fluctuations in class positions of 
the research participants because of their queer displacement were visible to Eda, 
the researcher, but her own upward mobility through education became (more) 
visible to the research participants once they visited the house where Eda’s mother 
used to live – an old, semi-detached house in a working-/lower-middle-class suburb 
of Ankara – and met her mother, a divorced woman in her late 50s, a public worker 
with a high school degree who had retired early due to chronic illness, a mystic 
and practising Muslim who was just one generation away from her rural roots. This 
and similar encounters brought the researcher and research participants closer, and 
it also meant that they perceived the relation between them in a more egalitarian 
way. Analytically, it would require another text to do justice to those encounters. 
Meanwhile, Eda was not fully aware of their sociological importance and political 
value until her mother passed away. For instance, it was only after her mother died 
that Eda came to learn that her mother and one of the research participants, who 
had visited the home in Ankara, had been developing a caring relationship across 
borders (both literal and metaphorical) and beyond this research.
The moments shared above taught us to listen more closely (Back 2007), to 
engage with our research participants (Jones et al. 2017) and to see the significance 
in sharing care as a mutual practice (Harris and Fortney 2017). When research 
participants questioned why we stayed distant, they indicated that they felt close 
enough to us to care about our distance. When they invited us to ‘come closer’ 
in those specific moments, they also invited us to see and treat them ‘as active co-
producers of knowledge’ (Giametta 2018, p. 874). For this very reason, we find it 
important to recognize the methodological issues, challenges and contradictions 
that may arise from close engagement in research relationships.
Writing about caring encounters and relationships might carry the risk of roman-
ticizing and universalizing a common experience of care in the field (Naldemirci 
2013, pp. 53–56). However, the multiple, complex and shifting positionings of 
research subjects (researcher and research participants) make it impossible to stand 
at an equal distance (or closeness) to every person in the social and emotional field. 
Of course, not every research participant invited us to ‘come closer’. A few even 
made it clear, often indirectly, that they would like to limit their research participa-
tion to an interview or to the fieldwork process of research. What we have learned 
from such research interactions is that the researcher has the responsibility to care-
fully observe ‘the signals’ in the field. Furthermore, we are informed by our and 
other researchers’ post-fieldwork experiences that multiple precarities of life, the 
gendered, classed and ableist pressures of neoliberal academia, which ‘requires high 
productivity in compressed time frames’ (Mountz et al. 2015), and some other un/
predictable factors may prevent both the researcher and the research participants 
from nourishing or maintaining caring relationships that they formed during the 
research, and yield to feelings of disappointment, abandonment, discomfort and 
guilt (see Huisman 2008).
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In qualitative research, particularly in long-term ethnographies like ours, the 
employment of critical research principles such as rapport, empathy, political inti-
macy and reciprocity may blur the boundaries between ‘research relations’ and 
‘personal relations’ (see, among others, Stacey 1988, Acker et al. 1991, Patai 1991, 
Huisman 2008, Gajparia 2017). This may easily result in unintentional or unde-
sirable disclosures and revelations from both sides of the research relationship. 
Unlike the research participant, however, the researcher can perceive and record 
the entire experience as data (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, p.158). Therefore, 
there always exists the danger of manipulating closeness in the field for the aim of 
gathering data (Acker et al. 1991, p. 141). Furthermore, what still remains domi-
nant in research is ‘the power of researchers to interpret their selection of data 
through their own ideas and values, and in terms of their chosen epistemology’ 
(Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, p. 115). All research involves ethical challenges, 
problems and contradictions of various kinds, and our ethnographies are no excep-
tion. Yet we, informed by critical methodologies, believe that ‘there is value in 
working through the messiness, engaging in fieldwork in a careful manner, rather 
than writing it off as too fraught with difficulties and dangers’ (Hyndman 2001, 
p. 265, emphasis added). While it would require another chapter to properly discuss 
the ethical issues that emerged in our ethnographies, we would like to underline 
that ‘in an unethical world, we cannot do truly ethical research’ (Patai 1991, p. 150). 
What we can do is ‘to make up our minds whether our research is worth doing or 
not, and then’ proceed with critical research principles (ibid.). We can, for instance, 
begin by recognizing vulnerability embedded in ‘our interpersonal bonds to oth-
ers’, and remind ourselves to be attentive to ‘the reality and practice of changing 
relationships with our research participants over time’ (Ellis 2007, p. 4). Moreover, 
what is pivotal is to question and reflect on our ethical choices in each step of the 
research, not only before and during the fieldwork, but even after the research is 
done (Huisman 2008). This would mean that we, researchers and research com-
munities, should spend more time on pondering how to write ‘in a way that is 
intellectually honest and politically responsible’, and such as to ‘humanize but not 
to romanticize or idealize’ (Ghannam 2013, p. 26). Despite all these precautions, we 
may fail again. And to mitigate the risk of failing again or to ‘fail better’ we need 
to unlearn hiding our failures from each other, from ourselves (Clark and Sousa 
2020, p.2), and from our research participants. On the other hand, we, standing on 
the hierarchical ladders of the university, are aware that only a few ‘are in a posi-
tion to admit and explore failure as an academic project’ (Bliesemann de Guevara 
and Kurowska 2020, p. 170). What we have learned from the Collective and our 
dialogue is that our failures, when shared care-fully, have the potential to erode 
academic hierarchies and myths (see also Clark and Sousa 2020). Our stories have 
taught us not to be caught up in navel-gazing and that we can and need to be kind 
to ourselves and towards our research (Mountz et al. 2015). This is also what we 
were told by some of our research participants during and after fieldwork. Which 
brings us to the very heart of the analysis in this chapter – namely, the question of 
care and caring practices in research.
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Caring is sharing
We take inspiration from Tronto’s post-human definition of care as a ‘species activity 
that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ so that 
we can live in it as well as possible’ (1993, p. 103). This notion of care connects to 
an understanding that care is associated with the concept of burden. To care is to 
carry the burden for another human or species. It is essentially a matter of empathy 
(Collins 1989). And this is also where our understanding of caring is rooted: that 
there needs to be an underlying capacity to identify with someone or something 
else. To care, in this understanding, can never be a one-way practice, as Harris and 
Fortney (2017) so distinctly put it, as it involves reciprocal engagement and imagin-
ing from the other’s perspective.
The examples given above illustrate how our own caring practices leading up 
to the revelatory moments were broken, in the sense that we had not been able to 
imagine ourselves as being the subject of care (by the research participants). We had 
been mostly interested in how we could care for the participants, and we failed to do 
it in an egalitarian way. Our reflexive repetition had been centred on critical reading 
and thinking about our differences and the issue of representation, without giving any 
deep consideration to what it is that connects us as researcher and research participants. 
Such a reflexive starting point, where the researcher is focused mainly on a self-cen-
tred practice that essentially has little linking to others, produces a disconnection from 
‘mutual, willful vulnerability’ (Harris and Fortney 2017, p. 22). By overturning this 
order, the reflexive practice can instead be an interactive process and exchange, result-
ing in a ‘reflexive caring’ that has the capacity to fundamentally change relationships.
Reflexive caring connects to many aspects of performance: enacting mun-
dane interpersonal encounters, building relationships with research partici-
pants, mentoring students and junior colleagues, crafting personal narrative 
and performative writing, encouraging authors and conference goers to revise 
their thinking, inviting a relational and posthuman turn.
(2017, pp. 20 f.)
Harris and Fortney not only capture the need for reflexive caring between researcher, 
research participant, students and colleagues but also argue that their understanding 
of reflexive caring involves the relation between writer and reader too. Seeing that 
the reader at times agrees and many times disagrees, wants something different from 
a text, asks for clarity or requests fluidity, the process of reflexive practice that this 
calls forth requires that the practice of caring is under constant revision. Without 
neglecting the importance of how our different subject positions affect who can 
open up to whom, whose words are heard and whose ears are deemed important to 
speak to, we sympathize with this understanding of conceptualizing reflexive caring 
as it allows for our shifting positionalities to be acknowledged along with the need 
for a reciprocity of affectionate relations with ‘others’.
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A final point that we wish to stress here, inspired by Harris and Fortney (2017), 
is the consequence of sharing, vis-à-vis our emotions with our research participants 
and our insights presented to you, the reader. We see this as an interconnected prac-
tice of caring as it allows for closeness as well as a knowledge transfer. Sharing is caring, 
as the well-quoted phrase says. We found ourselves able to share our stories with our 
research participants because they cared for us and allowed for a supportive environ-
ment for us to feel safe, which was intertwined with our care and engagement in 
their stories and lives. Accordingly, we would like to turn around the expression to 
highlight the reciprocity in caring practices, namely that caring is sharing. To say that 
you care for someone involves the act of letting someone into your personal space. 
Along these lines, we see this chapter as an attempt to reveal ourselves to you, the 
reader, through this caring practice.
Notes
 1 Following the conceptualization by MacDonald, we use the term ‘encounter’ to refer to 
‘the multiple and fragmented ways’ in which ‘subjects are called not only into being in 
relationship with one another, but also in relationship to history, geography and a myriad 
of other constellations’ (2020, p. 252).
 2 The Turkish state still maintains the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. International refugee applicants coming from outside ‘Europe’ are 
permitted to stay in the country until their legal status is determined and the UN 
Refugee Agency finds a ‘durable’ solution, which usually means ‘resettlement to a 
third country’. At the time of Eda’s research, the third countries that accepted Iranian 
LGBT refugees who received their legal status in Turkey were Canada, the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, Australia, and the average waiting time was around two 
to three years.
 3 All identifying details have been anonymized.
 4 A common word in Persian and Turkish, originally from Arabic, that can roughly be 
translated as ‘[being in] a foreign land, or absence from home’.
 5 The term derives from the Swedish word and notion mellanförskap, which com-
prises the experience of mixed-race adoptees and children of immigrants who nei-
ther feel fully at home in an imagined ‘homeland’ nor in Swedish society. Thus a 
‘betweenship’ captures both the position of being neither–nor and at the same time a 
mixed/hybrid identity. Similarly, Homi Bhabha (1994) conceptualizes experiences of 
in-betweenness.
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How research is conducted, who is involved, on which terms and, most importantly, 
who benefits from research results have been at the core of feminist scholarship 
since its establishment as an academic discipline. Who can be a knower and what 
can be known frame issues of representation and intersubjectivity at centre stage in 
feminist epistemological and methodological debates, inspiring and shaping feminist 
developments in the field of qualitative methodologies.
The Politics and Ethics of Representation in Qualitative Research: Addressing Moments 
of Discomfort engages in these and similar questions, expanding the tradition through 
conceptualizing moments of discomfort as sites of knowledge production for 
reflecting on the politics and ethics of the qualitative research process. Contributors 
approach the subject from different perspectives, critically examining their quite 
diverse social identities in naming the joy and the pain in the everyday doing of 
qualitative methods and in exploring the tensions between academic knowledge 
production and practices of solidarity and care. The contributors enter into a dia-
logue with both their research subjects and the reader in a way that is courageous, 
passionate and analytically powerful. The texts written by The Critical Methodologies 
Collective are crafted through the efforts and the dilemmas of thinking together, chal-
lenging neoliberal agendas that encourage division and competition, and exploring 
practices and strategies of building nurturing academic communities committed to 
diverse forms of gender and sexual justice(s).
Needless to say, methodological and ethical dilemmas become acute in the con-
text of a number of societal transformations in Europe generally and in Sweden 
more specifically, where most contributors to the anthology are located. Sweden, 
for many decades a role model of societal inclusion, gender equality and human 
rights, is today located at the crossroads of, on the one hand, neoliberal discourses 
of austerity played out through soaring racialized and gendered inequalities and, on 
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the other, exclusionary racist discourses on the threat of migration (and migrants) to 
the welfare state, in a context of the success of ethnonationalist political parties and 
a growing visibility of anti-genderism in public debates.
These societal transformations (resisted and challenged by a variety of social 
movements and solidarity networks) create a number of radical demands on 
feminist methodologies, and generate sharp dilemmas, making critical reflec-
tions on methodological journeys extremely needed while also more challeng-
ing than ever.
The anthology is a powerful contribution to the scholarly work challenging 
epistemologies of ignorance and epistemic injustices. It takes as a point of departure 
the fundamental role of listening and learning with and through others, particularly 
from others whose experiences, and meanings (of heteronormativity, colonialism 
and diverse forms of racism), become invisible, unnoticed, concealed, or simply – 
and violently – excluded within mainstream academia.
Inventing, developing and exploring methodological strategies (and sometimes 
failing in doing so) is at the core of this scholarly work that provides cautious, careful 
and reflective explorations of the embodied experience, of the ‘doing qualitative 
methods’ in the everyday of both the researcher and the researched. Challenging the 
tendency within the qualitative tradition towards forms of authoritative arrogance 
shaped by the (racist) desire to know the other, the volume recuperates humanness 
and emphasizes the difficult labour of interconnection and intersubjectivity that is 
constitutive of feminist qualitative methods.
The labour of care is at its best when acknowledging the shortcomings of 
methodological frames and methods of ‘giving voice’ or mediating ‘the view from 
below’, asserting meanwhile that an exploration of the political economy of loca-
tion and representation, although essential to feminist qualitative methodologies, is 
not sufficient.
Scholars in the volume identify and explore a number of dilemmas in the 
ways through which boundaries are transgressed in their own research practices: 
between work and personal life, between academic work and political engagement, 
and between intimacy and des-identification with research subjects. The different 
chapters share the efforts, the failures, but also the productive strategies evolving 
from boundary-transgressing, with an emphasis on practices of accountability and 
responsibility towards research subjects and the research community.
Vulnerability is a relevant topic of the analysis through the anthology: the 
vulnerability of the researcher as well as of the researched, courageously exploring 
the nature of vulnerability (or, rather, the tensions between experienced vulnerability 
and the researchers’ diverse privileged locations and social identities); but also the 
responsibilities owed to vulnerable research subjects, with special focus on who 
bears these responsibilities.
This scholarly work holds immense promise for feminist and critical scholarship. 
It shares important methodological knowledge without providing a method 
handbook, holding onto hope regarding the relevance of feminist qualitative 
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traditions without falling into either pessimistic readings or romantic agendas, and 
shifting experiences of vulnerability and discomfort from auto-referential agendas 
towards the creation of epistemic feminist communities of struggle.
A beautifully written, sensible, investigative and wise book that will be an excel-
lent companion for times to come.
EPILOGUE
What the Collective has meant to us
The Critical Methodologies Collective
VANNA: This group has been a solidary space within academia, where we have been 
able to laugh, cry and develop our thoughts as well as reflect on our anxieties 
with support from others facing similar dilemmas and discomforts. Since my 
first year as a PhD student, this group has been very special to me. We have not 
only discussed our projects, but have shared ups and downs in writing and in 
life in general. Coming from different departments and research contexts, being 
unified by an interest in methodological dilemmas – and hence a feeling of 
discomfort when performing our studies – we have built a friendship that has 
made me feel more at home within academia.
PANKHURI: The Collective has been a space to move away from rigid notions of 
what constitutes academic engagement, to a freer space which allows for exper-
imenting with different structures, tools and ways of thinking and writing. In 
doing so, one cannot always find, locate or measure progress but only sit with 
the range of discomforts being discussed and reflected upon. The Collective in 
this way is a rapture for the ruptures of intellectual gaps and thinking in aca-
demia. It is also a source of expanding my feminist consciousness; to find my 
experience in others’ words in different intersectional, regional and cultural set-
tings. To be a part of the Collective has therefore been like an act of resistance – 
to explore the full range of intellectual engagement (the ugly, uncomfortable 
and embarrassing and not just the successes, solutions or advancements) in our 
respective academic lives. The fact that this book was completed within set 
timelines even amidst a world pandemic, with the added constraints of care 
work and illnesses, is testament to the collective care and feminist solidarity that 
members have embodied and practised together.
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MARTA: I remember when Vanna asked me, some ten years ago, if I would like to 
join the group. My first instinct was to reply, ‘I don’t think I will have time for 
this.’ One of the things that the Collective has meant for me was to unlearn 
and resist this kind of notion of time, a notion that is so hegemonic in academia 
today. This has been not so much about using time in other ways, but about 
attempting to transform the very terms that define the ways in which time can 
be experienced.
KATRINE: The Collective has for me been a space for academic reflection outside 
of institutional settings and restraints. We have arranged workshops together, 
cooked and eaten lunches together, read each other’s unfinished, vulnerable 
texts, and engaged in discussions again and again because we chose to. In the 
Collective, I have felt a belonging to an embodied version of academia where 
it has been possible to be whole people with both analytical and emotional 
responses to our work and the world in which this work takes place.
TOVE: When I think of the Collective, the word that comes to mind is ‘space’. 
Space to think, space to learn, space to be unknowing and stupid, space to stay 
in discomfort without a feeling of needing to fix things, as well as a feeling of 
‘holding space’. I have seldom been in an academic context where I have felt 
as much support as I have in the Collective. Meanwhile, there have been times 
when everything said at a seminar, meeting or workshop has been unintelli-
gible to me. I typically experience such situations as daunting. However, in the 
space provided in the Collective, such experiences of discomfort have helped 
me find new spaces in myself, in my thinking, in my learning, in theory as well 
as in academia.
EMMA: In an allowing setting, the Collective has provided a space for discussion, for 
learning from the ongoing work of others and for addressing difficult and pain-
ful aspects of my research. I must admit that our meetings sometimes caused 
anxiety, as the insights from the others triggered feelings of insufficiency in 
terms of my previous reading, knowledge, analytical skills, etc. Maybe the anxi-
ety can be a sign that working collectively on themes connected to the politics 
and ethics of research, in particular addressing discomforts, can itself at times 
be a dis/comforting experience. Many times I think these themes are hidden 
in the ‘final product’ (in the case of a PhD, the thesis) and therefore not visible 
and/or theorized or learnt from. The main experience, however, of working 
together and of forming a collective is connected to feelings of pride and 
gratitude: I am proud of our work and of our Collective, and grateful to be a 
part of it.
JOHANNA: The Collective, to me, means not being alone in the otherwise often 
lonesome academic environment. For instance, while working on this volume 
it has meant sharing thoughts, texts and anxieties without feeling uncomfort-
able. It has also meant shared responsibility, in that there is always someone 
to cover for you or help out if aspects of one’s personal life make work life 
difficult.
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POURAN: I was introduced to the Collective at a stage in my doctoral studies when 
I felt insecure about what it was I was doing in academia and how I would 
pursue my research. The timing couldn’t have been better, as this space of criti-
cal knowledge reciprocation and caring for each other would time and again 
remind me of why I wanted to finish my thesis and keep learning, keep sharing. 
To me, the Collective is still as important today as it was back then.
EDA HATICE: ‘What the Collective means to me’ is the title of the Word document 
I opened to add my response. The question reminds me of an inspiring quote 
from bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress. The quote concludes the book and reads 
as follows:
The academy is not paradise. But learning is a place where paradise can be 
created. The classroom, with all its limitations, remains a location of possibility. 
In that field of possibility we have the opportunity to labor for freedom, to 
demand of ourselves and our comrades, an openness of mind and heart that 
allows us to face reality even as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond 
boundaries, to transgress. This is education as the practice of freedom.
(hooks 1994, p. 207)
I love sharing this quote with the participants of classes and lectures I teach. 
Yet I had not read it in relation to our Collective before. Looking back on 
our almost-decade-long union to write this volume made me realize that I 
understand and experience the Collective as another ‘location of possibility’ in 
academia.
When I joined the Collective soon after I started my doctoral studies, it 
meant to me a supportive reading group where I read and thought about criti-
cal and emancipatory methodologies together with fellow graduate students. 
In time, however, both the Collective and my participation in the Collective 
took on a new meaning.
If you arrived in Western academia as a ‘non-European’ woman who is the 
first among her extended family ever to set foot in a ‘foreign’ land and to speak 
in a ‘foreign’ language, it is very likely that you would feel discomfort in class-
rooms, corridors, seminar rooms or conferences. The Collective has provided 
me with academic space in which I can talk about my discomfort in comfort.
I consider being a part of such a collective both a luxury and a necessity. 
Building and sustaining caring communities within academia is crucial, par-
ticularly for those academic workers and students whose thoughts, bodies, and 
lives do not conform to hegemonic norms and those who have caring needs 
and responsibilities beyond the normative/binary, ethnonationalist, neoliberal, 
and speciesist logics of welfare regimes.
The Collective has taken care of me. It has nurtured me, politically and 
intellectually. When I had to take a break from work, the Collective made sure 
that there would be someone at ‘home’ to open the door when I came back.
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